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Preface
When we founded New City Agenda in 2014 we did so with the ambition of helping Britain’s ﬁ nancial 
sector realise its enormous social and economic potential. 
Financial crises always lead to demands for greater regulation. The 2008 global ﬁ nancial crisis was 
no exception. Since the South Sea Bubble, politicians and regulators have been promising that next time 
it will be different. We are told the people at the top of the institutions responsible will be held accountable. 
This hasn’t happened. 
A deep seated culture of box-ticking had developed in the UK’s ﬁ nancial regulators. Instead of 
concentrating on the big issues, regulators spent valuable time adding ever more detailed rules and 
procedures and giving consumers ever more complicated information. This is likely to increase confusion 
and cost rather than establish clarity. 
The administrative cost of the regulators is now almost £1.2 billion a year – six times greater than 
in the year 2000. There are now over 13,000 pages of detailed rules and guidance from the PRA and the 
FCA. The FCA handbook costs £3,641, the same to buy as a second hand Mini Cooper. Complexity and 
box-ticking beneﬁ t lawyers and gives a veneer of reassurance, but it increases costs and makes regulations 
more difﬁ cult to understand and enforce and easier to manipulate or avoid. It also distorts competition. 
Big ﬁ rms have armies of ofﬁ cials and a close relationship with the regulators to help navigate this 
complexity. Smaller ﬁ rms and new entrants often ﬁ nd themselves reeling from the complexity, with only 
a call centre at the regulator to help them out. 
Our ﬁ ndings are clear:
Unless we change the culture of regulators we will be sleep walking into the next ﬁ nancial crisis: 
This will have a devastating effect on our economy and our political system. Memories of the 2008 crisis are 
rapidly fading and industry lobbying has become more intense. There is a clear and present danger that we 
will repeat the mistakes of history. Much needed change is already being watered down. The attention of 
politicians has moved on. The vote to leave the European Union will mean that the UK will be in full control 
of its regulation, but it will also have signiﬁ cant resource implications for regulators over the coming years. 
Regulators need to redouble their efforts to change their culture and move away from the bureaucratic and 
ineffective approaches of the past.
PRA and Bank of England have further to go to improve transparency and reduce group think: The 
Bank and the PRA have been trying to transform their culture with their ‘One Bank’ initiative. There have 
been improvements. But there is a risk the Bank and the PRA will slip back into being an opaque institution 
blighted by group think. It needs to engage with the public in a meaningful and sustained way. The odd 
talking shop is not enough. The Bank needs to actively engage with the public and consider the needs of 
society. More needs to be done to prevent group think. Bringing more external challenge into the Bank and 
the PRA would be a good start. The Bank and PRA are disagreeing with the views of Sir John Vickers that 
banks need to hold more capital because they have an unevidenced faith that their supervision can ensure 
that large complex banks do not ‘take excessive risks’. 
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Andrew Bailey must implement a comprehensive programme of cultural change in the FCA: Previous 
attempts to reform the FCA have been blown off course. Leadership changes and the perception of political 
interference were in danger of making the FCA into a timid and cowed regulator. Cultural change at the 
FCA should be the primary aim and responsibility of the new CEO. Andrew Bailey will need to demonstrate 
independence from politicians and the industry. This will require establishing the key purpose and values of 
the regulator and the metrics used to judge its performance. It should also make changing the culture in 
ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms its number one priority – it can’t franchise this job out to other bodies. The FCA should make 
greater use of its new powers to name and shame misleading adverts, obtain redress for consumers and take 
action against senior banking executives. It should take stronger action to promote competition rather than 
relying on re-writing the information given to consumers. Finally, it should set up an independent evaluation 
ofﬁ ce within the regulator, as has been done by the Bank of England, to ensure that it learns from the 
mistakes and successes of the past.
Politicians should support cultural change and tackle the culture of secrecy in UK regulators: 
Politicians inﬂ uence the culture of the regulators through the framework they set, the statements they 
make and the people they appoint. Politicians have implemented a legislative framework which supports a 
culture of secrecy within regulators and damages accountability. It means that the FCA can negotiate secret 
agreements with banks and then refuse to disclose them. By restricting access to information the culture of 
secrecy also damages the ability of the National Audit Ofﬁ ce and others to properly evaluate the regulators’ 
impact. Politicians must reform the legislation so regulators are transparent and can be held accountable. 
They must also appoint diverse leadership and board members.  
Finally, if there is one thing we have learnt from our work at New City Agenda, it is that if you want to 
assess the culture of an organisation you need to talk to frontline staff. We are grateful to the current and 
former staff at the regulators and other stakeholders who gave up their time to speak to us. Their willingness 
to discuss the issues meant that the lack of transparency shown by the refusal of the FCA and PRA to 
cooperate with our research didn’t impede the project.
To help restore trust in ﬁ nancial markets the Bank of England, PRA and FCA need to demonstrate that they 
are acting on behalf of the public. This will require a change of culture and for politicians and regulators to 
do more to understand and act on the concerns of consumers and small businesses. This report serves as 
a warning against the hubris, complacency and refuge in detail within regulators which contributed to the 
ﬁ nancial crisis.
The Rt Hon the Lord McFall of Alcluith
The Lord Sharkey
29th August, 2016
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Background and Purpose 
A failure of regulation. In the lead up to the ﬁ nancial crisis, UK ﬁ nancial regulators had adopted a ‘light 
touch’ approach. This was supported by the Boards of the regulators which were dominated by those with 
industry experience and encouraged by politicians who thought the ﬁ nancial services sector was the goose 
that laid the golden egg. They hoped that by avoiding too much intervention, they could help to create a 
thriving ﬁ nancial sector and drive ﬁ nancial innovation. This may have been true in the short term. But in the 
long term regulators did not identify or act on serious shortcomings in ﬁ nancial institutions until it was too 
late. The result was the failure or near failure of key ﬁ nancial institutions with profound consequences for 
the entire economy. Politicians and regulators also failed to hold senior banking executives to account for 
fraud and misconduct.
Reforming regulation. To address these regulatory failures, the UK Government sought to fundamentally 
transform the UK regulatory landscape. The Bank of England was given greater responsibility for ﬁ nancial 
stability. The Prudential Regulation Authority was created to take a more judgement-based approach. The 
Financial Services Authority became the Financial Conduct Authority with the aim of improving the conduct 
of ﬁ nancial institutions by taking a more consumer-focused and proactive approach.  
A change in culture? Simply changing rules and regulations was not enough. What was required was a 
change in the culture of the UK’s ﬁ nancial regulators. To achieve this, each regulator launched cultural 
change initiatives. In this report we looked at how regulators have responded to crises in the past, how the 
regulators have sought to change their culture since the 2008 crisis, what impact it has had on employees, 
and whether stakeholders think this has made regulators more effective. 
Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Methods
This report is based on the work of the New City Agenda over the past year: We have hosted a 
number of lectures over the past year on regulation from Professor Anat Admati, John Kay, Martin Wolf, 
Antony Jenkins, Andy Haldane, David Pitt-Watson and Sir John Vickers. We have also reviewed all major 
documents detailing cultural change in the UK’s regulators, including various reviews of regulation, speeches 
by politicians and senior regulators as well as third party reports. In addition, we interviewed current 
and former regulators at both senior and junior levels, people involved with the governance of ﬁ nancial 
regulators, and a number of others stakeholders including large and small ﬁ nancial institutions, consumer and 
SME groups, industry representative groups as well as experts. In total, we have interviewed over 60 people.
Findings 
Stuck in a regulatory spin-cycle. Financial regulation in the UK operates in cycles. Following a crisis, 
politicians respond to public outrage by introducing new legislation and more detailed regulation. However 
this new regulation is progressively watered down, not sufﬁ ciently enforced or repealed. This lays the 
foundations for the next crisis. In the past this spin-cycle could take decades. Today it seems to be only a 
few years before lessons from the past are forgotten. History teaches us the most crucial thing is not what 
regulators do directly after the crisis, but how they hold onto the lessons they learned, integrate them into 
their culture and ensure that this continues to guide their action. 
A deep seated culture of box-ticking. Through these cycles of reform the UK had created a regulatory 
system which is costly, complex, centralised and captured. The administrative costs of regulators are now 
over £1.2 billion a year – six times what they were in 2000. There are over 13,000 pages of rules, guidance 
and supervisory statements published by the FCA and PRA. The FCA handbook costs £3,641, the same to 
buy as a second hand Mini Cooper. This complex box-ticking gives a veneer of safety and security. But it 
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also creates regulation which is both bureaucratic and ineffective. It can detract the attention of regulators 
away from wider systemic issues. It also feeds an industry of lawyers and compliance consultants while 
obscuring more important public concerns. It beneﬁ ts big banks and damages competition from new 
entrants and new business models.
From rhetoric to reality. In addition to changes to powers, focus and structures of the regulators, 
each of the regulators sought to change their internal cultures. The Bank of England and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority undertook this transformation through the ‘One Bank’ initiative. The Financial 
Conduct Authority also made piecemeal efforts to change its culture. Each regulator has changed the tone 
from the top. They have also changed internal processes like performance evaluation, staff development 
and processes of collaboration. The Bank of England and PRA have laid out a detailed plan for delivering 
a single culture for these two organisations. In contrast, the FCA has been blown off course by pressure 
from powerful stakeholders.
Forgetting the lessons of the crisis: Much needed improvements are already being watered down. 
The FCA has scrapped its review of bank culture and is failing to make effective use of its new powers. 
The CEO of the FCA was removed in what was widely perceived to be a political sacking orchestrated by 
the Treasury. The PRA is disagreeing with the views from Sir John Vickers that banks need to hold more 
capital, because it has an unevidenced faith that its supervision will stop banks taking excessive risks. The 
Government has already removed a key recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards by weakening the rules – known as the ‘reverse burden of proof’ – which were designed to 
ensure individual senior bankers were held accountable for misconduct. This was a particularly swift 
example – the fastest in the 300 year history of ﬁ nancial regulation - of the process of watering down 
of the regulatory framework which inevitably follows as memories of the crisis fade.  
Internal barriers to cultural change. Within the Bank of England / PRA, we found that the ‘One Bank’ 
strategy received a mixed assessment from employees, with some stating that it was not yet having a 
positive impact on the way they worked. Within the FCA we found that employees felt they’d been 
better supported to take a more proactive approach but this was in danger of fading. We identiﬁ ed some 
signiﬁ cant barriers to change at the FCA including the extent of bureaucracy and silos in the organisation, 
the organisation being overloaded, lack of opportunities for career progression, and internal and external 
pressure on the organisation.  
External perceptions. Stakeholders viewed the Bank of England and PRA as well respected high quality 
regulatory agencies. However some stakeholders thought they lacked transparency and could be closed 
and even arrogant. Their assessments of the FCA were much more mixed. Although many in the banking 
industry questioned the tougher approach of the regulator under the former director Martin Wheatley, 
most acknowledged that the regulator had been given a renewed sense of vigour. Stakeholders identiﬁ ed 
a range of problems with the FCA including variable quality of staff, excessive box-ticking, a culture of 
secrecy, a lack of willingness to use new powers granted by Parliament, a lack of clarity about what the 
regulator was trying to achieve, a lack of independent evaluation, internal silos, being overloaded with 
data and poor engagement with small players in the ﬁ nancial industry. Stakeholders noted some common 
issues in each regulator including increased regulatory burden, increased complexity which have created 
increasingly slow and narrow processes, a sense of fear of not being supported by superiors and the 
proliferation of administrative activities. It was seen as vital that senior managers supported frontline staff 
to exercise judgement rather than rely on box-ticking.
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Recommendations 
Bank of England / PRA. The Bank of England and the PRA need to conduct a transparent and independent 
assessment of the progress made with their cultural change programme and have it independently 
audited. The Bank needs to continue its efforts to improve on two core aspects of its strategy: openness 
and accountability. This means extending engagement with the public and beyond the closed circle of the 
ﬁ nancial sector. One way to do this would be building on the success of the Open Forum by demonstrating 
that this is more than just a one-off PR exercise. The Bank also needs to tackle group think by doing more 
to encourage internal and external challenge and independent thinking. There have been some steps in this 
direction with the ‘Bank Underground’ blog. The PRA also needs to better acknowledge the interactions 
between misconduct and prudential issues and that signiﬁ cant bank misconduct can have issues for 
ﬁ nancial stability.  
FCA. The FCA needs to ensure it does not get blown off course with its attempts to institute a new culture. 
This means developing a new comprehensive programme of cultural change, establishing the key purpose of 
the regulator and the metrics which will be used to measure success. Senior leadership need to demonstrate 
independence from politicians and the industry and provide support for frontline staff to take a more 
proactive approach. The FCA also needs to ensure it makes use of the new powers it has been given by 
Parliament to name and shame misleading adverts, get consumers redress and take action against senior 
executives. The regulator needs to reduce internal hurdles and departmental silos within the organisation. 
It also needs to ensure that medium and smaller sized organisations have better access to knowledgeable 
supervisors. The FCA needs to ensure it is more transparent and develop new ways of consulting with the 
public and gathering information about risks. The FCA should build on recent successes such as project 
innovate and payday lending regulation in order to develop new ways of engaging with those who are 
regulated. The FCA has recently done a lot of work around behaviour biases among consumers. It should 
also understand how its own behavioural biases – such as risk aversion or overconﬁ dence - inﬂ uence its own 
activities. It should make cultural change in ﬁ rms its number one priority and ensure it has genuine internal 
competence to understand and regulate culture. Finally, it should ensure it questions its policies through 
regular processes of external challenge by setting up an Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ ce as exists within the 
Bank of England. 
Policy Makers. Politicians are always tempted to directly inﬂ uence the regulators. However excessive 
meddling can be counter-productive, reducing morale in the regulator and sending it in many different 
directions. There is an urgent need to reform the legislation which has allowed a culture of secrecy to 
develop in regulators by removing section 348 of FSMA which currently places blanket restrictions on 
what information regulators can disclose. The current framework has damaged efforts to hold regulators 
accountable. There remains a strong case for introducing a duty of care owed by ﬁ nancial services ﬁ rms to 
their customers. Politicians need to ensure they appoint boards which provide a diverse range of experience 
– not just people from the ﬁ nancial industries. Finally, they need to ask questions about what is happening 
on the frontline and understand the views of staff, consumers and SMEs about the culture of the regulator. 
Financial services industry. The banks and other industry stakeholders need to update their perceptions 
of regulatory agencies and recognise they are not always the ‘B team’ or inferior to those who work in the 
industry. They need to move away from often unhelpful generic criticism of the regulators. Instead, they 
should engage with more focused and speciﬁ c ways of improving regulations and regulators. There is also 
a need to recognise that complaining about excessive tick-box regulation and then demanding more boxes 
to tick (in the name of certainty) can be counter-productive. 
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Introduction 
The ﬁ nancial services sector is a vital part of the UK economy. In 2014, the sector contributed 
£126.9 billion worth of value to the UK economy, over 9% of GDP. It employs 1.1 million workers. The 
ﬁ nancial sector is a leading exporter in the UK economy. It also pays £24.8 billion in tax each year.1 
However, in addition to being a source of value, the ﬁ nancial sector can also be a source of instability. 
In the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, UK taxpayers had to contribute £130 billion to bail-out the UK banking 
sector – equivalent to £2,000 each for every man, woman and child in the UK.2 Over £54 billion has 
been paid out by the major retail banks and building societies for misconduct scandals such as Payment 
Protection Insurance and mis-selling complicated interest rate swaps to small businesses.3 Standard and 
Poors has said that conduct and litigation charges are now ‘a way of life’ for the UK banking industry, 
and that some form of charge seems probable every year for the larger banks.4 Growth in productivity 
declined and has only been sluggish in recent years. Real wages and family living standards have suffered 
to an extent unprecedented in modern history.5 The crisis and the scandals all have a ﬁ nancial cost – but 
they also have a social cost: Small businesses forced into bankruptcy, livelihoods ruined, jobs destroyed, 
opportunities lost. These can have a very real impact on society and people’s health and well-being.
Public trust in ﬁ nancial markets has also been damaged. In a speech to New City Agenda, Andy Haldane, 
Chief Economist at the Bank of England highlighted that the words most used by members of the public to 
describe ﬁ nancial markets were ‘corrupt’, ‘manipulated’, ‘destructive’ and ‘greedy’. Among the Bank’s usual 
contacts in the ﬁ nancial sector the word was ‘regulated’. He said that these results indicated: 
‘A Great Divide between the views of ﬁ nancial insiders and outsiders, between the perceptions of 
producers and consumers of ﬁ nancial services, between the silent majority who buy and the vocal 
minority who sell ﬁ nancial products, between the echo chamber of the elites and the voting chamber 
of wider society. They underscore just how far ﬁ nance still has to travel to regain its social licence.’6 
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An important part of ensuring the success of the UK ﬁ nancial sector and its contribution to society is that 
it be well regulated. The UK has some of the most high proﬁ le regulators in the world including the Bank of 
England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. What UK regulators do 
today is copied tomorrow by other ﬁ nancial regulators around the world. 
In the lead up to last crisis we saw gradual adoption of a light-touch approach to regulation by UK regulator 
– the Financial Services Authority. The Board and senior leadership was dominated by those who worked in 
the ﬁ nancial services industry, leading to group think and a lack of internal challenge. The Bank of England 
believed that the UK banking system in 2007 was more resilient that it had ever been. There was also a 
deep-seated culture of box-ticking which asked many detailed questions about processes but overlooked key 
questions about the business models of banks and whether they were stable and delivered fair treatment for 
consumers. This drove a permissive culture within the regulator which meant many activities by banks went 
unchallenged. This resulted in increasingly risky activities and ﬁ nancial innovation which fuelled a boom in 
ﬁ nancial markets. But it also laid the foundations for the failure or near failure of major ﬁ nancial institutions. 
These failures had major consequences for the UK and global economies – which are still being felt nearly 
a decade on.
Transforming Regulation 
Following the ﬁ nancial crisis, there was an attempt to transform the regulatory landscape. The aim was to 
create regulators which were much more judgement based, focused on systemic questions and were forward 
looking and proactive.7 This led to the changes within the Bank of England, the creation of the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, and the creation of the Financial Conduct Authority. 
Following these structural and legislative changes, there was also supposed to be a transformation 
of culture within each of these regulators. The Bank of England sought to develop a more open and 
accountable culture.8 The Prudential Regulation Authority would seek to take a more systemic view and 
implement a forward looking and judgement based approach.9 The Financial Conduct Authority would 
also seek to adopt a more proactive and judgement based approach, focusing more on the overarching 
conduct of ﬁ nancial institutions.10
There are signs that the UK ﬁ nancial regulators are starting to transform their culture. If we simply listened 
to the tone from the top, we would hear much talk about the adoption of new values within each of the 
ﬁ nancial regulators. For instance the Governor of the Bank of England has championed the ‘One Bank’ 
strategy which promises to instil a culture based on four pillars: ‘diverse and talented’, ‘analytical excellence’, 
‘outstanding execution’ and ‘open and accountable’. The FCA has also sought to develop a culture which was 
more consumer-focused, transparent, forward looking and judgement based. Despite attempts to transform 
culture, there is still a big question mark over the extent to which this is more rhetoric than reality. 
This report aims to explore the extent to which ﬁ nancial regulators in the UK have been able to transform 
their culture. We consider how the historical background has shaped the culture of UK ﬁ nancial regulators. 
We will also ask how ﬁ nancial regulators have instilled a new culture and what impact this has had within 
their organisations, and detail key stakeholders’ assessments of changes in culture. 
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Overview
Chapter one looks at history of ﬁ nancial regulation in the UK. It charts a centuries-long cyclical pattern 
of regulation whereby governments react to crises by increasing regulation which is gradually undermined, 
creating the conditions for the next crisis. It argues that this created a regulatory structure which was costly, 
complex and concentrated and highlights what went wrong with the culture of the FSA. It then examines 
how the UK regulators responded to the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis. This charts out the new regulatory structure 
which emerged out of this crisis. 
Chapter two explores how the key UK ﬁ nancial regulators – the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation 
Authority and Financial Conduct Authority – have sought to transform their culture. It also looks at 
how employees have responded to these changes. We ﬁ nd that each ﬁ nancial regulator has introduced 
comprehensive changes. However while the Bank of England and PRA have been more consistent in their 
culture change initiative, the FCA risks being blown off course. 
Chapter three considers stakeholder responses to the change in culture within the regulators. We ﬁ nd 
that while stakeholders have generally positive assessments of the Bank of England and PRA, they see the 
FCA in a much more mixed light. We also identify some cross cutting issues which were brought up by the 
stakeholders we spoke with.
Chapter four provides an analysis of the results. It brings together our detailed observations into an 
over-arching narrative. 
Chapter ﬁ ve provides a set of recommendations to each of the regulators, to politicians and to the 
ﬁ nancial services industry.
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As long as there has been markets in the City of London, there has been 
regulation. The earliest recorded regulation of the City was a statue in 1284 
which empowered the Court of Aldermen to license brokers. As part of our 
research we have reviewed the history of ﬁ nancial regulation in the UK starting 
with the South Sea bubble in 1720 right through to the aftermath of the 2008 
ﬁ nancial crisis. The liberalisation of the ﬁ nancial sector in 1986 meant that the 
sector moved from more informal regulation based on close relationships in the 
City towards more formalised regulation. This process of formalisation started 
the rise of what has come to be seen today as excessive box-ticking. There was 
also the centralisation of ﬁ nancial regulation. In 2000 there was a move from 
a range of different specialist ﬁ nancial regulators to a single regulator which 
covered many thousands of ﬁ rms and was responsible for consumer protection 
and ﬁ nancial stability.
Historical Background: 
UK Financial Regulation Prior to 
2008 and responses to the crisis
CHAPTER ONE
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Never-ending cycles of regulation
This long history of attempts to regulate the ﬁ nancial industry in the City of London shows a pattern which 
is remarkably familiar. They show a clear cyclical pattern which is evident to this day. First there is mounting 
bad behaviour in ﬁ nancial markets which leads to a serious economic or ﬁ nancial problem and associated 
misconduct. This is followed by public moral outrage about the ﬁ nancial industry. The Government then 
steps in to impose legislation. Following a crisis or scandal, policymakers tend to increase regulation, 
give regulatory agencies new powers and reorganise their structure. However, the new powers are often 
undermined over time. This results in a new kinds of ﬁ nancial innovation, pressures for light-touch regulation 
from politicians and an overconﬁ dence from regulators that they are now cleverer and more effective than in 
the past. This effectively lays the groundwork for a new crisis and another round of regulation. 
The length of these cycles can vary, depending on the prevailing political and economic environment. In 
2015 the Government removed a key recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards by weakening the rules – known as the ‘reverse burden of proof’ – which were designed to ensure 
individual senior bankers were held accountable for misconduct. This was a particularly swift example – the 
fastest in the 300 year history of ﬁ nancial regulation - of the process of the watering down of the regulatory 
framework which inevitably follows as memories of the crisis fade.
Length of time before ﬁ nancial regulation 
watered down
Legislation Method of change Length of time before 
watered down
Act to Restrain the 
Numbers and Practices 
of Stock Brokers and 
Jobbers (1697)
Lapsed in 1707 following intensive lobbying 
by the City of London who were worried about 
the undue costs it imposed on brokers.
10 years
The Bubble Act (1720) Act was repealed in 1825 when the Attorney 
General said that “its meaning and effect were 
altogether unintelligible”.
105 years
The Bank Charter Act / 
Joint Stock Banking Act 
(1844)
Limited liability for banks was introduced in 
1857 when the Joint Stock Banking Act was 
repealed. Restrictions on expansion/mergers 
were also removed.
13 years
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Legislation Method of change Length of time before 
watered down
The Colwyn Report 
(1918)
The report warned of the danger of 
further mergers in UK banking and called 
for greater Government control. This informal 
policy against mergers remained in place 
until the 1960s.11
~40-50 years
Financial Services Act 
(1986)
City Practitioners demanded Sir Kenneth 
Berrill’s (Chair of the SIB) head on a plate and he 
was replaced.12 Standards were watered down 
under the “New Settlement” in 1989. Rules 
made by the Self-Regulatory Organisations no 
longer had to be “equivalent” to those of the 
Securities and Investments Board.
3 years after the 
original Act. 19 months 
after the regulation 
had come into force
Financial Services and 
Markets Act (2000)
2004/05 – the FSA found itself under 
signiﬁ cant political pressure to deliver light-
touch regulation and changed its approach 
with a move to Principles-Based regulation.
4/5 years
Banking Reform Act 
(2013)
The 2013 Act was due to introduce, 
from March 2016, a “presumption of 
responsibility” which would have presumed 
that Senior Managers were responsible for 
an alleged breach falling within their area 
of responsibility, unless the Senior Manager 
could satisfy the regulators that they took 
“reasonable steps” to prevent or stop the 
regulatory breaches occurring or continuing. 
This was altered in 2016 to place the burden 
of proof back on the regulator – essentially 
taking us back to the rules which existed 
prior to and following the ﬁ nancial crisis. 
Before the relevant 
provisions had come 
into force
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Failing to hold senior executives to account 
for misconduct
Another consistent theme are constant promises made by politicians and regulators that senior 
executives of ﬁ rms will be held accountable for scandal and misconduct. Regulators and politicians have 
been promising this for over 300 years – without much success. Indeed the situation has got worse. After 
the failure of City of Glasgow bank in 1878 the directors were all given prison sentences. When Barings 
collapsed in 1995 it was widely perceived that senior management had evaded responsibility – this was 
despite the fact that 10 members of senior management were ﬁ ned, banned from working in the City or 
acting as directors of a company. 
After the FSA was established in 2001, Howard Davies promised that the regulator would introduce a 
system were ‘speciﬁ ed individuals at the top of the ﬁ rm have clearly set out responsibilities for risk 
management and compliance, for which we hold them accountable.’ But when the major banks collapsed 
the public were told that responsibilities weren’t properly deﬁ ned and that there was an ‘accountability 
ﬁ rewall’ protecting the directors and senior executives. More people were sanctioned following the failure 
of Barings than for the incompetence and misconduct in HBOS, RBS and Northern Rock combined. 
Mistreatment of consumers and small businesses also continued to go unpunished. The only senior executive 
ﬁ ned by the FSA for the £38 billion PPI mis-selling scandal was the Chief Executive of sofa shop ‘Land of 
Leather’. Not a single banking executive was subject to any enforcement action for the mis-selling of PPI 
to consumers or interest rate swaps to SMEs.
Action taken against individuals following ﬁ nancial scandals
Name of 
Scandal 
Nature of Misconduct Action taken 
against individuals
Nature of punishment
South Sea Bubble 
(1720)
Stock market 
manipulation; 
insider trading; 
keeping false accounts; 
fraud and bribery. 
Directors and politicians 
were prosecuted. 
Directors were imprisoned in the Tower of London 
and had their assets conﬁ scated.13 33 directors were 
ﬁ ned the equivalent of more than £3 billion today. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer was expelled from 
the House of Commons and imprisoned in the 
Tower of London.
1825 Banking Crisis 
/ Poyais
Created fake South 
American country and 
used the London Stock 
Exchange to sell fake 
Poyaisian bonds.
Gregor MacGregor and 
3 other directors were 
prosecuted for fraud.
Gregor MacGregor and 2 other associates were 
acquitted. One other associate was convicted of 
making false representations and given 13 months 
in prison.14 
Overend and 
Gurney (1866)
Bank collapsed following 
lending to the railway 
industry. Fraud and false 
statements.
Directors prosecuted 
at the Old Bailey.
Acquitted as Judge said they were guilty of 
‘grave error’ rather than criminal behaviour.
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Name of 
Scandal 
Nature of Misconduct Action taken 
against individuals
Nature of punishment
City of Glasgow 
Bank (1878)
Bank collapsed 
following lending to 
people described as 
‘gangs of desperate 
adventurers’; falsiﬁ ed 
its accounts; share 
price manipulation.
Directors prosecuted 
at the High Court in 
Edinburgh.
Bank’s general manager and one director were 
given 18 month prison sentences. Five other 
directors were given 8 month sentences.15
Secondary Banking 
Crisis (1973-75)
Falling property prices 
led to the bail-out of 
around 60 banks by the 
Bank of England.
Jim Slater was 
prosecuted under 
the Companies Act. 
Directors of London 
and County Securities 
prosecuted for false 
accounting, forgery 
and theft.
Mr Slater was convicted and ﬁ ned £150. One 
Director of London and Country Securities was 
given 2 years in prison and the others were ﬁ ned 
or got suspended sentences.16
Norton Warberg 
(1981)
Investment fraud and 
conﬂ icts of interest.
Andrew Warberg ﬂ ed to 
Spain but was charged 
on his return in 1987.
Andrew Warberg was sentenced to 3 years 
in prison.17
Johnson Matthey 
Bank (1984)
High loan growth 
leading to concentrated 
exposures to a small 
number of customers; 
misreporting to the 
supervisory authority.18
Directors were 
investigated as there 
was “strong suspicion 
of corruption”. No 
action was taken as 
misreporting to the 
supervisory authority 
was not an offence.19
No punishment for the directors.
Customers were jailed for theft and lying 
to an inquiry into the bank’s collapse.
Barlow Clowes 
(1988)
Investment fraud. Peter Clowes was 
charged with fraud 
and theft.
Mr Clowes was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
BCCI (1991) Money laundering; fraud 
and terrorist ﬁ nancing.
Senior executives were 
charged, but were never 
brought to trial.
No punishment, but some cases were settled by 
payments to the US authorities.
Barings (1995) Rogue trading; false 
accounting and poor risk 
management.
Nick Leeson was 
charged in Singapore. 
DTI and SFA took 
action against directors 
and executives.
Nick Leeson was imprisoned for 6 years in 
Singapore. 10 Barings directors and senior 
executives were disqualiﬁ ed from being directors 
for up to 6 years.
Pensions 
Mis-selling 
(1990s)
Mis-selling of 
personal pensions.
No action was 
taken against senior 
executives.
None.
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Name of 
Scandal 
Nature of Misconduct Action taken 
against individuals
Nature of punishment
Equitable Life 
(1999)
Potential payments 
to policyholders 
were under-funded; 
management team 
were accused of 
‘dubious’ practices 
and nurturing a ‘culture 
of manipulation 
and concealment’.
Non-executive directors 
were subject to private 
legal action.
FSA investigated the 
role of executives.
Directors escaped punishment and did not pay 
any money in settlement of a private action by 
Equitable. The Appointed actuary was banned by 
the FSA from working in the ﬁ nancial services 
industry for 6 years. Roy Ranson escaped sanction 
by the FSA but was thrown out of the Institute 
of Actuaries.
Split-Capital 
Investment Trusts 
(2002)
Mis-selling of split-
capital investment 
trusts; market abuse; 
cross holdings; 
excessive gearing.
FSA investigated a 
number of individuals.
4 individuals voluntarily agreed to not perform 
certain functions in the industry for periods 
ranging from 6 months to 2 years. The FSA said 
that it had “not made any ﬁ ndings of regulatory 
breach against them and the…individuals have 
not made any admissions”.20
PPI Mis-selling 
(2000s)
Mis-selling of Payment 
Protection Insurance.
FSA investigated a 
number of ﬁ rms.
No senior executives at major banks have faced 
sanctions but the FSA did ﬁ ne the CEO of sofa 
shop ‘Land of Leather’.
Northern Rock 
(2007)
High risk business 
strategy reliant on 
wholesale funding; 
irresponsible lending 
leading to taxpayer bail-
out of Northern Rock.
Misreporting mortgage 
arrears statistics.
FSA investigated 
but apart from action 
taken for misreporting 
of arrears, no other 
action was taken 
against directors or 
senior executives.
For misreporting of arrears data: Andrew Jones 
was banned for life from the ﬁ nancial industry 
and ﬁ ned £320,000 by the FSA.21 David Baker 
was banned and ﬁ ned £504,000.22 Richard Barclay 
was banned and ﬁ ned £140,000.
HBOS (2008) High risk business 
strategy; Irresponsible 
lending; exposure to 
property and poor 
culture led to taxpayer 
bail-out of HBOS.23
FSA investigated Mr 
Cummings but failed 
to investigate any 
other directors or 
senior executives.24
Peter Cummings was banned for life from 
the ﬁ nancial industry and ﬁ ned £500,000.25 
Sir James Crosby returned his knighthood.
RBS (2008) Inadequate capital; poor 
judgement and due 
diligence around the 
ABN Amro takeover; 
credit and trading losses 
led to taxpayer bail-out 
of RBS.
FSA investigated 
RBS’s investment 
banking division, the 
takeover of ABN Amro 
and conduct around 
the 2008 rights issue.
Jonny Cameron voluntarily agreed to no 
longer work in the ﬁ nancial industry. The FSA 
did not make any ﬁ nding of regulatory breach 
against Mr Cameron.26 Sir Fred Goodwin lost 
his knighthood.
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What went wrong with the culture of the FSA 
and the Bank of England?
The most crucial lessons are that it is not just what regulators do directly after a crisis that matters, but 
how they hold onto the lessons they learned and ensure that they continue to guide their actions. In the 
run up to the ﬁ nancial crisis responsibility for ﬁ nancial regulation and stability lay with the FSA and the 
Bank of England. It is important that regulators learn from their mistakes so as part of our research we 
examined the issue of what went wrong with the culture of the FSA and Bank of England. This is an issue 
we have examined as part of the work of New City Agenda over the past year, including through the lectures 
we have hosted by Professor Anat Admati, John Kay, Martin Wolf, Rhydian Lewis and Antony Jenkins. We 
also reviewed a wide range of documents into the ﬁ nancial crisis and discussed this issue with a variety of 
former staff, politicians, and industry and consumer stakeholders. Our research highlighted the following 
cultural issues at the ﬁ nancial regulators which contributed to the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis.
• Regulatory architecture/structure: A single regulator which covered consumer protection and ﬁ nancial 
stability was simply too big to work effectively. It was a challenge dealing with a vast bureaucratic 
organisation. There were too many diverse objectives which actually required different sets of skills, 
cultures and approaches. The Board of the FSA would be talking about the Eurozone crisis one minute and 
the next minute talking about small Independent Financial Advisers (IFAs) and mortgage brokers. The scope 
of the FSA was expanded to include more small businesses without a commensurate increase in resources. 
Responsibility was not properly deﬁ ned and no one seemed to be ‘in charge’ of the tripartite system. This 
led to a culture of not challenging ﬁ rms or considering what would happen in a worst-case scenario.
• Regulatory philosophy and culture: The culture of the FSA was far too permissive. The FSA would 
only intervene when there was overwhelming evidence of failure. It was reactive rather than proactive. 
There was a group think problem and a lack of internal/external challenge. There was belief that senior 
managers in ﬁ rms would act in the best interests of customers and shareholders. The regulator was seen 
as a referee rather than as an agent of consumers – it had a desire to upset everyone to demonstrate it 
was doing a good job. 
• Regulatory approach: The reactive and permissive culture drove the regulatory approach. There was a 
lack of will to intervene in the operation of markets and to intervene in big ﬁ rms. The FSA did not want 
to be seen as interventionist by politicians. It was a very internally focused organisation – a lot of Board 
time and overall activity was focussed on the inside - on making the organisation work. It lacked an overall 
strategy and never tried to deﬁ ne what success looked like. There were ideological presumptions – people 
within the regulator really believed that markets would deliver for consumers and that even for extremely 
proﬁ table products such as PPI, the market would encourage ﬁ rms to have high standards of consumer 
protection. There was a touching naivety – a naïve faith that markets would discipline banks with risky 
business models and ensure that they were safe.
• FSA had a culture of box-ticking and was focussed on processes rather than outcomes. This 
was despite the signiﬁ cant emphasis which senior management at the FSA made on the move towards 
principles-based regulation. It failed to challenge the industry and was more comfortable examining 
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processes – such as how many staff could name the six treating customers fairly outcomes – rather 
than what was actually being delivered. 
• Unwillingness to challenge global standards on capital: The FSA & Bank of England were part of a 
global trend towards lower levels of capital through the introduction of the international Basel 2 standards. 
They also had an insufﬁ cient focus on liquidity and did not realise (or did not see it as a problem) that UK 
banks were heavily dependent on wholesale markets.
• The ‘tone from the top’ was that the FSA should not be an enforcement-led regulator: The FSA was 
a weak enforcer – there was a culture which said that the FSA was not an enforcement led-regulator. Fines 
were too low and individual executives were let off the hook.
• FSA relied too much on disclosure of information to consumers: It responded to too many issues 
by writing and re-writing rules on how information was disclosed to consumers. It thought that relying 
on disclosure of information was an appropriate method to use rather than considering more robust 
intervention such as banning toxic products such as PPI.
• FSA failed to examine the business models of banks – it did not “follow the money”: The FSA didn’t 
understand how banks made their money or what impact this might have on their resistance to regulatory 
change. The FSA said that it was not a price regulator which seemed to indicate that it was uninterested in 
the value-for-money of various ﬁ nancial products or the lack of competition in various markets. 
• Political pressure on the FSA for “light touch” regulation inﬂ uenced its culture: The FSA was under 
industry and political pressure to “cut back” red tape and regulation and take a light-touch approach. CEOs 
had a manifesto of reducing the weight and size of regulation.
• FSA and Bank of England placed insufﬁ cient emphasis on systemic stability. The Bank of England 
issued a few sermons but didn’t take any action. The Bank failed to see the build-up of risks and “group 
think” meant that there was little challenge to prevailing orthodoxies. It believed that the UK banking 
system was far more resilient than in the past. The Bank failed to understand that the UK mortgage market 
relied on unstable wholesale funding.
• Bank of England tried to avoid responsibility for ensuring ﬁ nancial stability: By making excuses that 
it lacked powers to do anything about ﬁ nancial stability the Bank allowed a narrative to develop that it 
hadn’t done anything wrong and didn’t need to change. Prior to the ﬁ nancial crisis the Bank did not view 
the developments in the ﬁ nancial system such as growing credit and complexity as posing extra risk.
Regulatory responses to the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis
The ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008 was a signiﬁ cant challenge to the UK ﬁ nancial regulatory landscape. It stretched 
the regulators to their breaking point. It showed up some signiﬁ cant shortcomings and led to a fundamental 
rethink of how the ﬁ nancial industry was regulated. The result was the foundation of the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, which became a subsidiary of the Bank of England and the FSA transforming itself 
into the Financial Conduct Authority. A new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was established in the BoE to 
protect and enhance the resilience of the ﬁ nancial system.
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There was a fundamental rethinking of the approaches to regulation. New regulators claimed that they 
would be more proactive, rely on judgement rather than box-ticking and take strong enforcement action 
against ﬁ rms and individuals which breached requirements. They said that they would hold senior executives 
to account for poor conduct and allow mismanaged ﬁ rms to fail. Senior management at the regulators 
explained these new approaches – but, in some areas, their statements were very similar to those made 
on the introduction of the FSA. 
New structures, new powers and new objectives
The reforms gave regulators new structures, new powers, new objectives and new governance arrangements. 
Less attention was initially paid to changing the culture of these organisations. The FCA introduced a set 
of cultural values. The Bank of England launched its One Bank programme in 2014. We will look into these 
culture change initiatives in more detail in the following chapter. 
Following the establishment of the FCA, PRA and FPC in April 2013, their activities have continued to evolve. 
In 2014, the FCA took over the regulation of consumer credit from the Ofﬁ ce of Fair Trading. This increased 
the number of ﬁ rms regulated by the FCA from around 27,000 to well over 70,000. Two-thirds of the FCA’s 
total regulated population now conducts consumer credit activities.
The ‘Tone from the Top’ in the UK’s ﬁ nancial 
regulators – big similarities between the FSA 
and the FCA/PRA
The ‘Tone from the Top’ is seen as a key driver of an organisation’s culture, but the bold 
claims made in speeches and statements are not enough to drive a change in culture. On the 
establishment of the FCA and the PRA, senior management made a wide variety of comments 
and speeches – setting out the new approach which the regulators would take. Many of these 
statements were actually very similar to those made around the year 2000 by senior executives 
at the FSA. Just like banking, this shows that changing the tone from the top alone is not enough 
to ensure a change of culture – cultural change is lost in the middle and fails to reach the frontline 
or make a difference to the way the regulator operates. In a regulator the ‘tone from the top’ 
needs to be translated into behaviours and make a real difference to how those on the frontline 
do their job. It needs to be translated into clear processes and be made a key part of remuneration 
and performance management schemes. Regulators started out with the best of intentions to hold 
senior executives accountable – but they failed to put in place the culture in the regulator to 
make sure that this happened.
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Similar Statements made about the regulatory 
philosophy - FSA and FCA/PRA
Subject FSA FCA / PRA
Senior Management 
Responsibility
“Regulators have tended to ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to 
pin clear duties on chief executives. There have 
been cases where a highly legalistic approach on 
their behalf to the responsibilities they consider 
themselves to have has allowed them to escape, 
when a commonsensical view would argue that 
they must surely have had some responsibility 
for ensuring that the business was controlled in a 
way which prevented either its customers being 
unreasonably exploited, or indeed its shareholders 
money being put unreasonably at risk”
“When things go wrong, we shall look directly 
to senior management, whom we shall hold 
accountable….Now we have a system of personal 
registration, where speciﬁ ed individuals at the top 
of the ﬁ rm have clearly set out responsibilities for 
risk management and compliance, for which we 
hold them accountable.”27 
“[This] brings us towards a system where individual 
responsibility becomes both clearer and more 
immediate. There will be more existential pressure, 
if you like, on leaders.”
“It also, crucially, moves us away from this position 
where determining who is accountable for what, 
has required often enormous powers of regulatory 
decryption. Indeed, there are cases where it’s 
taken weeks, if not months…to determine line 
management responsibilities.”28 
Box-ticking “Our philosophy is one of trying to work smarter, 
we think it is consistent with the approach we 
are setting out today, that we want to be a more 
analytical, thinking Regulator, we want there to 
be less box checking and routine activity”
“the content of those discussions will also 
change, away from investigation of whether 
evidence exists to demonstrate compliance with 
speciﬁ c rules to discussion of broader issues 
and of desired outcomes: in short, a move away 
from what is normally characterised as “box 
ticking” – the comfort zone for both regulator 
and compliance functions.”29 
“Too often our response was overly reliant on 
regulation by rote. We built ever more rules and 
guidance about how to build a compliant process. 
It was robotic…In actual fact, in many cases – like 
PPI – tick-box regulation simply encouraged a 
tick-box service. Leaving ﬁ rms with often huge 
clean-up bills and badly damaged brands.”30 
“a new philosophy of regulation. Not 
regulation through the rear-view mirror – but 
forward-looking regulation. Not regulation based 
on historic data collection but much more real 
time. Not box-ticking regulation, but regulation 
based on judgement.”31 
Competition “We take the view that promoting competition 
can be an important way of achieving our 
regulatory objectives. In particular, we see great 
value in transparency, so that better informed 
consumers can take better investment decisions.”32
“We want to ensure that a competitive ﬁ nancial 
services market works for the interests of 
consumers, with adequate protections in place.”33 
“We believe that, through better competition, 
consumers will beneﬁ t from better choice. Not 
just choice of provider, but choice of products, of 
services, of channels. And that these choices will 
create a virtuous cycle where innovators encourage 
fast followers amongst market incumbents, 
which in turn encourages more innovation and 
competition in the interests of consumers.”34
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Subject FSA FCA / PRA
Too-Big-To-Fail “Given the nature of ﬁ nancial markets, which 
are inherently volatile, achieving a “zero failure” 
regime is impossible and would in any case be 
undesirable. Any such regime would be excessively 
burdensome for regulated ﬁ rms and would not 
accord with the statutory objectives and principles 
set out in the Act…. Considerable dangers would 
arise if consumers or market participants believed 
that no ﬁ rm would ever be allowed to collapse; 
this would reduce the incentive for individuals 
or ﬁ rms to take due care in assessing the risk 
attaching to their ﬁ nancial decisions.” 35
“The system “will move us away from a world 
in which the job of the supervisor is to crush the 
probability of failure, come what may.”36
Toxic / complex 
products
“These transfers [of credit risk] have taken 
more exotic forms, such as Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDOs) or indeed synthetic CDOs. 
One investment banker recently described 
synthetic CDOs to me as “the most toxic 
element of the ﬁ nancial markets.” 37
“Both complexity and interconnectedness 
obscure investors’ understanding of the level and 
distribution of risk across the system, even if there 
is a reasonable degree of disclosure — which 
is often not the case. The resulting opacity of 
ﬁ nancial instruments can be a source of systemic 
risk in itself.” 38 
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The foundation of PRA and FCA was based on a recognition that there had 
been a range of failures in regulators’ responsibilities, powers and governance 
mechanisms. It took longer to acknowledge that the culture of the regulators 
also needed to change. In this chapter, we look at how the PRA and FCA sought 
to change their culture. We will explore the background to cultural change in 
each regulator, the kind of culture they are trying to create and the methods 
they are using to do this. We consider employees responses to this cultural 
change. Finally, we look at some common themes which run across each of the 
change initiatives in the regulators.
Culture and cultural change in 
the UK’s ﬁ nancial regulators
CHAPTER TWO
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Overview of cultural change programmes
Bank of England / PRA – corporate style, top-down 
cultural change programme
We ﬁ nd that the Bank of England and the PRA have developed and started to implement a detailed plan 
for cultural change. It articulated some core goals and cultural values. It has launched a programme similar 
to what you might ﬁ nd in many private sector organisations involving the introduction of a Code of ethics 
and shifts in remuneration structures, measurement, hiring, talent development and collaboration. The Bank 
held an Open Forum to discuss the future of ﬁ nancial markets. A new Oversight Committee was introduced 
although this was then abolished. An Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ ce was also introduced to keep the Bank’s 
performance under review. There has been some push back from longer serving staff members and it was 
not yet clear that the initiative was having a signiﬁ cant positive effect on frontline staff. Overall the cultural 
change initiative seems to be proceeding relatively smoothly. From our discussions with various stakeholders, 
it appears that the PRA was becoming increasingly integrated within the BoE.
FCA – a fragmented approach to cultural change
The FCA took a more fragmented approach and did not have a comprehensive programme of cultural change 
in place. Its senior leaders introduced new values and made a number of speeches emphasising the need to 
adopt a new culture and approach – which was characterised by those outside the regulator as ‘shoot ﬁ rst, 
ask questions later’. It made changes to hiring, training and remuneration systems but was not clear on what 
it was trying to achieve or how progress should be measured. Staff said that there are positives at the FCA 
including a friendly environment, high quality staff and many learning opportunities. There are also negatives 
include staff turnover, overload and external pressure and bureaucracy. There seemed to be an overarching 
concern that while Martin Wheatley had galvanised staff, there was a danger of back-sliding. Events around 
the Davis review, the perceptions of political interference and the removal of the CEO meant that the FCA 
was blown off course and risked not achieving its objectives. 
Bank of England / PRA
The One Bank Strategy 
One of the main drivers of making the PRA part of the BoE was culture.39 When the PRA became a 
subsidiary of the bank, it was hoped that it would ‘beneﬁ t from the Bank’s judgement-driven culture’. 
This was challenging as many of the key people in this new organisation had come from the FSA, and 
presumably had been imprinted by the culture there. 
Following the foundation of the PRA the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, announced 
the ‘One Bank’ initiative.40 At the heart of this was the plan to develop a common culture in both of the 
organisations. The initiative established a renewed mission for the Bank – ‘Promoting the Good of the 
People of the United Kingdom by maintaining Monetary and Financial stability’. 
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The One Bank strategy focused on the Bank ‘maximising our impact by working together’. It bought 
together aspects of central banking previously dealt with separately such as macroprudential supervision, 
microprudential supervision and monetary policy. There are four central pillars of this One Bank 
strategy: (1) diversity and talent, (2) analytical excellence, (3) Outstanding execution, and (4) openness 
and accountability. 
The 2015 BoE annual report outlined progress on the One Bank plan. This included harmonising staff terms 
and conditions, implementing a new talent strategy, embedding targets for diversity, and creating an integrated 
research function. Efforts were made to increase transparency and an international directorate was created. 
A central aspect of the One Bank strategy had been to establish a similar culture across the bank. The One 
Bank strategy aimed to be ‘much more than a ‘to do’ list of major projects’. It was hoped it would lead to 
‘fundamental shifts in the Bank’s culture and thinking’ 
Values at the Bank of England / PRA 
The One Bank strategy states the values which underpin the culture of the Bank of England. These values 
should provide the basis to measure employees’ performance. The ﬁ ve core values are: 
 1. Collaborative. 
We are committed to working together to ensure our best possible contribution to the public good. 
We share information, skills and expertise freely. 
 2. Inclusive. 
We actively encourage challenge and divergent views, and create an environment where all staff 
can speak up, share their views and inﬂ uence outcomes. 
 3. Empowering. 
We expect initiative-taking, creative thinking and rigorous analysis in all areas. To achieve this, we will 
clearly delegate suitable responsibility and accountability for analysis, recommendations and decisions. 
 4. Decisive. 
We support decisive action grounded in policy. We will create an environment that is agile, where 
all staff can respond swiftly to changing priorities, with a focus on delivery. 
 5. Open. 
We encourage open debate as the most constructive way to resolve conﬂ icts. And we ensure that 
communication is open and transparent in discharging our duties in pursuit of our mission.
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Mechanisms for Developing One Bank Culture
To foster the One Bank culture, the Bank and the PRA put in place a range of mechanisms. 
Competence Development 
The Bank sought to develop staff competencies to deliver the judgement-based, forward-looking supervisory 
approach. This has involved career development for all staff, succession planning, a greater emphasis on 
diversity and inclusion, and the development of a graduate qualiﬁ cation in central banking which was 
launched in conjunction with Warwick Business School in 2015. 
Remuneration
Harmonisation. There has been an ongoing attempt to harmonise the reward systems in the PRA and the 
rest of the Bank. Ex-FSA and BoE staff were moved onto similar contracts. The PRA developed a remuneration 
scheme to attract and retain a mixture of talent at all stages of their career. Staff at the Bank and PRA 
receive both pension beneﬁ ts and performance related-pay. 
Bonuses. In 2013/14, bonus payments for individual performance were made to Executive Directors, other 
senior executives and staff on Bank terms from a pool of 6% of relevant base salaries; in the case of those 
still on FSA terms the pool was 11.25%. In 2014/15 the bonus pool was 6% of salary for Bank staff and 
15% for FSA staff. From 1st April 2015 all bonuses will be paid from a pool worth 10% of salary. It is not 
clear whether any element of bonuses are deferred – as the PRA requires for senior executives in ﬁ rms – or 
whether it is subject to clawback or malus in the event of material failures or poor performance.
Pensions. The Bank operated a deﬁ ned beneﬁ t pension scheme. The ﬁ nal salary scheme is closed to new 
members, but the career average scheme is still open – with contributions worth around 30% of salary. Staff 
transferred over from the FSA to the Bank/PRA were initially members of a deﬁ ned contribution scheme. 
Following the changes, all staff were placed in the career average pension fund. Those who had transferred 
over from the FSA accrued beneﬁ ts at a lower rate.
Hiring
Recruitment and retention. Retaining existing talent and hiring new talent is at the forefront of the PRA’s 
concerns. Staff turnover at the PRA is higher than the rest of the bank (10.6% compared to 8.7%). A survey 
of exit interviews completed in November 2013 identiﬁ ed the transition to the Bank, limited or unclear 
advancement opportunities within the Bank, a hierarchical culture and pay as being the major reasons for 
leaving the PRA. 
Performance Management and Promotions
Mobility. Internal promotions and staff mobility across the Bank/PRA were encouraged. There is clearly 
signiﬁ cant mobility in the PRA. During 2014, 13% of PRA staff received a promotion and 23% moved role. 
Learning. There is a modular learning framework at the Bank. New entrants are put through appropriate 
technical training. The new qualiﬁ cation in central banking provides a common technical basis for staff. 
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Code of Ethical Standards. Following a review of ethics and conduct in the Bank, a new enhanced Code 
applying to all employees covering these policies and rules was developed which sought to ‘capture the 
essence of what it means to be in public service at the Bank.’ The Code provides a statement about the 
behaviours colleagues, counterparties, stakeholders and the public should expect from employees at the 
Bank. All employees will be required to attest on annual basis to their familiarity with the Code, and their 
observance of it. To support this initiative, the Bank is establishing a central compliance function, which will 
work with management to embed the approach in terms of both understanding of, and compliance with, 
the Code. It is not clear how the Bank will report on issues raised regarding possible breaches of the Code 
and any speciﬁ c occasions where it has been breached.
Speaking Up. Earlier inquiries into failings at the BoE during the ﬁ nancial crisis identiﬁ ed lack of escalating 
concerns upwards. The Bank has introduced a ‘Speak Up’ policy enabling employees to raise concerns they 
may have about disregard of Bank policies and codes, a risk to the Bank, malpractice or misconduct. The PRA 
also provides whistleblowing facilities for individuals within the ﬁ nancial institutions which it supervises. 
Challenge
Practitioner Panel and Consultation. The PRA has a statutory duty to maintain effective arrangements to 
consult practitioners and consider their representations. It is also required to establish the PRA Practitioner 
Panel to represent the interests of practitioners. Members are appointed by a number of trade associations 
including the British Bankers Association, Association of British Insurers, Building Societies Association and 
the Investment Management Association. The PRA seeks input from ﬁ rms on the effectiveness and quality 
of its supervisory framework and approach through individual feedback from ﬁ rms to their usual supervisory 
contact; industry events and forums; the PRA’s consultation process; and engagement with the PRA’s 
Practitioner Panel. The PRA also asks ﬁ rms to complete an annual feedback survey. In 2014/15, ‘Overall, the 
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feedback suggests that the majority of respondents have a positive view of the PRA (93% of respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed that they have an effective relationship with the PRA).’41
There are no requirements for the PRA to consult academics, consumer groups or the public. The PRA is 
not required to formally consult the FCA Consumer Panel, although the Consumer Panel does have the 
right to communicate its views to the PRA.
Independent Reviews. The Bank commissioned a number of independent reviews. These have included 
reviews of the transparency arrangements for monetary policy, its forecasting performance, its provision 
of liquidity during the ﬁ nancial crisis, its framework for providing liquidity to the banking system, the 
failure of a major payment system and its knowledge and involvement into manipulation of the foreign 
exchange market. These have been undertaken by bankers, ex-central bankers and the former Chairman 
of Arcadia Lord Grabiner QC. 
Evaluation Ofﬁ ce. The Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ ce (IEO), established in September 2014, supports 
the Court in discharging its statutory obligations to keep the performance of the Bank under review. 
It operates at arm’s length from the business areas of the Bank and is staffed by a small, permanent 
secretariat headed by an Evaluation Director reporting directly to the Chairman of Court. The IEO 
undertakes one-off assessments as well as regular reporting to Court on the performance of the Bank’s 
policy areas and strategy. The IEO has recently undertaken an evaluation of the PRA’s approach to 
implementing its competition objective.
Staff Blog. Bank Underground is a new blog written by staff at the Bank of England. The blog was 
launched as part of the Bank’s Strategic Plan which called for a new publication giving insight into topical 
issues from a staff perspective rather than that of the MPC, FPC or PRA board. On Bank Underground, 
authors write in an individual capacity and there is no ‘house view’. Some posts broadly accord with the 
Bank’s ofﬁ cial views or provide further underpinning for them. Other posts differ from the Bank’s ofﬁ cial 
position and the external consensus.
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Open Forum. The Bank of England Open Forum was held on 11th November 2015. It was held to take stock 
of reforms and discuss the future of markets. It brought together policymakers, ﬁ nancial market participants 
and users, academics, media representatives and wider society. This included discussions about the role of 
ﬁ nancial markets in the economy, the impact of regulation and building a social licence for markets. The Bank 
concluded that it and others had a ‘responsibility to explain clearly to the public what we are doing to make 
ﬁ nancial markets better serve the needs of society so everyone can enter into the debate.’ This would involve 
talking and listening to the public so that the Bank understood their needs and challenges as consumers. The 
Bank also committed to talking and listening to a broader set of stakeholders across society when it designs 
and implements policy. 
National Audit Ofﬁ ce. Historically the Bank of England has been outside the scope of the NAO. The new 
Bank of England Act brings the Bank within the scope of the NAO so that the NAO can conduct value 
for money studies of the BoE and the PRA. However, the NAO has its ability to do this restricted in that 
it cannot examine policy decisions taken by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), FPC or the Board of 
the PRA. It also cannot examine supervision decisions relating to payment systems, settlement systems or 
clearing houses. 
Leadership
Senior Managers Regime. The Bank intends to apply the core principles of the Senior Managers Regime 
(SMR) to its own senior managers. In line with PRA rules the principles of the SMR will apply primarily to the 
Governor and Deputy Governors, the Chair of Court, and members of Court who chair certain operational 
committees. The Bank will map how the Bank’s responsibilities are discharged, and allocate responsibilities 
to individual senior managers. These maps will be published. It will also describe and publish its governance 
structure. The Bank will also ‘take a rigorous approach to senior managers’ suitability including having a 
‘robust’ appointments process, assessing ongoing suitability of senior executives for their role annually and 
improving the induction package to ensure that new senior managers fully understand their responsibilities.
Governance of the Bank of England. The Bank’s Court of Directors acts as a unitary board, setting the 
organisation’s strategy and budget and taking key decisions on resourcing and appointments. Required to 
meet a minimum seven times per year, it has four executive members from the Bank and up to nine non-
executive members. Subject to the activities which are reserved by statute for the MPC, FPC and PRA Board, 
Court is responsible for managing the Bank’s business, and where appropriate it may delegate as it sees 
ﬁ t. The Court has a majority of independent non-executive members and an independent non-executive 
Chairman. Non-executive members of the Bank’s Court also regularly met without executive members, 
both informally and in the form of the Oversight Committee of the Court and have the right to commission 
reviews into the Bank’s performance. The Oversight Committee has been abolished and the number of 
non-executive members on the Court is being reduced from nine to seven.
Governance of the PRA. The Board of the PRA is chaired by the Governor and includes four Bank of England 
staff, the CEO of the FCA and six external members. The external members currently include ex-banking and 
insurance executives, management consultants and lawyers. The Bank of England Bill will replace the PRA 
Board with a Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC), which will take decisions about the PRA’s rules, policies 
and supervision. However, the PRC will no longer take decisions on issues such as staff terms and conditions, 
recruitment and IT. Members of the PRC will be appointed by the Chancellor, rather than the Court with the 
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approval of the Treasury. A review of the PRA Board’s effectiveness by the Chairman of the Bank’s Court found 
that ‘Overall, the Board was seen to be working well’. Three main areas for improvement were identiﬁ ed: the 
measurement of the PRA’s performance against objectives; talent management and succession planning; 
and the volume of material on Board agendas. PRA Board members can continue to hold senior positions in 
regulated companies, although currently none do so. External Board members are dominated by those with 
banking and insurance experience.
Measurement
Organisational Performance. The PRA keeps track of (1) employee turnover, (2) breaches of the 
Memorandum of Understanding with the FCA (3) an annual feedback survey of regulated ﬁ rms, (3) the 
number of complaints (4) complaints received by the Complaints Commissioner and (5) attendance at 
Board meetings. None of these metrics directly measure culture. It is also difﬁ cult to identify clear and 
objective outcome measures for the PRA and the BoE. This means the organisation has to rely on a range 
of metrics to track its over-arching performance. 
Individual Performance. The performance of staff has a clear link to reward and is based on staff meeting 
objectives aligned with the Strategic Plan as well as peer reviews whereby staff assess their own performance 
and that of those around them. Behaviours would be a critical part of the review.
Collaboration 
Collaboration with Industry. The PRA collaborates by gathering individual feedback from ﬁ rms, attending 
industry events and forums, a wider consultant process and engagement with the PRA’s practitioner panel. The 
PRA holds brieﬁ ngs for small groups of ﬁ rms to emphasise regulatory activity. 93% of industry respondents 
to the PRA’s survey agreed or strongly agreed that they had an effective relationship with the PRA.42 
Collaboration with other regulators. There was also some evidence of collaboration within the regulators 
such as three joint meetings between the PRA board and the FPC. The annual report points out that ‘the PRA 
continued to work closely with the FCA across a range of supervisory and policy matters’. There continues 
to be some shared IT systems between the PRA and the FCA. 
Staff Responses
Mixed Responses. A survey of staff at the bank as a whole showed there was some degree of trepidation 
about the One Bank initiative among longer staying staff.43 A National Audit Ofﬁ ce report found that a more 
judgement based approach has meant that decisions are being taking at more senior levels. This has reduced 
supervisors ‘own decision-making and motivation’. The Bank’s own staff survey showed that staff are proud 
to work for the Bank, it is strong on teamwork and collaboration, managers acting on people’s suggestions 
and the Bank’s overall performance on delivering its mission. The most negative responses were to questions 
about performance evaluation, reward, communications with staff and barriers to staff doing their job well. 
One of the least favourable answers was also given to a question about the Bank’s strategic plan: Only 35% 
of staff gave a favourable answer to the question ‘Based on my recent experiences, the Bank’s Strategic Plan 
and initiatives are having a positive impact on the way we work’ with 21% giving an unfavourable answer and 
40% neutral.
Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England  |  37
Growing complexity of regulation
The FCA and the PRA now have rulebooks, guidance and supervisory statements of over 13,000 
pages, an increase from 8,000 in 2007. This ﬁ gure probably under-estimates the increase as the 
PRA moved to a smaller font size for its rulebook. To buy a printed copy of the FCA rulebook now 
costs £3,641, the same as a second hand Mini Cooper.
This growing complexity of regulation, particularly as it becomes closer to implementation is 
not unique to the UK. In the US, The Volcker Rule – which aimed to prevent banks from engaging 
in proprietary trading - went from a three-page memorandum by Paul Volcker, to 11 pages of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, and then to over 900 pages of regulation and commentary on the Volcker 
rule in 2013.44 
Standards concerning the amount of capital banks need to hold have also become far more 
complex. The ﬁ rst Basel Accord, Basel I, consisted of 30 pages. Its revision in 2004, Basel II, had 
expanded to 347 pages. The last revision in 2010, Basel III, covers 616 pages, twice as big as 
Basel II, and more than twenty times as big as the original accord of 1988. The application of 
these requirements has also increased in complexity. Initially, Basel I had ﬁ ve risk categories for 
the calculation of the risk-weighted capital of a bank. Under Basel II and III, this increased to 
more than 200,000 risk categories for a large bank. A comparable evolution is that of the 
number of calculations to be made by a large bank to determine its risk-weighted capital. This 
number increased from a few calculations under Basel I to more than 200 million calculations 
under Basel III.45 
In addition to growing detail of rules, the regulators supervisory approach became more detailed. 
An assessment by the FSA of the prudential and conduct risks in a bank, known as an Advanced 
Risk Response Operating frameWork (ARROW) assessment, became extremely resource intensive. 
It could involve up to 130 interviews and a broad Risk Mitigation Plan would be developed, with
the points ticked off a long list with little consideration of whether they had been addressed effectively. 
Drivers of complexity
There were several drivers of this increasing complexity. Among ﬁ rms there was a desire for 
certainty about the standards. Regulators also prefer more detailed rules as this gives staff 
clearer standards to apply, makes it easier to challenge non-compliance and also demonstrates 
regulatory activity. Others we spoke to noted that we had given regulators very difﬁ cult tasks. For 
example, designing a letter which encouraged consumers to shop around for retirement income 
products was an almost impossible task. Writing and constantly re-writing these sorts of disclosure 
documents every few years was resource intensive, but there was no evidence it generated any 
improvements to competition.
Distortions to competition
Growing complexity in regulation also constitutes a barrier to entry into the banking sector. The 
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compliance costs associated with the laws and regulations are often sunk costs. Higher sunk costs 
reduce the incentive for entry into the market. By creating economies of scale, these higher ﬁ xed 
costs create an unequal playing ﬁ eld between small entrants and existing large players. 
Larger banks and institutions have a close and continuous relationship with the regulator. This 
can also distort competition. The largest banks and other institutions have teams of people within 
the regulators they can use to test ideas or to ask questions. Smaller banks and institutions do 
not have the same access. For example we were told that if the CEO of a medium sized institution 
wants to ask the FCA a question then they have to ring the call centre.
Problems from excessive complexity
Those who spoke at New City Agenda’s lectures also noted some of the problems from 
excessively complex regulation:
“Complexity…opens up more ways to obscure the ﬂ aws of the regulations from the 
public and creates the pretence of action even if regulations are ineffective.” 46 
– Professor Anat Admati
“A great deal of complexity of modern ﬁ nance is [to exploit complexities in the regulatory 
system]. We try to lay down rules from the centre. These have unintended consequences 
and markets develop in order to circumvent or mitigate the impact of these rules. We then 
construct more complex rules to try to deal with it and that process goes on and on forever, 
and it goes on in a way that is more and more complicated and less and less effective. In truth, 
if that kind of structure would have worked the Soviet Union would have worked” 47
– John Kay
“Incoherent conglomerates have spawned ﬁ endishly complex regulation which creates a 
barrier to entry and is a dead-weight cost: like a bindweed, it strangles value and entrenches 
sometimes surreal and unnecessary complexity. The provision of different services – some 
core utilities; some discretionary risk businesses – results in a form of regulatory capture with 
the valid pursuit of risk becoming a prisoner of its bedfellow, certainty.” 48 
– Rhydian Lewis, CEO RateSetter
The future
Some in the industry and regulators wished to return to an earlier era when supervision would be 
based on high-level discussions between ﬁ rms and regulators. Banks would respond to the points 
raised, respected the regulators and would not ask for justiﬁ cation in the form of detailed rules. 
Some said that the environment had changed and that banks and their armies of lawyers would 
be willing and able to challenge everything that wasn’t codiﬁ ed. Others have noted that rules are 
necessary to ensure consistency across different institutions. Whilst many in the ﬁ nancial services 
industry have called for simpler regulation few had concrete suggestions of how it could be 
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achieved or particularly costly regulations they would like to remove. Whilst saying they were 
in favour of principles, some in the industry showed a stubborn attachment to particular rules.
Indeed, some stakeholders we spoke to pointed out that it was not only the regulator which had 
a culture of box-ticking. Too many ﬁ rms also had a culture of box-ticking, which saw regulation 
as the only guide to acceptable behaviour. Firms responded to ever more complex regulation by 
engaging in gaming to operate within the letter, not the spirit of the rules. This led to waves of 
ever more complex regulation and detailed box-ticking supervision.
What many respondents agreed on was that moving to a less complex regulatory system will 
inevitably involve giving more discretion to regulators. This will require a change in the culture of 
the regulatory organisations – where currently hierarchy and conformity are more valued than 
judgement and individuality.
Length of FCA/PRA rules, guidance and supervisory statements
Financial Conduct Authority
Background – Shoot First, Ask Questions Later
New Culture. Following the creation of the FCA, senior leaders claimed that they would seek to signiﬁ cantly 
change the regulator’s culture. It was hoped they could make the FCA more proactive, transparent and 
consumer-focused in its approach. It would develop a ‘judgement based’, ‘forward looking’ and ‘forward 
thinking’ approach. There was the intention for the FCA to be more proactive – characterised as “shoot ﬁ rst, 
ask questions later” – although it should be noted that Martin Wheatley’s use of this phrase only referred to 
the new power the regulator had to ban products, rather than its entire portfolio of activities.
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“The key difference between the future and now, and forgive me for being scary in my use of analogy, 
is we are being given the power to shoot ﬁ rst and ask questions later. Today’s approach is we ﬁ nd a 
problem and do lots of analysis, then we publish a set of draft rules and do a cost beneﬁ t analysis, we 
consult with the industry and you tell us we have got it wrong, and we publish another set of rules. 
A year later we get to the point where we think we got it right ﬁ rst time. We have got to reverse that 
process. The presumption is we will step in to make temporary banning orders, where products or 
certain features are removed, or removed from particular parts of the market, and then we will do the 
consultation and cost beneﬁ t analysis.”  - Martin Wheatley 49
New Assumptions. The assumption of ‘rational economic actors’ at the heart of the FSA’s thinking 
was challenged. This entailed rethinking the idea that ‘everything and everyone behaves entirely 
predictably – or at least predictably in the classical economic sense: (1) where consumers are always 
rational actors, (2) where prices are competitive and respond to new information, (3) where people 
read and understood the terms and conditions.’ The FCA said that this was a false paradigm. ‘Looking 
back now, we can see this approach to regulation was ﬂ awed. It was too simplistic and inﬂ exible. It 
left too many questions unanswered.’ 50
New Functions and strategies. To reﬂ ect its new operational objective to promote effective competition, 
the FCA created a new Competition division and recruited around 30 staff. A number of market studies were 
launched, including cash savings, retirement income products and general insurance add-ons. The FCA also 
developed a new communications and media strategy which was more overt, aimed at both consumers and 
regulated ﬁ rms, had a more aggressive tone and was designed to establish an identity and establish with the 
industry what the FCA stood for. 
Areas for Change. The FCA sought to change its culture to be more forward looking by: 
1. Acting on market intelligence earlier from a wider range of market participants, including consumers, 
trade bodies and individual ﬁ rms; 
2. Being more willing to act on some hard evidence, rather than waiting for a comprehensive search for 
all possible evidence; 
3. Being more willing to engage with the industry and trade bodies at an earlier stage. 
There was also an acknowledgement that senior managers would maintain cultural control across the entire 
organisation. The 2014 FCA Board effectiveness review found that the FCA Board ‘sets a good example by 
attaching considerable importance to the FCA’s own culture’ but suggested that the formal mechanisms for 
assessing this should be improved.51 The 2015 Board effectiveness review concluded that:
“All directors are aware that a successful transformation from the FSA to the FCA is dependent on a 
tangible change of organisational culture. The previous regime is described as silo-orientated and 
defensive, and unlike the PRA, the FCA did not have the advantage of changing its location. There has 
been an effort to reconstruct the culture through teamwork (including the development of house 
views) and improved levels of openness. The current culture is described as professional, purposeful 
and increasingly collegiate. There is a mix of existing and newly appointed executives, described as 
engaged and with a good understanding of values, and staff survey results are improving.” 52 
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The FCA also articulated some cultural characteristics and personal qualities it sought to promote. 
These included:
• Five cultural characteristics: Backbone, Professional excellence, Curiosity, Already on the case, 
Strength as a team; and 
• Three personal strengths: Judgement, Drive, Inﬂ uence.
FCA work on bank culture
At the same time as the FCA was seeking to understand and transform its own culture, it 
also sought to monitor the culture of the organisations which it regulates. In a 2013 speech, 
Clive Adamson, then Director of Supervision at the FCA said that ‘Culture is like DNA. It shapes 
judgements, ethics and behaviours displayed at those key moments, big or small, that matter 
to the performance and reputation of ﬁ rms and the service that it provides to customers and 
clients’.53 In another speech, Martin Wheatley pointed out that ‘You can’t always react or 
respond to gross derelictions of moral duty with a tick list of technical submissions … There has 
to be some sense of ethics and responsibility: of culpability when things go wrong and pride 
when things go right’.54 
This emphasis on individual responsibility and culture led to a number of initiatives to track and 
measure culture within regulated institutions. The 2015/16 FCA Business Plan listed ﬁ rm culture 
as one of its priority issues. It would conduct a thematic review on ‘whether culture change 
programmes in retail and wholesale banks were driving the right behaviour, in particular focusing 
on remuneration, appraisal and promotion decisions of middle management, as well as how 
concerns are reported and acted on’.
On 31st December 2015 it became known that the FCA was scrapping its thematic review of bank 
culture and would engage with banks as part of the process of supervision. This meant there would 
be no public report published of the progress banks were making. Instead the results would be 
discussed with the banks in secret. The FCA also said that it did not want to duplicate the work of 
the Banking Standards Board (BSB). This was despite the fact that the BSB is a voluntary initiative, 
is not publishing a transparent assessment of progress and has no power to sanction any of its 
members. Some stakeholders thought that scrapping the bank culture review showed a complete 
insensitivity to the problems which still exist in the culture of banks. They thought the FCA was 
too optimistic about the progress that had been made and the potential to make further progress 
within a short space of time. Under the approach of the FCA and the BSB, individual banks won’t 
be held accountable for progress and there will be no transparency or independent evaluation. 
There was concern that the FCA was trying to franchise out this vital work.
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Mechanisms for Cultural Change
Competence development 
More Competent Staff. The FCA sought to change the ‘tone from the top’ by strengthening recruitment of 
senior staff, testing their technical ability, but also examining their characteristics and behaviour. To further 
develop their existing staff, the FCA launched the FCA Academy. This offers executive education which 
involve technical academies, management training as well as an FCA diploma. Finally, the FCA reviews staff 
departures through tracking turnover, sickness and high performing leavers. It is examining how to manage 
risks with staff turnover and knowledge retention. 
Remuneration
Pay and Bonuses. Levels of remuneration are decided by the FCA executive committee. Staff can receive 
basic pay, membership of a deﬁ ned contribution pension scheme and a performance-related bonus. This 
is determined by whether individuals achieve their objectives associated with the business plan as well as 
individual areas of responsibility. In 2015/16, 96.2% of staff received a bonus, with 80.9% receiving a bonus 
of more than a tenth of their salary. Directors can receive bonuses of up to 35% of basic salary – although in 
recent years bonuses have typically been between 15% and 20% of salary. We believe that bonuses for FCA 
staff, including directors, are paid in cash and are not subject to any form of deferral or clawback. There had 
also recently been across the board increases in holiday allowances.
Hiring 
Reducing Staff Turnover. The FCA stated that hiring was a major way it could build the right culture. An 
important part of this was hiring people who have more experience into established roles and ensuring new 
recruits have experience in the sector which they regulate. The FCA has also sought to cut down on the 
amount of turnover within the organisation – reducing turnover from 15% to 8.9% in the 2014/15, but 
this increased to 11.5% in 2015/16. Over one-third of employees have been with the organisation for two 
years or less.
Performance management and promotion 
Better Performance Management. The FCA has sought to connect its remuneration with performance. 
Remuneration for higher level executives is connected with achieving objectives set out in the business plan. 
We did not manage to discover how the FCA’s performance management scheme operated for mid-level 
managers and frontline staff.
Internal reporting of concerns 
The FCA had a whistleblowing procedure with the ability to report concerns to line managers, internal audit 
or the Treasury.
Measurement of success and employees
Unclear Measures of Success. The FCA used a range of measures to determine their success including 
Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England  |  43
customer satisfaction, practitioner satisfaction, its staff survey, the number of breaches of the MoU with 
the PRA, the number of complaints closed from ﬁ rms and consumers and employee turnover. It also reports 
data on enforcement action, including number of cases opened and closed, levels of ﬁ nes and other penalties 
and the length of time taken to complete cases. Although the FCA claims to have an “outcomes-based” 
performance framework, it does not provide any clear detail about how it is measuring the vast majority of 
the outcomes outlined in the table below taken from its annual report.
FCA: Measuring performance against the statutory objectives
Statutory 
objectives
Ensuring that ﬁ nancial services markets function well
Securing an appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers
Promoting effective competition in 
the interests of consumers
Protecting and enhancing 
the integrity of the UK 
ﬁ nancial system
Outcomes Consumers 
have access to 
fair products 
and services, 
which deliver 
what they 
promise
Consumers 
can be 
conﬁ dent 
that ﬁ rms 
treat them 
fairly and 
ﬁ x problems 
promptly
Competition 
contributes 
to improved 
consumer 
outcomes
Firms compete 
on clear costs 
and consumers 
have the 
information 
they need
Consumers 
can trust ﬁ rms 
to be ﬁ t and 
proper and 
for ﬁ nancial 
markets to be 
clean
A respected 
regulatory 
system that 
lets good ﬁ rms 
know where 
they stand
Outcomes 
indicators
Fair products 
and services
Building 
trust and 
engagement
Value for 
money 
products and 
services
Competitive 
markets
Clean 
regulated 
markets
Attractiveness 
of market
Improved 
consumer 
experience
Effective 
remedies
Getting better 
service
Clear and 
useful 
information
Low ﬁ nancial 
crime
Respected, 
joined-up 
regulation
Collaboration
Within the FCA. The FCA intended to ensure there was greater collaboration within the FCA to ensure 
that causes of problems are addressed before they can become full blown issues which ﬁ rms need to take 
action to address. 
With Other Regulators. There are also Memorandums of Understanding with other organisations 
such as those between the FCA and other regulators. The relationship with the PRA is particularly important 
in the area of policy making. The FCA do mention that the co-ordination between both regulators has been 
problematic at some points, which has ‘led to some delays, and authorisations of ﬁ rms and approvals of 
individuals, where there continue to be some systems issues that have caused delays to information-sharing.’ 55 
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Leadership
Board Membership. The FCA Board is made up of a Chairman, the FCA CEO, three executive directors, the 
Bank of England’s Deputy Governor for prudential regulation and four non-executive directors appointed 
by HM Treasury and two appointed jointly by HM Treasury and BIS. Following the ﬁ nancial crisis the 
Government made a concerted effort to appoint more individuals with a broader range of experience, 
including consumer experience to the FSA Board. This was partly in response to criticism that the FSA 
Board had been dominated by those with industry experience, including Sir James Crosby, who was CEO of 
HBOS whilst also being a member of the FSA Board. However, as the terms of the more consumer-focussed 
members of the FCA Board expired they have been replaced by those with more industry related experience. 
The Board meets around 16 times a year and publishes minutes of its meetings. Below the Board is the 
Executive Committee (ExCo), which is made up of the executive members of the Board – the ExCo does not 
publish minutes of its meetings. Every year a strategy day was held, last year it was at the O2, and the ExCo 
would all appear on stage together and take questions from the audience of FCA staff.
Internal / External Challenge
Consultation with consumers and ﬁ rms. The FCA has duty to consult both consumers and practitioners 
when proposing policy and guidance. It also has a formal duty to consult the PRA. The FCA was required to 
consult the four panels established by legislation – the Practitioner Panel, Smaller Business Practitioner Panel, 
Financial Services Consumer Panel and a new FCA Markets Practitioner Panel. A new Consumer Network was 
established, including 10 consumer groups – to try and ensure that the FCA engaged with a wider range of 
consumer groups. The aim was to identify the early indicators that may alert the FCA to issues or trends that 
could harm consumers. For example, collaboration with Citizens Advice highlighted the consumer harm that 
was being created by credit brokers.
Occasional Papers. The FCA published a series of Occasional Papers on priority subjects such as the use of 
behavioural economics, trials of different approaches for redress and information provision and consumer 
vulnerability. The Paper on Consumer Vulnerability developed a deﬁ nition of vulnerability and was designed 
to stimulate debate and aid ﬁ rms in developing strategies to deal with vulnerable consumers, such as those 
suffering from illness, disability or bereavement. It is not clear how the conclusions from these occasional 
papers are taken into account in FCA policy development.
FCA Staff Responses 
Staff Survey Results. The FCA conducts an annual staff survey. The FCA refused to publish the results 
of this survey until it was compelled to by a Freedom of Information request, perhaps not an indicator 
of a wholehearted commitment to openness. The survey covers issues including engagement, wellbeing, 
leadership, line management, development of the FCA, career & talent management, working at the FCA 
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and performance support. In the majority of the categories, favourable responses had deteriorated since 
2014, with the larges declines in the areas of leadership and performance support. The results are below the 
comparable benchmarks for UK ﬁ nancial services companies in all areas except engagement, wellbeing and 
line management. However, the FCA’s results are above the UK public sector norms.
FCA 2015 Staff survey results
Category Total Favourable 
Score FCA 2015
Compared with
FCA 2014 FCA 2013 UK ﬁ nancial 
Companies
Development of the FCA 73 -3 2 -6
Leadership 50 -7 -5 -7
Engagement 84 -2 2 5
Wellbeing 80 -1 2 14
Career & Talent Management 44 -3 3 -6
Line Management 80 0 1 1
Working at FCA 63 -3 1 -7
Performance Support 62 -9 -9 -7
In addition to the FCA’s own survey, we spoke with a number of current and former FCA employees 
about the culture of the organisation. They identiﬁ ed a range of drivers and inhibitors of cultural change 
at the regulator. 
Drivers of Change 
Leadership. When Martin Wheatley took over at the FCA, he introduced a more muscular approach to 
enforcement. One ex-staff member told us that ‘Wheatley was a galvanising force – people felt backed up 
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and like they had a mission’. Another said ‘Bold statements that the regulator would be more proactive 
and aggressive (changing tone from the top) were well received within the regulator and were helpful to 
drive staff. 30% extra resource was put into enforcement –to back up the tougher talk’. Some dissented 
with one person telling us that ‘Management lacked gravitas, lacked visibility. They sat in an ivory tower. 
Communication from management was lacking’. 
Signiﬁ cant Cultural Change. One employee told us that there was a ‘Lot of emphasis at the time from 
top management that this entailed cultural change. They established new cultural characteristics. They 
emphasised a more proactive regulator, who doesn’t retrospectively respond but acts sooner.’ 
Many staff thought the cultural change was well communicated. One said there was ‘Lots of good internal 
comms and learning opportunities: Culture change was achieved through regular communication from senior 
management, know-how sharing’. They also described how top management ‘really communicated what 
(the cultural values) means in practice’. These values used to be their screensaver. We were told ‘there were 
internal values champions who initially let people know about characteristics and what they meant. This was 
Stage 1 –raising awareness. Since 9 months ago, it’s Stage 2 –now they are aware but need to continue to 
embed it’. Another ex-employee of the regulator told us the ‘change processes were very good. There was 
much better and more frequent feedback provided by senior executives to frontline staff. Senior staff – in 
particular Martin Wheatley – actually walked the ﬂ oor and held informal and formal feedback sessions. 
Staff were encouraged to read speeches from senior executives. There were large divisional meetings to get 
everyone engaged’. 
This was not just ‘tone from the top’, but appeared to be translated into a larger cultural change initiative. 
One staff member we spoke with told us that there had ‘been a big culture change effort, with initiatives 
starting when the FCA was created, where a new set of values and corresponding behaviours were 
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announced. ‘[Managers] had to roll it out to the entire population [of staff] and take people with them, 
embody [The values]. And we have staff surveys, which ask our staff if they know what the values are and 
what they mean, I do not have the numbers, but I know that more and more people know what [the values] 
mean for their jobs on a day to day basis’. 
Although staff saw a clear process, there was also a signiﬁ cant amount of ambiguity. One employee we 
spoke with didn’t really know what this process of ‘embedding’ entailed. They pointed out that there were 
‘values champions’, but they were changed every year. The employee also pointed out that staff ‘Used to 
make fun of [the new FCA cultural characteristic of] ‘Backbone’ because it wasn’t obvious what it meant’. 
They also noticed that the cultural characteristics were ‘not part of the annual appraisal, but something in 
bear in mind and something that comes up in conversations’.
We were unable to ﬁ nd any written documentation which outlined the full extent of the FCA’s cultural 
change initiatives.
Friendly. Staff said the FCA had a relatively friendly and supportive culture. One ex-employee we spoke 
with told us that ‘when I moved into the regulator I was pleasantly surprised about the friendliness and 
openness of people, the organisation was set up relatively straight forward, everyone had their name on top 
of their screen, so it was easy to identify and ﬁ nd the people around ...so my initial impression was, this feels 
relatively commercial, and not as archaic as I would expect. My expectation was to get to an archaic, paper-
ridden place. Instead I found a positively surprising environment’. 
Sense of purpose for individual employees. Many of the regulatory ofﬁ cials we spoke with told us that 
they had a clear sense of purpose. One person told us ‘my colleagues are very proud of what they are 
doing. Me too.’ A number of senior regulatory ofﬁ cials we spoke with who now work for banks or advisors 
continued to identify with their previous roles at the FSA/FCA. A common metaphor used to describe 
themselves was like ‘Blackpool rock – if you cut me in half you will see FCA written right through me’. Many 
of the employees reported feeling challenged in their jobs. They said job satisfaction is generally very high. 
According to the employee survey results, everyone working there is really committed to the organisation. 
Often this was related to the kind of job they were doing – they felt that it was ‘something worthwhile’.
High Calibre staff. Many of staff and ex-staff we spoke with told us that employees at the FCA were 
generally very high calibre. One person told us in their team all staff came ‘from strong academic 
backgrounds, good quality intellectual people’ and this was ‘consistent across most of the people I met’ 
working in the FCA. Another told us that ‘the calibre of people was unbelievable’. This employee thought that 
they would ‘shoot to the top there after extensive industry experience, but the talent pool was unbelievable. 
I didn’t expect this outside the private sector. They had top lawyers from the Magic Circle ﬁ rms. They 
wanted better work/life balance but still with the challenge. They have better hours here’. In journalist Joris 
Luyendijk’s investigation of the culture of the London ﬁ nancial industries, he spoke with a senior regulator 
who said that ‘the perception is that the regulator is sort of the B-team, those who didn’t make it in, or into, 
the banks. It really doesn’t seem like that at all, on the ground. There is more room to be eccentric here, 
certainly, as the culture is less conformist. But B-team? Just ask recruiters – they give us job offers at banks 
all the time’.
Learning opportunities. The ﬁ nal factor which the staff and ex-staff we spoke to thought was positive was 
the availability of learning opportunities. We were told that the ‘Training sessions are remarkably good. Under 
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manager level, you don’t go away for residential training but experts and academics regularly give a talk 
on topical issues, such as behavioural economics or from Bank of England talking about where the economy 
is going in the next 3 months. There are weekly departmental and team meetings, where the department 
head shares publications ... everyone is encouraged to share any interesting aspect they encounter during 
their work’. They also told us about ‘It’s like going to University, constantly getting the latest research and 
development within the ﬁ nancial industry. The FCA Academy provides all full time members of staff an 
opportunity to enrol in an MA degree in ﬁ nancial regulation.’ 
Barriers to cultural change
Overload and Pressure. The ﬁ rst factor which employees thought was a signiﬁ cant barrier to positive 
cultural change was organisational overload. One ex-FCA employee talked about the ‘feeling of being 
embattled by external pressures like the Treasury, banks, and politicians. This meant the organisation was 
a bit reactive. It was difﬁ cult to clear space to be more proactive’. 
The banks were clearly one important source of pressure. Another was the Treasury and politicians. 
We were frequently told that the FCA was at the bottom of the pecking order with the Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the PRA above it. One ex-regulator told us that ‘Treasury and politicians directly inﬂ uenced the 
regulator. Treasury could change legislation but also held meetings with the regulator’. This external inﬂ uence 
can be harmful when there are constantly shifting messages and demands. ‘To support the process of cultural 
change the regulators need stability. The political messages have got to be consistent’. One person pointed 
out there was a high degree of cautiousness because ‘People working at the FCA now could ﬁ nd themselves 
on the wrong end of a government soundbite’.
Most of the people we spoke with recognised that there are many regulatory agencies within the ﬁ nancial 
markets, and each of these agencies has been extending their regulatory remit in recent years. This does not 
only leave banks dealing with additional regulations, it also means other regulators spend much of their time 
processing and harmonising regulations produced by other regulators. One person we spoke with told us that 
‘much regulation came from Europe which left little space for domestic regulators’. 
The overload which comes from an externally imposed agenda which is constantly shifting has an impact 
on individual employees in the FCA. One person we spoke with in the FCA said ‘it is not enough to have 
these (values) set in stone, we need to ask ourselves does the environment allow me to put the values into 
practice? For example, If I am overloaded with 60 hours work, how can I be curious? ... the environment 
needs to allow the values to ﬂ ourish; it is not enough to have the values and ask the staff if they understand 
them. And I am not sure all the managers have the same awareness at the FCA’.
Little external recognition. Alongside a large amount of external pressure, regulators felt that they 
received little external recognition – particularly for doing things right. One employee of the FCA told us 
‘a regulatory body is a difﬁ cult place to be ... because if you do your job well no one knows it, but if you are 
held to account for what goes wrong, then we are perceived as really bad’. This employee added that ‘our 
biggest successes are kept secret. A lot of our success is unseen and unspoken, and it should stay like that! 
When banks got into trouble we made sure by working with them that they didn’t fail. We worked with the 
industry making sure that people’s mortgages were fulﬁ lled, same for many other events when we were 
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instrumental in protecting consumer’s interests. Those successes were not celebrated because that is the 
way it is. We enact a role of custodians of the system’.
External pressures could lead to mistakes. There was some concern this external pressure could lead 
to the FCA making similar mistakes to those the FSA made during the ﬁ nancial crisis all over again. One 
person we spoke with mentioned ‘a reticence because of [the] ‘Martin Wheatley sacking [for being too tough 
on the industry] and the strong pro-business rhetoric’. The political stance will inhibit the appetite to act 
aggressively. We were ‘entering new phase of the standard cycle of, crash/scandal, regulator becoming more 
aggressive and then swinging back to light-touch. Watering down of reverse burden of proof would make it 
harder for the regulator to take action against individuals’. The government was undermining the conﬁ dence 
of regulator which will have a knock on impact on efﬁ ciency. The regulator was supposed to be independent 
but there was a ‘clear danger of going against the Government…the regulator doesn’t have independence 
- it would be emasculated and afraid to be aggressive. The individual appointed (as the new CEO) would 
[need to] set [a] new tone from the top’.
The challenge of external pressures were also identiﬁ ed by the FCA Board effectiveness review. It said that 
recent interventions and criticism were affecting morale and leading to a number of problems: 
Directors acknowledge that recent interventions (Davis, TSC, HM Treasury), and levels of public 
scrutiny and criticism have impacted negatively on culture and morale, inﬂ uencing executive 
cautiousness, levels of defensiveness, and the willingness to escalate issues and learn from 
mistakes, as well as, potentially, attracting and retaining talent. During September’s [2015] 
[Audit Committee meeting], one director noted that the biggest risk for the Board is the current 
level of organisational change.56 
Turnover and Career progression. A further barrier to cultural change mentioned by FCA employees 
was turn-over of personnel. An ex-regulator we spoke with told us that ‘there had always been a retention 
problem at the FCA. The regulator pays a reasonable amount of money. But people left – and continue to 
leave - because of repeated change or because change had been reversed’. Another added that following 
the ﬁ nancial crisis, the FCA became a ‘parking spot’ for many people who had previously been employed 
in banks. One regulatory ofﬁ cial describes the situation as follows: ‘The ﬁ nancial crisis did a number of 
interesting things the FCA needed to recruit a number of external people, simultaneously banks were 
not hiring anymore. So a lot of people from banking went into the FCA as a parking spot, waiting for the 
recruitment in banks to pick up again, and then leave, and put a couple of years experience in one’s CV, 
and then trying to get out again’. 
Closely linked with issues of turnover were concerns about a lack of career progression. This was succinctly 
explained by an ex-employee who said there is ‘still problem of progression –there was zero scope for 
promotion/career progression. People knew that they were never going to get promoted. You had to leave 
and many did’. Another person told us that ‘if you come from a bank and you want to have an idea of 
career progression and that your voice is heard, it is more suffocating, you always need to wait your turn 
to get a decision made. It’s down to processes; if you are used to getting decisions made quickly this can 
become frustrating ... This is also happening now, people that have joined the FCA from the banking industry 
are desperate to get out of the FCA ... They just come in for a couple of years, put it down in their CV and 
move back to the ﬁ rms’. Promotion was also based on reputation and image of an employee rather than 
independent assessments of performance. Another person added that ‘the negative (of the FCA) is that 
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it’s a very ﬂ at structure. It is very difﬁ cult to get promoted. Progression is much harder than at any other 
company’. This employee noted that the FCA would generally ‘Matched the salary (they had at the) bank, 
but the salary doesn’t tend to rise’. This employee told us how they were frequently called by recruitment 
consultant but that they ‘don’t want to do a less meaningful job for a bank for 20K more’. 
Bureaucracy and silos. A further barrier to cultural change is extensive bureaucracy and organisational silos 
within the FCA. This slowed down change processes as well as displacing work. One ex-employee told us that 
at the FCA ‘it takes a week to do the work, and months to get it through the committees and structure’. Part 
of this was due to a bureaucratic heritage within the organisation. One employee mentioned that ‘people 
that had been there for a long time were very structured and bureaucratic, slow, procedural and methodical 
in making decision’. This meant it would take a ‘long time for decision making but be relatively transparent. 
The people that would come from different organisations, who were all a little frustrated that some decisions 
need to be made much quicker, but these people ... would understand why decisions were made so slowly, 
and also why often decisions were not made at all.’ It was also mentioned that ‘if something is in writing at 
least a 100 people needs to review it’.
One side effect of these bureaucratic processes was that they created silos within the organisation and 
barriers to communication between different departments. One person told us that ‘although it was a 
friendly environment there was not much cross-divisional fertilisation, there was a culture of silos. Whether it 
was personality or structure, I was surprised I could never get to communicate across departments as I would 
have wanted, It might have come down to politics, to turf wars amongst management people, there was an 
element of land grabbing and ambitions’.
One of the central tensions continued to be between the supervision and enforcement departments. A 
regulatory ofﬁ cial in a bank described how this relationship was ‘a constant negotiating process. Supervisors 
are really busy, deal with all the difﬁ cult jobs, they need to anticipate what will blow up next so they have to 
be always on the ball. They are always busy and arguably overworked.. They are concerned that enforcement 
may compromise the relationships they built with the banks. It is very political’. 
Summary – FCA staff views on the 
organisation’s culture 
There are some clear positives at the FCA including a sense of purpose, a friendly environment, high quality 
staff and many learning opportunities. There are also negatives include staff turnover, overload and external 
pressure and bureaucracy. There seemed to be an overarching concern that Martin Wheatley had galvanised 
staff, but that there was a danger of back-sliding. 
The mixed culture at the FCA was very well captured by one employee who described it as the following: 
The positives: as a working environment is open and transparent, and the work life balance is better. There 
is an amount of work to do and you do it…it was interesting work, you felt you are making a difference, the 
remuneration was ok, but that some people coming from banks were paid more. Probably what was not so 
good was that there was poor cross-fertilisation, it was bureaucratic, but ultimately you understand why 
because everything had to be documented because of freedom of information, you need to have an audit 
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trail. The area in which they could have done better about career questions; also decision-making changed, 
I felt there was more responsibility given at a lower level and that seems now to have disappeared, the 
decision making has gone up again particularly on the ﬁ rm supervision side’. 
Common themes across the Bank, PRA and FCA
There were a number of common themes in both the organisations which have been identiﬁ ed 
as needing improvement. 
Hiring and Turnover
High Staff Turnover. Both regulators had developed long term strategies to attract talent. However, it was 
not certain whether these strategies were actually working. 26% of resignations from the PRA in 2013 were 
identiﬁ ed as ‘high performers’. In October 2013, 34% of FCA staff had only two years or less of experience 
with the regulator. This loss or lack of experience could lead to a troubling situation where the industry 
began to see the regulator as inexperienced, thereby undermining their capacity to regulate. 
Measurement 
Unclear Measurement. There needed to be further evaluation of the costs and beneﬁ ts of the activities of 
the regulators. The FCA only assessed the costs and beneﬁ ts of what it planned to do and did not evaluate 
different options. Both regulators planned to develop a method for directing regulatory resource – but they 
had not done so as yet. 
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Each of the regulators needed to go further to reﬁ ne their means of measuring the impact of their activities. 
The NAO report states that ‘each regulator has established a performance measurement framework, set out 
operational aims and what success looks like, and developed metrics for measuring performance. At present 
the metrics do not bring together information on whether their intended outcomes are being met and the 
contribution that each regulator’s performance makes in achieving those outcomes. The PRA Board has 
reviewed and revised its management information in taking an early view on its strategic focus, but the FCA 
has not yet planned a similar exercise.’57 Although there is some intention to measure performance, there is 
also little in the way of a systematic frameworks within which to undertake this activity. 
Collaboration
Poor Data Collection. There has been a signiﬁ cant change in the way that the regulators supervise ﬁ rms. 
One of the most signiﬁ cant aspects of this change has been a move to forward looking regulation and also 
a greater emphasis on issues such as conduct and risk rather than just compliance with legal standards. 
Despite improvements, there are some potential shortcomings. It was too early to evaluate the effectiveness 
of this new forward looking approach to regulation. There are also some important shortcomings with data 
collection systems. In particular, the regulators don’t have a strategic approach to understanding the data 
which they hold and how it might be used. 
Transparency 
Lack of Transparency. There are also issues around transparency. The FCA and the PRA were somewhat 
opaque and it was unclear how they operated internally. Also, due to the restrictions imposed on regulators 
by Parliament, the auditor was unable to gain full access to information from the regulator. In a recent 
study into the action taken by the FCA to prevent mis-selling, the NAO said that the restrictions limit its 
“ability to reach a judgement on the FCA’s value for money, as we could not carry out a full assessment of 
the effectiveness of the FCA’s actions. For instance, we have only limited evidence on how the FCA’s actions 
have changed ﬁ rm behaviour, and how effective its redress schemes have been in providing compensation 
to consumers.” 58 As we will see in the next chapter, this was an issues which was mentioned by many of the 
stakeholders with whom we spoke. 
Conclusions
Both the PRA and the FCA were founded on the assumption that something needed to change not just in 
the rules, governance arrangements and the structure, but also the culture of the regulators. In this chapter 
we have seen there was commitment from senior leaders in each organisation that they would introduce 
a new approach to regulation. The PRA would move towards a more judgement based approach. The FCA 
challenged some of its core ideas about the market it regulated and tried to adopt a more forward looking 
and proactive stance on regulation. 
To deliver these changes, we saw each organisation adopted varying strategies. The PRA is part of the 
BoE’s more integrated One Bank strategy which has sought to clearly articulate some core goals, cultural 
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values and other typical aspects of culture. It has launched a change programme similar to what you 
might ﬁ nd in many ﬁ nancial sector organisations involving shifts in remuneration structures, measurement, 
hiring, talent development and collaboration. There has been some push back from longer serving staff 
members for instance. Overall the cultural change initiative seems to be proceeding relatively smoothly. 
From our discussions with various stakeholders, it appears that the PRA was becoming increasingly 
integrated within the BoE. 
This contrasts with the FCA which has adopted a more fragmented approach. When the new regulator was 
established, its senior leaders made a number of speeches emphasising the need to adopt a new culture. 
There were attempts within the regulator to do things like articulate values, make changes to hiring 
systems, measurement and performance management, remuneration, talent development and collaboration. 
However there was a lack of an overarching logic to much of this change. There was no equivalent to the 
One Bank strategy. In addition, many of the initiatives appears to involve assurances that senior leaders 
were developing the culture. There was less in the way of concrete changes which had been delivered. The 
FCA continued be given new responsibilities including the regulation of the Consumer Credit sector and the 
establishment of a Payment Services Regulator. Further turmoil was also created by the inquiry by Simon 
Davis of Clifford Chance into its brieﬁ ng of the press around the launch of the supervisory work into the fair 
treatment of long standing customers in the life insurance sector. It came under greater and more negative 
scrutiny from politicians, the media and regulated ﬁ rms. This created further structural change within the 
regulator,59 the perception that politicians were inﬂ uencing its work and the departure of the CEO, followed 
by the appointment of a temporary replacement. As a result exactly how the FCA was transforming its 
culture remains unclear and difﬁ cult to understand. The FCA did not have a comprehensive programme of 
cultural change in place and therefore was blown off course and risked not achieving its objectives.
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In the previous chapter we saw that the ﬁ nancial regulators have put in place 
signiﬁ cant cultural change initiatives following the ﬁ nancial crisis. Staff working 
in these regulators have judged these changes as being a mixed success: Some 
aspects have been changed such as tone from the top, remuneration and 
opportunities for development. However there remain a number of important 
issues which continue to hamper the regulators such as overload, bureaucracy, 
staff turnover and a lack of clarity about what they are trying to achieve. In this 
chapter we will look at stakeholder’s perceptions and evaluations of cultural 
change within the main ﬁ nancial regulators. 
Stakeholder Responses to 
Cultural Change in the UK’s 
ﬁ nancial regulators
CHAPTER THREE
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Bank of England
High Status. The Bank of England was seen as a high status place to work and was widely respected among 
all the stakeholders we spoke to. It was seen as having high quality people, producing excellent quality 
outcomes and being relatively even handed in the way it operated. The various reports, speeches and other 
interactions with the Bank were generally appreciated by stakeholders. 
Discrete Intervention. Most stakeholders point out that there had been changes in the way in which the 
BoE operates in recent years. One commentator on the sector told us that ‘We have witnessed a decline of 
nudge and wink regulation’. A senior regulator ofﬁ cial in a large bank told us that in the past ofﬁ cials at the 
BoE had a close relationship with the institutions which they regulated. Ofﬁ cials in the Bank had a close 
knowledge of how the banks they regulated actually operated. If there was a problem, banks would often 
be notiﬁ ed discretely. We were told that, in the past, ‘They called you into a carpeted room to give you a 
carpeting’. This tradition of intimate knowledge of regulated institutions as well as discrete interventions was 
seen as continuing to inform the culture of the BoE today. 
Lack of Transparency. Although most people we spoke to were positive about the BoE, some pointed out 
that it lacked a degree of transparency. One person pointed out that the architecture of Bank itself said 
something about the culture of the institution. The solid walls around the bank symbolised how it was cut off 
from the rest of the world. They quipped ‘the walls around the bank were once there to keep people out and 
ensure the gold inside was safe. Now they are there to keep the Bank employees in’. 
Compensation. We were told that relatively low levels of pay – particularly at the junior level – might 
make it difﬁ cult to attract the best and the brightest. This has been compounded by rising property prices 
in London which meant many new recruits struggled to ﬁ nd suitable accommodation. Changes to pensions 
meant that lower rewards in the short term are not balanced out by generous rewards in the long term. There 
were some concerns about homogeneity of background and thinking within the institution. Many of the staff 
came from an elite background. Someone we spoke with described it as the ‘Eton and Balliol’ of regulators. 
One person told us that ‘If you didn’t get out at 30, you can’t get out’ and ‘once you get to the top of the 
organisation, there is a homogenous culture of long stayers’. This could have been due to the generous ﬁ nal 
salary pension scheme, which is now no longer available. It could also reﬂ ect a culture which valued long 
service: we were told that anyone who left the Bank before retirement was known as a ‘quitter’. Finally, there 
was concern among a few stakeholders we spoke to that the focus on economics driven policy making in the 
Bank has meant that ‘people at top had been governed by academic theory. This was illustrated by Northern 
rock and [the focus on] moral hazard’. 
Lack of Challenge. There were also some concerns about the extent of challenge to the Bank’s strategy 
provided by the Court. Those who knew the history of the Bank described the Court’s role in the past as 
“decorative”, although they were aware that there had been some changes made recently. The concerns 
about the potential lack of challenge were exacerbated by recent changes which included reducing the 
number of non-executives from 9 to 7 and abolishing the Oversight Committee composed of the non-
executives. It was also noted that although the NAO was now able to conduct Value for Money (VFM) 
studies of the Bank, it required the permission of the Court and was restricted from examining the ‘the 
merits of the general policy of the Bank in pursuing the Bank’s objectives’. This was seen as fettering the 
discretion of the NAO. There was also a ‘superior’ attitude amongst the Bank which was not welcoming of 
external challenge – for some meeting the Bank was like meeting an ‘arrogant version of the Queen’.
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Group Think. The concern about the lack of challenge was heightened as the Bank was also seen as 
institution vulnerable to ‘group think’ as one person said to us ‘the Bank was very efﬁ cient at getting stuff 
done but free thinking was not encouraged’. The Bank had failed to warn about the build-up of excessive 
risk in the ﬁ nancial system prior to the crisis and was fully bought into the mistaken paradigm that the UK 
banking system was more resilient than ever. It was also noted that the legislation governing the role of the 
Financial Policy Committee required it to reach consensus wherever possible – which could discourage robust 
challenge or those with maverick ideas. This could delay action which needed to be taken to tackle ﬁ nancial 
stability risks.
Engagement with the public. Prior to the Open Forum, engagement with the public and consumer groups 
was not seen as being a priority within either the Bank or the PRA. Then, in November 2015 the Bank hosted 
its ﬁ rst Open Forum – which was the ﬁ rst time in its 300 year history it had brought together all of the 
stakeholders to discuss the progress toward ﬁ xing the ﬁ nancial sector. The Open Forum was ‘an opportunity 
to hear a different set of views from a different set of voices: from the customers and users of ﬁ nance, as 
well as the producers and investors’. The Open Forum was seen as an important innovation and stakeholders 
thought that it was vital that the Bank built on its success by ensuring that engagement with consumer 
groups and the public was an ongoing process and not just a one-off event or PR exercise.
Prudential Regulator Authority (PRA) 
A High Quality Institution. The PRA was generally seen by stakeholders as a high quality institution. 
They told us that the since moving into the Bank, the PRA had adopted a more judgement based approach 
to regulation. This meant it ‘looks at the overall picture, not just the details’. The culture of the PRA beneﬁ ted 
from a low level of staff turnover (although this was increasing) and that staff had a clear view about their 
role – which enabled them to be clear to ﬁ rms about what they expected. Bank of England/PRA staff also 
had a clearer view of the organisation’s values and beliefs, how their performance was assessed and their 
ability to progress their career at the Bank/PRA. Most stakeholder believed that staff at the Bank/PRA tended 
to see they could have a long career at the regulator and would receive some prestige or non-ﬁ nancial reward.
PRA better with the Bank. Most people we spoke with pointed out that it had improved signiﬁ cantly since 
the PRA was created and made a subsidiary of the Bank of England. One person we spoke with told us that 
‘the BoE culture, after the crisis, permeated the PRA, lots of senior people moved to the PRA very quickly’. 
In addition to a shift within the culture people told us that the PRA had beneﬁ ted from getting many of the 
high quality staff from the old FSA. A senior regulator at a large bank told us that ‘the PRA worked because 
it had the bench strength, it had the mandate, it was focused and thoughtful about its approach and knew 
about gaps in its capabilities’. Another person we spoke to told us that the best people tried as hard as they 
could to join the PRA following the restructuring of the FSA.
Clarity of Purpose. There was clarity amongst stakeholders about the PRA’s central purpose and what it 
was trying to achieve – a safer and more stable ﬁ nancial system. There was also clarity about what the PRA 
expected from the banks – partly due to the fact that the engagement was over factors like capital levels 
and ‘the PRA spoke in numbers’, making clear what they expected to be achieved and by when. There tended 
to be ‘no surprises’ from PRA supervisors. 
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Lack of Empowerment for supervisors. The only reservation expressed was that supervisors were not 
sufﬁ ciently empowered to exercise judgement and sometimes did not feel able to answer questions. The 
PRA/Bank was still a hierarchical organisation and sometimes to make a decision, staff had to pass it all the 
way ‘up the line’ to senior management. This was due to a ‘culture of fear’ of making the wrong decisions. 
There was a ‘one-tailed’ distribution for supervisors – they could never make mistakes or take risks as if they 
did it would have a severe impact on their career. It was noted that ‘you can’t run a business with a group 
of risk managers who will never make mistakes – they will constrain it.’ Regulators needed to have processes 
in place to ensure that they learnt from any mistakes. 
Disconnect between Misconduct and Prudential Issues. Although the PRA did not have any 
responsibility for conduct regulation some stakeholders thought the PRA needed to do more to grasp 
the interconnectedness between bank misconduct and prudential issues. The losses to banks from retail 
mis-selling and misconduct had been signiﬁ cant – over £54 billion in the past 15 years.60 Whilst the PRA 
now included misconduct issues in its stress tests, it had failed to discuss these issues with consumer groups 
and as a result some consumer stakeholders believed that it had understated the possibility of misconduct 
losses in the major banks in a stress scenario. The PRA also needed to understand that misconduct issues 
around products such as Buy-To-Let mortgages could lead to greater losses for banks in the future.
Costly regulation
Regulation has become more costly, both to comply with and to oversee. The total administrative 
costs of operating the FCA, PRA, FOS, FSCS and Money Advice Service are now almost £1.2 billion 
a year – a six-fold increase from the £200 million the FSA, FOS and FSCS cost in 2000. Recent 
increases in administrative cost have been driven by changed approaches, particularly additional 
front-line staff, and additional costs to replace information technology (IT); and to the costs of 
running two regulators instead of one. The higher costs of the FOS are mainly the result of a long-
term failure by major high-street banks to deal with PPI complaints effectively or fairly. 
In addition to the administrative costs of the regulators there is also evidence that the cost of 
complying with the regulation had increased. HSBC recently announced that it was hiring 3,000 
more compliance ofﬁ cers. 88% of large ﬁ rms and 44% of smaller ﬁ rms surveyed by the FCA 
practitioner panel in 2015 reported devoting more time and money to regulation over the past 
12 months.61 The FCA and PRA are required to consult before introducing new regulation and 
conduct a cost-beneﬁ t analysis which includes an estimate of the costs and beneﬁ ts of the new 
regulation where possible. But these were often seen as an after-thought rather than as a driver 
of policy. Indeed the FCA has stated that it is not required to assess the costs and beneﬁ ts of a 
number of possible options, but only the option it has chosen to implement.62 
The beneﬁ ts of ﬁ nancial regulation are also poorly estimated. The ﬁ nancial crisis highlighted the 
large economic and social costs associated with inadequate ﬁ nancial regulation. New City Agenda 
has estimated that the top 10 misconduct scandals in retail banking have cost banks and their 
shareholders over £54 billion in redress and ﬁ nancial penalties since 2000.63 Stronger and more 
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proactive regulation can save both consumers and the industry money in the longer-run. For 
example if the FCA had decided to intervene quickly and efﬁ ciently and ban single-premium PPI 
and heavily restrict the sale of other forms of PPI in 2005 then banks would have paid out £15-20 
billion less in redress and associated administrative costs.
Regulators and other stakeholders seemed to be placing a lot of faith in the introduction of the 
Senior Managers Regime to improve compliance and reduce overall cost. It was thought that 
identifying individuals and holding them to account could enable a reduction in administrative 
box-ticking and, it was hoped, in the longer-term the need to take costly enforcement action. 
There was also the hope that the use of technology could help ﬁ rms better manage regulatory 
requirement and reduce compliance costs – this was known as ‘RegTech’. The FCA had issued a 
call for evidence concerning how RegTech could improve efﬁ ciency and transparency and whether 
there are any factors which are restricting the development of RegTech.
As part of the Enterprise Act 2016 the Government has set a £10 billion target to cut the cost of 
regulation during this Parliament and expects regulators, including the FCA, to play a part in this 
initiative. Regulators will need to undertake and publish assessments of the economic impact to 
business of any change to their regulatory policies and practices. These assessments must have 
been veriﬁ ed by the Government’s Regulatory Policy Committee – an independent body which will 
scrutinise the evidence for the regulatory proposals. The Bank of England and the PRA are outside 
the scope of the Enterprise Act. 
Administrative costs of UK ﬁ nancial services regulatory bodies
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Financial Conduct Authority 
Mixed Attitudes. Whilst stakeholders’ attitudes towards the culture at the BoE and the PRA were generally 
positive, attitudes to the FCA’s culture were much more mixed. They ranged from mildly positive to very 
negative. Some regulatory ofﬁ cials and consumer groups took the more positive tones and acknowledged 
that the FCA had improved in recent years and it was doing a good job given it faced so much pressure from 
many powerful stakeholders. The CEO of a smaller institution we spoke with exempliﬁ ed the more negative 
attitude. He told us that ‘If I ran an organisation with culture like the FCA, the FCA would come in and try 
and shut it down’. 
Culture has Changed. There was an acknowledgement that following the ﬁ nancial crisis the culture had 
changed within the organisation, with the disappearance of light touch regulation and a more robust 
and consumer-focussed approach. Many of the banks thought this went too far under the leadership of 
Martin Wheatley, and they hoped for a co-operative approach in the future. However, stakeholders also 
acknowledged that there were a number of underlying issues which needed to be addressed. These included 
questionable quality of some staff, the continued prevalence of tick-box regulation, increasing complexity, 
risk-aversion, the continued existence of silos, and difﬁ culties in addressing problems associated with 
big data. Some of the people who worked closely with the regulator acknowledged that the culture had 
improved following the formation of the FCA. This mainly was due to the FCA having more resources and 
being more robust in its responses to banks, which meant it had enabled the organisation to attract and 
Staff numbers at FSA and FCA/PRA
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retain high quality people and give employees there a sense of power and purpose. One person we spoke 
with told us that “the work is more interesting than it used to be. They still prove successful in attracting 
people there ...the salaries have gone up –they do not feel anymore as the poor relative. Because they 
have more teeth and power the regulator feels to have more ability. If you work there to improve the 
way the industry works…now [the FCA] are more in the position to make changes, to have an impact on 
how things work. They were muted in the past, and the balance has shifted, so there is more potential in 
getting satisfaction on the job right now’. Another person we spoke with acknowledge that there has been 
‘signiﬁ cant improvements especially in terms of challenging the received wisdom’ which has led to ‘improved 
welfare for consumers’.
Progress in New Areas. In addition to some improvement in the culture, stakeholders which we spoke 
with acknowledged that the FCA had made progress in addressing new sectors. In particular attempts to 
support FinTech innovation through ‘project innovate’. One person we spoke with acknowledged there 
had been ‘progress in the P2P sector: It was not business as usual for regulators. Regulators were being 
driven to engage with the P2P sector in a much more informal way than with other sectors. The FCA had 
a genuine recognition that they had to learn about the P2P sector. FCA staff learned quickly, but were also 
asking lots of questions to P2P lenders. The FCA was very open, even though our organisation does not 
have a dedicated supervisor.’ 
Effective action to tackle problems in the payday lending sector. In the Payday lending sector the 
programme of work instituted by the FCA included stronger rules on affordability, restrictions on collection 
practices and a price cap were seen as successful in tackling problems in the market. Stakeholders welcomed 
the analytical approach to setting the price cap and the work undertaken to understand the business models 
of the payday lenders. In this sector the FCA had enjoyed strong political and consumer group support for 
the action it had taken. Citizens Advice has reported that problems reported to them about payday lending 
had halved since the introduction of the new requirements. The FCA had also required a number of payday 
lenders, including Wonga and Dollar Financial to pay redress to consumers for their past misconduct.
Increased willingness to address problems. Some people we spoke with notes that the FCA has become 
more willing to recognise and address problems. One told us that ‘FSA executives and board members were 
unwilling to take career limiting decisions by upsetting the industry. This led to a culture within the FSA of 
trying not to upset the industry unless it was really important….If you found a problem, the FSA board would 
be unhappy that a problem had been found. The FCA Board would be happy that a problem had been found’. 
The FCA had been more proactive in addressing issues surrounding sales incentives schemes for frontline 
bank staff, required banks to change the structure of schemes and had taken enforcement action.
More proactive engagement with consumer groups. Consumer groups noted that the engagement 
they had with the regulator had improved as part of the transition to the FCA. They had a single point 
of contact within the FCA and staff within the regulator were more likely to seek out the views of 
consumer groups when formulating policy. Beyond consumer groups, with the exception of a few events 
surrounding its formation, the FCA made less of an effort to reach out to members of the public or 
to solicit their views. Responses to consultations continued to overwhelmingly come from ﬁ rms and 
industry representatives.
Light touch regulation disappears – shoot ﬁ rst, ask questions later. Many interviewees mentioned the 
quote from Martin Wheatley: ‘shoot ﬁ rst, ask questions later’. Although they knew this quote was taken out 
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of context, they thought it captured the more robust or ‘aggressive’ stance of the regulator. One ofﬁ cial 
in a bank we spoke with told us that following the ﬁ nancial crisis ‘the sense of common purpose ‘ seemed 
to disappear, because the regulator started to perceive themselves as being too close to ﬁ rms. Light touch 
regulation disappeared’. Another person we spoke with told us that ‘Wheatley was given an aggressive 
mandate, shoot ﬁ rst ask later, and his departure marks a political tone change. Maybe the FCA overshot their 
aggressive stance, but as conduct regulator it was right that they became more aggressive’. An asset manager 
told us that ‘before 2008 if a ﬁ rm would breach a regulation they would receive a slap on the wrist, but 
now they pay thousands if not millions of pounds. They (the FCA) want to be taken seriously, and one way 
of doing it is by saying, if you do not conform you are going to pay for it’. They also pointed out that being 
more robust in enforcement meant that ﬁ nancial institutions were beginning to take the regulator more 
seriously. The asset manager told us that regulators ‘don’t just need back-bone, you also need bite: In terms 
of how the culture of the regulator is changed, is that they have much more bite. Back bone [which is one of 
the values of the FCA] is not sufﬁ cient, in order to be taken seriously you need to have bite. You can certainly 
have back bone as you ensure the regulation is produced, heard clearly and you can patrol it, but in order to 
make sure people listen to you, you need to be able to put out sanctions and penalties’
Stronger enforcement action: There was acknowledgement by both consumer and industry stakeholders 
that the FCA needed to take stronger enforcement action against misconduct. The level of ﬁ nes levied by the 
FSA was widely viewed as inadequate. The FSA had proved too reluctant to take action against individuals. 
However, there were some complaints from the industry about the level of ﬁ nes and how there seemed to 
be some competition within the FCA as to who could levy the largest ﬁ ne.
Lack of durable cultural change: Consumer stakeholders were concerned that with Martin Wheatley’s 
departure, the FCA could slip back into the approach taken by the FSA. There was a concern that those at 
mid-levels within the FCA could see Wheatley’s removal as an implicit signal that they should rethink the 
strategy of being tough on the banks. Examples cited of this included the scrapping of the FCA’s review 
of bank culture and the introduction of a deadline for PPI complaints. As one person said of the culture in 
regulators generally ‘it is a civil service with a civil service mentality: do your job, keep your head down, 
don’t stick your neck out unless your boss and bosses boss have demonstrated a willingness to stick out 
their own’.
Variable quality of staff. A consistent theme among many stakeholders we spoke to was the variable 
quality of the staff at the FCA. One regulatory consultant told us that the FCA has ‘a terrible culture’ and 
that they ‘recruited people who couldn’t cut it at banks’. Others were subtler in their views: ‘Regulators 
have some high quality individuals, but they are only in pockets. The result can often be the ‘C team going 
up against the banks A team’. This can result in a situation of incompetent [staff] who don’t know they are 
incompetent’. The CEO of a smaller bank echoed this sentiment point out that you can ‘ﬁ nd handful of really 
good people (in the FCA). But its bench strength [is] lower than the non-regulatory environmental’. 
A regulatory ofﬁ cial in a bank explained how there were concerns that their regulators often did not have the 
degree of experience with their business that they had in the past: ‘We have now some concerns about the 
knowledge and experience of the people at the regulator, we now see what we would perceive to be junior 
staff, high turnover of staff, it worries us from the perspective that we spend a lot of time to educate them 
on our organisation, and it feels like it is a continuous process because they are not retaining knowledge or 
staff. This is especially true for the FCA…Before it was different’. 
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There was a concern that the split between the PRA and the FCA had further decreased quality of personnel 
at the FCA. One regulatory consultant explained that ‘all good people want to be in the PRA, all the dobbins 
went to the FCA.’ Another regulatory ofﬁ cial echoed this view, pointing out that ‘those with talent did 
everything they could to go with the PRA’. 
This lack of high quality staff in the regulatory process meant that regulatory ofﬁ cials may not ask the right 
questions of banks, and they often rely on box ticking processes rather use their judgement. An industry 
stakeholder pointed out that ‘when you are dealing with people that are skilled and they understand the 
ﬁ rm, they ask you the right questions. If they are not they ask you a stack of questions, which they may 
contain some of the right questions or may not. So the effort on the ﬁ rm part is disproportionally high when 
you are dealing with those that do not have a clue’. This was echoed by another regulator who explained 
that ‘we have seen a naivety about the questions they ask ... they seem to be unsure and the questioning 
seems to be disproportionate, which is a sign of lack of experience’. Another regulatory ofﬁ cial in a large bank 
said that he was concerned that sometimes regulators would ‘bring a boy to a knife-ﬁ ght’. 
The ﬁ nal concern is that increased demand for regulatory ofﬁ cials within banks had driven signiﬁ cant levels 
of turn over. One person we spoke with said that ‘the layer below the executive board was very lumpy and 
people were always looking over their shoulder or for a career outside the regulator’. A regulatory ofﬁ cial 
pointed out that ‘the staff turnover is very high. So if you have had staff covering you as a ﬁ rm for more 
than 2 years, you are doing well! If you are in a job less than 2 years you cannot really demonstrate you can 
do a job. But you do not want to stay more than 3 years, otherwise it shows that you cannot make a move’. 
Turnover driven by regulatory ofﬁ cials moving into industry has increased in recent years as Operational 
Risk Ofﬁ cers have proliferated, and increased in numbers in banks, so have Regulatory Compliance Ofﬁ cers, 
who are the highest paid resource in the industry presently. This is due to extensive rules that require to be 
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interpreted (by Regulatory Compliance Ofﬁ cers) and people (ie. Operational Risk Ofﬁ cers) need not only to 
interpret the rules but also to monitor that people do their job properly according to the rules’. 
Too much box-ticking. According to some, the FCA relied on what one person we spoke with called a 
‘quagmire of tick-box processes’ or an ‘expanded nightmare of tickbox compliance’. Some examples which 
were mentioned were the 650 page mortgage market review, and the overly complex documentation around 
the senior management regime. One regulatory consultant we spoke with compared two sets of documents 
prepared by the PRA and the FCA on a similar topic – the FCA documentation was signiﬁ cantly longer, much 
more complex, and far more difﬁ cult to understand. 
Some people we spoke to were concerned that due to the number of relatively inexperienced staff engaged 
in supervision, they would often rely on standardised processes rather than using their own judgement. One 
regulatory ofﬁ cial in a bank explained: ‘The analogy I like to use: Once upon a time I was a credit analyst and 
when I started I had no idea about how to be a credit analyst, so I wrote everything I knew about the credit 
hoping that in there I had captured the real risk and that my boss could ﬁ nd it. Whilst when you learn the job 
you just write one sentence’. 
Deep seated culture of box-ticking. Others were more concerned that staff who were too familiar with 
the tick box approach to regulation had not learned to accept ideas about judgement. One ex-regulator we 
spoke with told us that ‘people that grew up with that (tick box) approach are now ﬁ nding the fact that we 
do not live any more in that world. So there are people inside the regulator, and outside the regulator that 
really cannot get around to the new approach’. 
Lack of empowerment for frontline staff. Some stakeholders we spoke with pointed out that concerns 
about career mobility within and outside the regulator meant staff were more likely to follow the rules to 
show that they had done everything correctly – even if it was not the most effective way of doing things. 
One person we spoke to told us that ‘It was difﬁ cult to empower frontline staff in the regulator to innovate. 
It was much easier for them to become box-tickers than risk taking a career limiting decision. Even in 
policy proposals such as the Mortgage Market Review the FCA had created paperwork to give the industry 
security. There was a deep-seated culture of box-ticking. This demand also came from the industry as they 
wanted the regulator to tell the industry what the industry should tell their staff to do’. Consumer groups 
acknowledged that although the FCA did indulge in tick-box regulation this activity was often driven by 
an industry which demanded ‘certainty’ about how it should behave to meet regulatory requirements in 
all possible sets of circumstances. Too many in the industry regarded the regulator as the only guide to 
acceptable behaviour.
Ultimately this focus on tick-box processes meant that banks felt that they were being diverted from core 
processes. The CEO of a small bank told us that ‘Effort ﬁ lling out forms doesn’t add to a better, less risky 
business or better customer experience’. 
Lack of clarity. Another concern mentioned by a number of the stakeholders we spoke to was a lack of 
clarity from the FCA. One bank ofﬁ cial we spoke with told us that the ‘FCA is lacking clarity ... because 
you cannot deﬁ ne conduct ... it is sometimes not a fair comparison between FCA and PRA. PRA speaks in 
numbers ... we want that capital ratio met by then’. [For the FCA] ‘It is really, really, hard, they have a rule 
book … but they do not tick to them … it is too hard. Ticking to the rule book doesn’t stop bad conduct ... It 
is too difﬁ cult and resource-intensive to tick to the rule book, but if something bad happens, you can say the 
rule was there’. Another bank ofﬁ cial echoed these concerns, pointing out the difﬁ culty in articulating what 
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good conduct looks like: ‘We expect different conduct, but the trouble is articulating exactly what it looks 
like.’ A consumer group told us that principles-based regulation was ‘OK as an idea. The problem was that no 
one knew what on earth it meant in practice.’ The FCA was also facing pressure as ‘the industry didn’t want 
principles-based regulation, it wanted to be told what to do.’
Unclear regulatory requirements. There was also concern that the regulatory requirements or expectations 
the FCA set for ﬁ rms to comply with could be spread out across numerous publications, including the 
handbook (including principles, rules and guidance), thematic reviews, Dear CEO letters, statements, 
communications, brieﬁ ngs, ‘treating customers fairly’ publications, review reports and industry produced 
guidance. It was noted that spreading these out across multiple and occasionally quite old publications could 
pose particular difﬁ culties for small ﬁ rms. This could especially be the case if these publications were not 
available on the FCA website and had to be found on the old FSA site which lacked search functionality.
Reluctance to use the new powers granted to it by Parliament: The Financial Services Act 2012 which 
created the FCA had granted it a number of new powers. These included the ability to name and shame 
ﬁ rms which issue misleading ﬁ nancial promotions, publish details of warning notices issued to ﬁ rms, and 
ban or restrict the sale of ﬁ nancial products. It had also recently gained the power to order individual ﬁ rms 
or a number of ﬁ rms to operate a redress scheme. The FCA has only used the product intervention powers 
once, only established one formal industry-wide redress scheme and has published a few warning notices – 
but without identifying the ﬁ rms or the individuals involved. As far as stakeholders were aware, it had never 
used its power to name and shame ﬁ rms which issue misleading ﬁ nancial promotions. This was a signiﬁ cant 
missed opportunity as the whole point of Parliament granting the new powers was that they would be used 
by the regulator to strengthen the incentive for ﬁ rms to pay fair redress and issue clear ﬁ nancial promotions.
Hard to engage with and doesn’t make use of market intelligence: Consumer and SME stakeholders 
believed that the FCA need to make far better use of the intelligence it held to identify emerging risks. 
There was also the sense that the FCA was difﬁ cult to engage with and failed to take reports of misconduct 
seriously or to investigate them properly. It was said that the mantra which individuals reporting concerns 
heard from the FCA was that the issues they raised were individual complaints (which should go to FOS) 
rather than issues of wider concern. Part of this probably reﬂ ected the lack of feedback received from 
the regulator but it was thought that this was also driven by a cultural attitude which failed to see the 
opportunity of meeting with consumers or receiving information about their experiences from consumers 
and whistleblowers.
A culture of secrecy, leading to a lack of accountability: We spoke with a number of whistle-blowers and 
others who had provided information to the regulator who were often frustrated by this culture of secrecy. 
The root cause of this secrecy was said to be restrictions imposed on the regulator by Section 348 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act which provides a blanket prohibition on the FCA disclosing information 
received from ﬁ rms, without the speciﬁ c permission of the ﬁ rm involved. There were also concerns from 
consumer groups that the regulator hid behind the restrictions and refused to disclose instructions it had 
issued to ﬁ rms. This damaged accountability as stakeholders could not tell what instructions had been given 
to ﬁ rms. In one case, a bank had told a consumer group that it was pursuing an approach to redress because 
it had been told to do so by the regulator. The regulator refused to disclose whether or not it had given 
the ﬁ rm any instructions and if it had then what those instructions contained. Stakeholders noted that the 
regulator also refused to provide any sort of feedback about the action it would take in response to reports 
of misconduct from consumers, SMEs, ﬁ rms or whistle-blowers. Whistle-blowers and SMEs we spoke with 
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stated that this attitude was very frustrating and fed suspicions that the regulator was too close to the 
banks. In one case, investigated by the Complaints Commissioner, the FCA had failed to properly investigate 
a whistle-blower’s allegations, had asked the bank involved for its view and then reported that view back 
verbatim as though it had come from the FCA. 
The lack of transparency also extended to ‘agreements’ negotiated by the FCA with banks such as those 
about the redress scheme for Interest Rate Hedging Products (IRHPs) which the regulator refused to disclose, 
even to the Treasury Select Committee. In a number of cases the FCA would also enter into agreements with 
ﬁ rms instead of taking enforcement action, but refuse to publish details of these agreements. There has been 
no formal independent evaluation of this ‘early intervention’ activity.
Despite being given a speciﬁ c power by Parliament to name speciﬁ c ﬁ rms issuing misleading ﬁ nancial 
promotions and publish details of the promotion, those reporting a misleading promotion to the FCA receive 
the following reply:
“We are assessing the promotion in accordance with our team’s case assessment procedures. Our 
processes require a determination of whether there is a breach and then an assessment of whether 
the issue meets our risk threshold. We then decide what action, if any, we should take. Due to 
conﬁ dentiality restrictions, we are unfortunately unable to provide you with any information as to 
what action we may have taken/take in this case, as we cannot divulge details of our action taken in 
respect of individual ﬁ rms.”
The culture of secrecy damaged the accountability of the regulator as it was very difﬁ cult for politicians 
or the public to see what action it had taken in particular cases. The NAO has also raised the issue that as 
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the FCA is prohibited from disclosing information because of Section 348 this limited its “ability to reach 
a judgement on the FCA’s value for money,” as it “could not carry out a full assessment of the effectiveness 
of the FCA’s actions.” Some consumer stakeholders believed that it was strange that policymakers had made 
the NAO the statutory auditor of the FCA but at the same time were restricting the NAO’s ability to do an 
effective job.
Lack of independent evaluation: The FCA was seen as not having a culture of learning from its mistakes 
or of commissioning clear independent evaluation of its activities. These issues compounded the cultural 
issue identiﬁ ed above that the FCA might not always set out what it wants to achieve from its speciﬁ c 
interventions, deﬁ ne what success looks like or monitor whether these impacts were being achieved. 
These views supported concern expressed by the National Audit Ofﬁ ce that when trying to get redress 
for consumers the FCA “does not evaluate its chosen redress schemes formally, making it hard to assess 
whether schemes achieve their intended outcomes.” One stakeholder told us that “Internal audits were good 
at ﬁ nding out what went wrong but could not do proper evaluation. This meant that when you are asking 
somebody to evaluate impact of something like Mortgage Market Review or the Retail Distribution Review, 
they are essentially marking their own homework. The FCA needed a strong head of strategy who was not 
looking for a job in the industry.”
New objective to promote competition but most interventions focussing on the disclosure of 
information to consumers: The FCA had been given a new objective to promote effective competition. 
Most stakeholders viewed this as an important and welcome new objective for the FCA and a key way 
of improving the way customers were treated. Some in the industry viewed this as an important way for 
‘consumers to do their part, shop around, get competition working’. There had been a lot of activity at the 
FCA in terms of recruiting new people for their competition division and launching a number of market 
studies. For most, the jury was still out on whether this activity was effective. The market studies seemed 
to take a long-time and some consumer advocates were concerned that the majority of recommendations 
concerned changes in the way information was disclosed to consumers. Others viewed the FCA as too 
optimistic in its view that a few new entrants would transform the retail banking market. 
Internal Silos. Another concern which the stakeholders we spoke with highlighted was the impact of internal 
silos within the organisation. One bank regulatory ofﬁ cial told us that ‘we could have typically received 5 
FCA reviews in one week, so it feels like they are not joined up, they are not speaking together. Why would 
anyone give 5 reviews to one organisation? If those people had truly spoken with our supervisor [at the FCA] 
and had understood our business, they would have known that some of the responses would have to come 
from a particular area of the bank, and by sending 5 reviews they would have put signiﬁ cant pressure on that 
area. So it does feel like they do not speak to each other . . . so from that perspective we could say that we 
see that they operated in silos’. 
Data overload. One surprising issue which was mentioned related to how the FCA deals with data. We 
were told by some regulatory ofﬁ cials that the FCA has been inﬂ uenced by the trend towards ‘big data’ 
and now regularly demands large amounts of data from the ﬁ rms it regulates. The problem is that it is not 
clear whether the regulator actually knows what to do with that data or has the competence to effectively 
process it. One senior regulatory ofﬁ cial in a bank pointed out that ‘there is a ‘rush to data’ now – the 
regulators are demanding huge amounts of raw data. The problem is that the banks have an analytic 
advantage. This rush to data has created an ‘analytic arms race’ – many of the quantitative skills which are 
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demanded are in short supply. It often results in there being more data than they know what to do with. 
This has created huge ‘data lakes’. This ofﬁ cial went on to point out that although was the data, there 
may not be the capability within the FCA to process it. At a New City Agenda event, Antony Jenkins 
(CEO Barclays 2012-15) noted the importance of regulators being able to access data: 
“Regulation is essentially a data problem. We have these rules and we have these behaviours – are 
they congruent? Where are the gaps? That is a data problem, and that can be solved by big data. 
That needs to be built in to the way banks and other industries are developing their systems, and then 
regulators need to be able to use technology to access that. The good news is we have the solution 
and the problem; the bad news is that we have to act if we really want to embrace it.” 64 
Small players and new entrants ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to engage with. One consequence of the increasing 
complexity of regulation has meant that smaller players in the ﬁ nancial industry ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to engage 
with the FCA. The CEO of one medium-sized institution we spoke with told us that ‘I have to phone a call 
centre and go through a computer menu. You could have a wry smile and think this is mad, but it is worrying 
– the likelihood is that we are only seeing them once every four years. There is no willingness to have a 
relationship, or understand your business’. This meant that sometimes engaging with the FCA felt like they 
were ‘talking into a vacuum’.
Lack of independence and increasing pressure from Treasury. The ﬁ nal concern which some stakeholders 
mentioned was the potential lack of independence of the FCA. One person we spoke with told us that 
‘the role of the Treasury has altered and there is a risk that the board will become an executive committee 
of the Treasury.’ There was a belief among some that the regulatory independence of the FCA was being 
compromised and that the Treasury was inﬂ uencing the work of the FCA through making speeches including 
a message that it was time for a ‘new settlement’ and removing the Chief Executive of the FCA.
Both regulators
When speaking with stakeholders, we noticed a number of themes which cut across different regulators. 
There was a wide-spread sense that, following the ﬁ nancial crisis, there had been an increased regulatory 
burden which has increased complexity. This has made processes much slower, prompts a sense of fear, 
created a proliferation of administrative tasks and meant banks do things for the sake of doing them. This 
has created a thriving market for regulatory ofﬁ cials but some think it has got in the way of the relationship 
with clients. 
Increasingly regulatory burden. Many of the regulatory ofﬁ cials we spoke with mentioned the increased 
burdens of regulation which they faced. One pointed out that ‘the pace of change is very fast, if you look at 
the number of pages of regulations that have been published between 2008 and now you talk about tens of 
thousands of pages’. 
This increased regulatory burden has been exacerbated by the existence of multiple regulatory demands. For 
instance, one asset manager told us how ‘MIFID2 is asking for 84 different ﬁ elds of information per trade.’ 
These include ‘The trader identity, his name, his address, his passport number ... It is becoming so invasive 
that you are wondering if this is in breach of the Data Protection Act’. 
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This increasing demand can also create a clash between different regulatory codes in some contexts. One 
person we spoke with told us that ‘initially you saw the regulatory climate becoming more stringent with 
the introductions of new controls, bringing more transparency, more rules than principles based. This is 
very important in the UK, because it is more about principles based regulations, rather than rules based 
regulations, and this is very different in Europe, for example in France they are more rules based’. 
Slow processes. One result of this increased complexity has been slow implementation of policy. One 
person we spoke with told us that ‘at the FCA and at the PRA lead time of policy implementations is 
impacted by the bureaucratic procedures, and it is very slow. It is impacted by the excessive work load they 
seem to have compared to the resources available ...I understand the challenges they have in having to make 
sure that the processes are followed ...because you might rush into a policy that you have to unwind later, as 
we have seen, so that you have to come up with some supervisory discretion if the policy is too stringent ... 
and reverse engineer decisions’. 
Narrowing focus. With the increased regulatory load, there was a concern that regulators would stop 
thinking more broadly and only focus on speciﬁ c aspects which they were directly responsible for. One 
person told us that ‘I think that you get into a mode where you stop wanting to understand what’s going 
on and you become focused only on the small bit required. You want to stop understanding and taking risks, 
because it is better for you’.
Fear. Associated with this narrow focus is a sense of fear. One person told us that as an employee in a bank 
‘you are in fear because you feel you have got only downside, as an employee in a regulated entity, because 
you have the risk if you do anything. ... If something is done badly I could be attacked personally. If you do it 
well it’s not that the regulator sees that you have gone out of your way, it’s just what it is expected of you’. 
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Not being recognised for good actions which go above and beyond the regulations was also mentioned 
by another regulatory ofﬁ cial in a bank. They pointed out that ‘our impression was that these acts towards 
consumers which went beyond regulatory requirements could help us to garner support from the regulators, 
but the regulator seems to be not involved with these type of things but we would say that we want good 
outcomes from the consumers. And we were surprised we wouldn’t ﬁ nd more support from the regulator for 
that type of approach.’ 
Proliferation of administration. Another implications of the increasing regulatory burden has been the 
expansion of administrative (rather than analytical) components of many jobs in the ﬁ nancial industries. 
One person we spoke with told us that ‘there are a lot of bureaucratic activities, which make my job more 
similar to an administrator than to a ﬁ nancial analyst. Everything needs to be documented. ... I think the 
administrative component of the job in some instances can go up to 30-40%! And it’s not getting easier’. 
In addition to expanding the role of administration, some people in ﬁ nancial roles were concerned about 
how this impacted on their relationship with the client. One person told us that ‘the regulator is ultimately 
trying to minimise, if not eliminate, my direct relationship with the client’. 
A hot market for regulatory ofﬁ cials. One implication of the expanded weight of regulation has been to 
create a thriving market for regulatory ofﬁ cials. We were told that compliance ofﬁ cials are ‘earning serous 
money, why? Because ﬁ nancial institutions need them. Their proﬁ le has changed massively post crisis. You 
need them because the regulator has more bite, because the rules have become more complex, and because 
the number of rules has proliferated. You need good ones, and you are prepared to pay’.
Conclusion 
In this chapter we looked at stakeholder perceptions of the UK ﬁ nancial regulators. We found that the Bank 
of England is widely respected by key stakeholders as a high quality regulator with signiﬁ cant intellectual 
ﬁ re-power and high quality people. However, it continues to be seen as somewhat cut off from the public. 
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) has established itself as a respected regulator in the eyes of most 
stakeholders we spoke to. This is driven by high quality staff, focused regulatory scope, but perhaps most 
importantly its merger with the Bank of England. There were concerns that the organisations remained 
hierarchical and vulnerable to group think – although there had been welcome attempts at improved 
evaluation, welcoming academic challenge and enabling staff to write articles which did not accord with the 
‘house view’ on the new Bank Underground blog.
Perceptions of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) were much more mixed. The most widely circulated 
story among stakeholders – in particularly the banking community – was that the FCA was staffed by people 
who could not make it in the banking world due to the lower level of pay offered. This lack of intellectual 
resource meant that it had a culture of rule following and box-ticking. Also it was frequently said that the 
FCA had over-reached its remit under Wheatley. The quote of ‘shoot ﬁ rst, ask questions later’ was frequently 
repeated and sometimes misinterpreted. However, many stakeholders recognised this story was not entirely 
true. The more informed stakeholders recognised real pressures within the regulator which included demands 
from multiple powerful constituencies, the existence of silos, too much risk adversity, and revolving doors 
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between the regulators and industry. There was acknowledgment that the FCA had needed to engage 
more with consumer groups and take stronger enforcement action and to some stakeholders these were 
welcome development. However, the culture at the FCA continued to suffer from excessive secrecy, lack 
of responsiveness to feedback and an absence of independent evaluation. Finally, we found that there 
were a number of cross-cutting issues which stakeholders saw as shared between each of the regulators, 
including an increasing regulatory burden leading to increased box ticking which made doing business more 
cumbersome and potentially got in the way of relationships with the customer or client. There were also 
issues around increased complexity which have created increasingly slow and narrow processes, a sense of 
fear, the proliferation of administration and an increasingly buoyant market for regulatory ofﬁ cials. 
Enforcement action
A common problem throughout the history of bank and ﬁ nancial services regulation has been 
a failure to take action against senior executives for fraud and misconduct. From the South 
Sea Bubble, through Overend and Gurney to the Secondary banking crisis, Barings, RBS, HBOS 
and Northern Rock – many senior executives have managed to escape sanction. When it was 
established in 2001 the FSA was given an extensive range of disciplinary, criminal and civil powers 
to take action against ﬁ rms and individuals who breach regulation. These included the ability to:
• Withdraw a ﬁ rm’s authorisation
• Prohibit an individual from operating in ﬁ nancial services or from undertaking speciﬁ c activities
• Suspend a ﬁ rm for up to 12 months from undertaking speciﬁ c activities
• Suspend an individual for up to 2 years from undertaking a speciﬁ c function
• Censure ﬁ rms and individuals through public statements
• Impose ﬁ nancial penalties
• Seek injunctions
• Apply to court to freeze assets
• Seek restitution orders
• Prosecute ﬁ rms and individuals who undertake regulated activities without authorisation
FSA was not an enforcement-led regulator
But, in the run-up to the ﬁ nancial crisis, the FSA made little signiﬁ cant use of these powers. The 
FSA was at great pains to stress that it was not “an enforcement led regulator”. The ﬁ nes levied 
on banks were only a tiny fraction of the revenue the institutions had gained from misconduct. 
Consumer groups pointed out that ﬁ rms got ﬁ ned more for ﬁ xing the price of Action Men dolls 
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than they did for mis-selling ﬁ nancial products – the ﬁ nes were just a cost of doing business 
rather than a credible deterrent against poor practice. The FSA failed to take action against 
individual executives for presiding over misconduct. Not a single senior banking executive has 
been sanctioned for mis-selling products to consumers. 
Staff we spoke to said that the FSA “lacked conﬁ dence” and there was “a fear of bringing 
enforcement action against ﬁ rms and a reticence to pursue an agenda of enforcement.” The 
FSA was scared that action against individuals would take a long-time and lead to extended 
challenges from their lawyers. We were also told that suggesting a very large ﬁ ne – even in the 
tens of millions for a large bank would lead to the individual being laughed at. This attitude was 
compounded when Legal & General won a case in the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal 
which reduced the ﬁ rm’s ﬁ ne by 50% and criticised the FSA’s enforcement process. Even when the 
FSA ensured that ﬁ rms named an executive responsible for particular activities such as complaints 
handling – it stated explicitly that it would not take action against the executive if their bank 
failed to treat customers fairly.65 
Seismic change following the crisis
Following the ﬁ nancial crisis we were told that there was a “seismic” change in terms of the FSA’s 
attitude to enforcement. The organisation felt that it had a strong moral and political mandate to 
conduct greater levels of enforcement action. There was strong internal pressure to get out and do 
more enforcement action. There was a signiﬁ cant increase in the number of actions taken against 
individuals – peaking at just over 50 in 2010. But this then declined and 13 individuals were 
sanctioned in 2014 and 22 in 2015 – although these numbers remain higher than the average of 
6 individuals a year sanctioned in the run-up to the ﬁ nancial crisis.
Since the ﬁ nancial crisis and the LIBOR scandal a narrative was developed that it had been 
difﬁ cult for the regulator to take action against individuals – we were told that there was an 
accountability ﬁ rewall and the trial was going cold halfway up the bank and before it reached 
the senior executives. This resulted in the recommendation by the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards that a Senior Managers Regime which would clearly attribute responsibilities 
to individuals. Senior Persons would know that they can be held accountable and subjected to 
enforcement measures if they fail to uphold those responsibilities. They also recommended the 
introduction of a ‘reverse burden of proof’. This would mean that if a contravention occurred 
in a part of the business for which a senior manager was responsible that senior manager 
would be guilty of misconduct unless he or she could show they took such steps to prevent the 
contravention as could reasonably be expected of a person in their position.
Watering down of the Senior Managers regime
The Senior Managers Regime came into force for banks and insurers in March 2016. Firms had to 
provide the regulators with ‘Responsibilities Maps’ outlining the division of responsibilities among 
their senior management. The Government has also extended the Senior Managers Regime to 
other ﬁ nancial sectors. However, the ‘reverse burden of proof’ has been diluted and the onus is 
now back on the FCA and PRA to prove misconduct. The Government said that it would have 
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been disproportionate to apply the reverse burden of proof to smaller organisations like building 
societies and credit unions. The Chief Executives of the FCA and PRA supported this change – but 
some people we spoke to questioned whether they would ever have been able to give a different 
opinion in public. But this ‘tone from the top’ is nothing new. In 2000, Howard Davies, Chairman 
and CEO of the FSA said:
When things go wrong, we shall look directly to senior management, whom we shall hold 
accountable. In the case of the failure of Barings, or the pensions mis-selling debacle, 
senior management have not been held directly accountable. Now we have a system of 
personal registration, where speciﬁ ed individuals at the top of the ﬁ rm have clearly set out 
responsibilities for risk management and compliance, for which we hold them accountable.
Therefore whilst important, setting the right ‘tone from the top’ in the regulator is insufﬁ cient 
to ensure greater action taken against individual ﬁ nancial services executives. Regulators need 
to have clear processes so they automatically investigate and consider taking action against 
individual executives when they have ﬁ ne a ﬁ rm. If regulators decide to not pursue a case against 
an individual then they should state clearly the reasons why they have decided not to do so. This 
will improve accountability and help ensure that after the next ﬁ nancial crisis we do not have the 
same old excuses trotted out by regulators and politicians about why those responsible have been 
let off the hook.
Levels of ﬁ nes
The ﬁ gures for the level of FCA ﬁ nes certainly show an increase over the pitiful amounts from 
the FSA. To a certain extent these were driven by the action taken against a number of banks for 
manipulating LIBOR and FX markets. This was accompanied by a signiﬁ cant increase in the average 
level of ﬁ nes for other breaches from just below £1 million in 2008 to £24 million in 2015. This 
was partly due to a change in the FSA’s penalty policy in 2010 which was designed to increase the 
level of penalties in line with its “credible deterrence” strategy. 
In his 2015 Mansion House speech the then Chancellor said “simply ratcheting up ever-larger ﬁ nes 
that just penalise shareholders, erode capital reserves and diminish the lending potential of the 
economy is not, in the end, a long term answer.” 66 The BoE has estimated that the $150 billion 
of ﬁ nes levied on global-banks over the past ﬁ ve years translates into more than $3 trillion of 
reduced lending capacity. Andrew Bailey, deputy governor of the BoE and the new chief executive 
of the FCA, said in 2014 that authorities in the US and elsewhere should consult regulators before 
imposing their ﬁ nes. He said too-heavy penalties can have “real or potentially negative effects on 
the safety and soundness of the ﬁ rms we regulate”.67 
It remains to be seen whether the increase in FCA ﬁ nes will be sustainable. The FCA’s policy allows 
a signiﬁ cant element of discretion and this could be used to reduce the level of ﬁ nes. Indeed since 
the start of 2016 the level of ﬁ nes has shown a dramatic decrease with the FCA levying total ﬁ nes 
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of just £9.9 million so far. The FCA will be consulting on its penalty policy later this year and has 
not yet stated how it will ensure that this consultation reaches out beyond the industry and takes 
in the views of the public.
Fines levied on ﬁ rms by the FSA/FCA
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In this chapter, we will bring together the detailed ﬁ ndings of each chapter to 
draw some wider conclusions which will drive the recommendations which are 
made in the following chapter. 
There have begun to be changes in the culture of the regulators. These changes 
have been different in each of the regulators: within the Bank of England and 
the PRA, cultural change has been relatively disciplined and a top-down and 
comprehensive strategy has been transformed into speciﬁ c actions. Within the 
FCA a plan for cultural change was initially set out internally, but the regulator 
has been somewhat blown off course by demands of various stakeholders. The 
new conduct regulator has been battered and bruised by leadership changes, 
constant restructuring and pressure from politicians. 
Employees within the Bank of England / PRA as well as the FCA are broadly 
positive about the initiatives, but also note there are some important barriers 
to cultural change. It is not yet clear that these cultural change initiatives are 
making a signiﬁ cant positive difference on the frontline. Stakeholders also 
saw the Bank of England / PRA as having been more successful at changing its 
culture, while they have a much more mixed assessment of the FCA. 
Analysis of cultural change in 
the UK’s ﬁ nancial regulators
CHAPTER FOUR
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Historical background
Cycles of Regulation. Since there have been ﬁ nancial markets, there has also been regulation. Looking 
at over 300 years of history of the UK ﬁ nancial markets reveals a cyclical pattern of regulation: Buoyant 
ﬁ nancial markets and increased ﬁ nancial innovation which, go unchecked, lead to a ﬁ nancial crisis. This 
sparks the creation of new regulation in the ﬁ nancial markets. Over time this new regulation is often 
slowly undermined or outﬂ anked by the ﬁ nancial industry. This subsequently lays the grounds for a further 
unchecked boom and a further ﬁ nancial crisis. Politicians and ﬁ nancial regulators have been swearing that 
‘this will never happen again’ and that next time ‘senior executives will be held responsible’ since at least 
the 18th century. 
Informal Regulation. Another enduring aspect of regulation of the ﬁ nancial sector has been the role of 
informal modes of regulation. Hard law had been used at times to reign in the ﬁ nancial sector, but often 
more informal mechanisms were more important. The most well-known of these was ‘the governor’s 
eyebrows’ – whereby the Governor of the Bank of England would allegedly communicate his displeasure 
with banks plans through a raising his eyebrows. Another example of this informal regulation can be found 
in informal pressure put on banks to reign in merger activities in the early 20th century and later to keep 
ﬁ rms undertaking different activities - banking, mortgages, insurance and securities trading – in separate 
organisations. 
Learning from the past. Many of the challenges which ﬁ nancial regulators face today could be seen as 
having precedents in the past. During the 18th century there was a wave of ﬁ nancial innovation which 
involved the creation of new ﬁ nancial instruments. These new ﬁ nancial instruments both provided an 
opportunity for the ﬁ nancial sector to rapidly expand. They also created new risks which were ultimately 
managed by greater centralisation of control in the Bank of England. The ﬁ nancial sector is facing similar 
issues today as FinTech companies create new ﬁ nancial instruments and business models which are entirely 
outside of the legislative framework. It is worth reminding ourselves that these waves of unchecked ﬁ nancial 
innovation have sowed the seeds for both economic growth and economic crises in the past and it may be 
no different in the future. Regulators and politicians have also always struggled to take action against senior 
executives in banks and other ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms following fraud, misconduct and ﬁ nancial crises. 
Box-ticking and the pressure for a light-touch approach in the run-up to the ﬁ nancial crisis. The 
liberalisation of the ﬁ nancial sector in 1986 meant that the sector moved from more informal regulation 
based on close relationships in the City towards more formalised regulation. This process of formalisation 
started the rise of what has come to be seen today as excessive box-ticking. There was also the centralisation 
of ﬁ nancial regulation. In 2000 there was a move from a range of different specialist ﬁ nancial regulators to 
a single regulator which covered many thousands of ﬁ rms. The FSAs regulatory remit was increasingly large 
and its attention was stretched thinly across both consumer protection and ﬁ nancial stability. In the years 
immediately preceding the ﬁ nancial crisis there was a gradual weakening of the regulator’s approach to the 
ﬁ nancial industry due to political pressure for ‘light touch’ regulation. The regulator was too permissive, too 
reactive and shied away from more vigorous enforcement action against the ﬁ nancial industry. They had 
a naïve faith that markets were self-correcting and would discipline banks with risky business models and 
assumed that market pressure would lead to senior executives acting in the interests of customers. Finally, 
the regulators tended to only focus on obvious outliers. This meant that they tended to overlook more 
systemic problems. Each of these factors combined laid some of the foundations for the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis.
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Restructuring Regulation 
Beyond light-touch. Following the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis there was wider reﬂ ection about what exactly 
had gone wrong within the ﬁ nancial regulators. The initial wave of changes were in response to the failure 
of Northern Rock and led to the Supervisory Enhancement Program, which was then reinforced with Adair 
Turner’s review in 2009. Both of these taken together represented an important departure from the ‘light 
touch’ approach to regulation which had dominated regulatory thinking in the lead up to the ﬁ nancial crisis. 
This was pushed further by the 2010 review which recommended greater focus on conduct of ﬁ nancial 
institutions and ﬁ nancial stability. This was ultimately enacted through the 2012 Financial Services Act which 
established a new regulatory landscape made up of the FCA, the PRA and the BoE. 
New regulators. The changes introduced by the 2012 Financial Services Act largely focused on creating 
new structures (establishing the FCA and moving the PRA to be a subsidiary of the Bank of England), with a 
new scope of operation (such as focusing on conduct or prudential regulation) and new legislative powers. 
The LIBOR scandal also led to an increased focus on why individual executives had been able to escape 
sanctions. Regulators were subject to criticism for failing to take action against executives who had presided 
over misconduct and the collapse of RBS, HBOS and Northern Rock. New legislation was introduced to 
establish a new ‘Senior Managers Regime’ to hold executives to account for misconduct which falls within 
their areas of responsibility. There was also an awareness that moving to a more effective regime would 
take more than changes to regulatory structures, objectives and powers: It would require a change in culture 
within the regulators. There was a clear danger that the creation of the FCA and PRA might end up just being 
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a superﬁ cial rebranding exercise if the more formal changes were not backed up with more substantive 
changes to the culture of the organisations and the way they operate. It is interesting to note that when 
the FCA and PRA were launched, much of the ‘tone from the top’ was similar to the launch of the FSA 
over a decade earlier. 
A costly and complex regulatory system. The creation of a new regulatory landscape was intended to 
introduce a more proactive and robust approach to regulation. However, it has also meant that ﬁ nancial 
regulation has become more costly, and complex. The amount spent on regulating our ﬁ nancial industries 
has risen signiﬁ cantly following the crisis. We now spend almost £1.2 billion a year on ﬁ nancial regulators. If 
we took into account the amount of resources which the industry devotes to regulation, the ﬁ gure would be 
much higher. The complexity of regulation has continued to increase under this new regulatory structure. The 
rulebooks have grown in size signiﬁ cantly in recent years and measures of how much capital banks need to 
hold have become increasingly complex. There are now over 13,000 pages of rules, guidance and supervisory 
statements issued by the FCA and PRA. The regulator’s scope continues to expand with the FCA taking over 
responsibility for regulating thousands of ﬁ rms offering consumer credit. 
Changing Culture 
We then conducted a systematic assessment of the actions the regulators were taking to change 
their culture. We examined the following areas:
Leadership: Changing tone from the top and establishing core purpose, values and objectives
Processes: Embedding the cultural change through reforms to processes such as 
remuneration, performance management, hiring, promotion and staff development
Decision making: How regulators brought other perspectives into their decision making 
processes through consultation, collaboration and introducing internal and external challenge
Evaluation and accountability: How regulators evaluated their impact, learned 
from their activity and were held accountable.
Staff responses: Perspectives of staff on cultural change and their impression of the 
barriers encountered.
Measurement: How regulators were measuring the progress of their cultural change programmes
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Cultural change in the Bank of England / PRA – the ‘One Bank’ programme. Culture change has been 
undertaken under the auspices of the One Bank programme at the PRA and BoE. This is a top down change 
programme with the over-arching objective of creating a common culture in both organisations. It is based 
around a set of common values and has been implemented through changes to the way competence 
is developed at the bank, the structure of remuneration, the way people are hired, how performance is 
managed and promotion are distributed, concerns are reported, external and internal challenge is managed, 
leadership and collaboration processes take place.
Culture change at the FCA – a fragmented process. A similar process took place within the FCA. Following 
its founding, the organisation articulated some core cultural characteristics and values. Senior executives also 
made public statements about the importance of implementing a new culture within the organisation based 
on a ‘forward thinking’ and more ‘judgement based’ approach. This culture change has been enacted through 
a series of internal changes such as changes to competence development, the structure of remuneration, 
hiring practices, performance management and promotion, the internal and external reporting of concerns, 
leadership and collaboration. Unlike the PRA / Bank of England, many of these initiatives in the FCA 
appeared to be a little more loosely linked together. There have also been signs that the FCA risks being 
blown off course from implementing various cultural changes. The regulator was battered and bruised by 
leadership changes, constant restructuring and pressure from politicians.
Staff reactions. We found evidence that cultural changes within each of the regulators has been relatively 
well received by the staff. At the Bank of England, there was evidence that senior staff had adopted the new 
judgement based approach. However the acceptance of the One Bank strategy was more mixed – with many 
mixed responses as to how the strategic plan impacts on their jobs. We had more extensive evidence about 
employee reactions at the FCA. We found that staff generally felt energised by the new approach introduced 
by Martin Wheatley, and that the culture change initiative and values had been well communicated. Staff 
thought the regulator was friendly and their work had a sense of purpose. However there were concerns 
around the extent of bureaucracy and silos in the organisation, the organisation being overloaded, lack of 
opportunities for career progression, and internal and external pressure on the organisation.
International comparisons. We also examined how the FCA and PRA compared to regulators in nine other 
major ﬁ nancial centres – comparing the topics they discussed in their annual reports and the backgrounds of 
their senior staff.
Stakeholder Reactions 
Bank of England / PRA. Generally we found that stakeholders respected the Bank of England. They said 
it had high quality people, and that it was efﬁ cient and effective. However they also saw it as lacking 
transparency or even arrogant at times. The PRA was also widely respected by stakeholders. It beneﬁ ted 
signiﬁ cantly from operating as part of the Bank of England – it was seen as having high quality people, 
being proportionate in its action, having a clear purpose and creating ‘no surprises’ for various organisations. 
Both the Bank of England and the PRA were still seen as vulnerable to group think and there was concern 
that they ignored external challenges to their policies. Sir John Vickers had laid out a comprehensive and 
well-argued view in a New City Agenda lecture concerning why the BoE was taking an approach to capital 
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requirements which was too soft. He explained that in setting the level of capital the Bank was assuming 
that it was “clairvoyant and extremely agile”. The BoE disagreed with his views as it believed that its new 
supervisory framework would stop banks from taking excessive risks. Some viewed this as demonstrating 
an overconﬁ dence in their own abilities.
More active engagement with the public. The Open Forum which the Bank organised to get the public’s 
perspective on reform was seen as valuable initiative but stakeholders thought the PRA and the Bank needed 
to do more to embed the process of consulting the public into their ongoing activities. It would be very 
disappointing if the Open Forum began to be seen as a one-off talking shop or PR exercise.
FCA. Stakeholder assessments of the FCA were much more mixed. They acknowledged that the 
culture had indeed improved, there was an increased willingness to engage with consumer groups and that 
enforcement action was stronger. However there was concerns about variable quality of staff, excessive 
box-ticking, a culture of secrecy, a lack of willingness to use new powers granted by Parliament, a lack of 
clarity, a lack of independent evaluations, internal silos and being overloaded with data. Smaller ﬁ rms noted 
the difﬁ culties of engaging with the FCA as they had to phone a call centre. There could be a potential 
distortion to competition as larger banks beneﬁ ted from dedicated supervisory teams within the FCA which 
were available to answer questions. The FCA had scrapped its review of bank culture, which demonstrated 
complete insensitivity to the problems in the sector. There were also concerns as to whether the Board of 
the FCA would be independent enough to stand up to industry lobbying and political interference.
Cross cutting issues. There were also issues which cut across all of the ﬁ nancial regulators. The stakeholders 
we spoke to mentioned concerns with increased regulatory burden, increased complexity which have 
created increasingly slow and narrow processes, a sense of fear, the proliferation of administration and an 
increasingly buoyant market for regulatory ofﬁ cials. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we bought together the over-arching ﬁ ndings of this report. Ultimately what we ﬁ nd is 
that UK ﬁ nancial regulators tend to operate in cycles – with a crisis leading to greater and more detailed 
regulation which is then undermined by ﬁ rms and politicians eventually leading to another crisis. One 
result has been to create a regulatory structure which is more costly, complex and concentrated. Following 
the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis there was a familiar attempt to increase regulators powers in order to protect 
a similar crisis happening again. This was enacted through changes to the structure and objectives of 
regulators and the powers given to them. To ensure these changes are not just symbolic, they needed to 
be translated into more sustained changes to the culture of FCA, PRA and Bank of England. We found that 
each of these organisations had made progress in changing their cultures. The BoE and PRA have been more 
consistent, whereas the FCA risks being blown off course in its cultural change. We found that stakeholders 
acknowledged this differential progress. While the BoE and PRA were widely respected, there were more 
questions for the FCA around issues such as external pressure, internal bureaucracy and organisational 
overload. In the following chapter, we will detail what this means in terms of speciﬁ c recommendations as 
to how UK ﬁ nancial regulators can ensure they deliver the change of culture which is required to make the 
ﬁ nancial sector resilient and successful. 
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In the previous chapter, we outlined the major issues which UK ﬁ nancial 
regulators face in their attempts to change their culture. We found that current 
attempts to transform UK ﬁ nancial regulators are part of a familiar pattern of 
cycles of regulation. But it has meant the ﬁ nancial regulation in the UK has 
become more costly, complex and concentrated. The reforms following the 
2008 ﬁ nancial crisis has created stronger regulators. The ﬁ nancial regulators 
themselves have been variably successful in their attempts change their 
culture. The Bank of England and PRA have delivered a more consistent change 
initiative. The FCA began on a course of cultural change, but risks being blown 
off-course due to extensive external pressure. This was reﬂ ected in stakeholders’ 
assessments of each regulator. While the Bank of England and PRA were well 
regarded among all stakeholders we spoke with, assessments of the FCA were 
much more mixed.
Recommendations
CHAPTER FIVE
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Recommendations
Our analysis identiﬁ es a number of issue which each of the ﬁ nancial regulators need to address: 
For the Bank of England and the PRA, increasing transparency and openness were highlighted by some 
stakeholders. One way to do this would be building on the success of the Open Forum by demonstrating 
that this is more than just a one-off PR exercise. The Bank needs to tackle group think by doing more to 
encourage internal and external challenge and independent thinking. There was also the need to ensure that 
the One Bank initiative makes a meaningful difference for employees at the Bank. The Bank will need to 
conduct a transparent and independent assessment of progress made with their cultural change programme. 
The FCA and its new CEO Andrew Bailey need to develop a new comprehensive programme of cultural 
change, establishing the key purpose of the regulator and the metrics which will be used to measure success. 
Senior leadership need to demonstrate independence from politicians and the industry and provide support 
for frontline staff to take a more proactive approach. The FCA also needs to ensure it makes greater use of 
the new powers it has been given by Parliament and takes robust action in response to intelligence from the 
public and whistleblowers. Finally, it should learn more about the effectiveness of its activities by setting up 
an Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ ce.  
Policymakers need to recognise that excessive meddling can be counter-productive, reducing morale in the 
regulator and sending it in many different directions. Policymakers also need to acknowledge the limitations 
of ever more detailed regulation. There is an urgent need to reform the legislation which has allowed a 
culture of secrecy to develop in regulators by removing section 348 of FSMA. There remains a strong case for 
introducing a duty of care owed by ﬁ nancial services ﬁ rms to their customers. 
The ﬁ nancial services industry need to update their perceptions of regulatory agencies. They need to 
move away from generic criticism of regulators and suggest more focused and speciﬁ c ways of improving 
regulations and regulators.
Bank of England / PRA
• Conduct a transparent and independent assessment of the progress made with their cultural 
change programme: Through the One Bank initiative a comprehensive and detailed plan has been 
developed for cultural change in the Bank/PRA. This should identify the key metrics and milestones which 
are being used to measure the impact of the programme. This assessment and the overall progress with the 
programme should be audited and evaluated by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ ce.
• Embed its new judgement based approach: Stakeholders felt that the Bank of England and PRA had 
adapted its culture well towards implementing a judgement-based approach to regulation, based on 
focusing on the big risks and senior management engagement. They will also need to acknowledge that 
their staff are subject to behavioural biases such as overconﬁ dence, group think and social inﬂ uence which 
may impact on their ability to exercise judgement when supervising ﬁ rms.
• Improve engagement with the public. One of the weaknesses of the Bank of England is that it has 
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typically only engaged with very limited circle of ﬁ nancial institutions. This means it has been perceived 
as lacking a degree of transparency. It also means that it has been mainly inﬂ uenced by the voices of a 
relatively small community of ﬁ nancial technocrats. This gives rise to dangers of group think. The Bank 
has taken some steps towards creating more open engagement through its Open Forum. It is vital that 
the Bank/PRA builds on the success of the Open Forum by making sure public consultation is part of an 
ongoing process rather than a one off PR event.
• Encourage challenging and independent thinking. The National Audit Ofﬁ ce report on the Bank of 
England following the ﬁ nancial crisis pointed out that a lack of diverse and independent thinking was part 
of an ineffective response to the ﬁ nancial crisis. The Bank has taken some steps towards addressing this 
issues – such as establishing the ‘Bank Underground’ blog. More of these initiatives to create forums for 
independent thinking would be welcomed. There is a danger that as research agendas within the Bank 
become more centrally co-ordinated and managed that divergent research initiatives get driven out. There 
was also a danger that the Bank was overconﬁ dent in its ability to supervise large, complicated banks and 
was therefore disagreeing with the views of Sir John Vickers that capital requirements were inadequate.
• Understand that bank misconduct can have consequences for prudential regulation. There could be 
a tendency for prudential regulators to think that conduct issues are not their concern. This would be a 
mistake as it is clear that conduct issues can become so large that they have an impact on the stability 
of banks. Future problems in the Buy-to-Let market would be likely to stem from an interaction between 
conduct and prudential issues.
• Reinforce that objectives had changed and no longer includes encouraging innovation or attracting 
banks to locate in the City: The PRA no longer has to consider these issues and it is important that these 
points are reiterated to frontline staff.
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FCA
• New CEO Andrew Bailey should institute a comprehensive programme of cultural change: The new 
CEO needed to take responsibility for developing a comprehensive programme of cultural change within 
the FCA and be held accountable for progress.
• Demonstrate independence from politicians and industry: External pressure from politicians and 
industry lobbying had resulted in the regulator being blown off course in its limited attempts to establish a 
new culture. The new CEO would need to demonstrate that the FCA would resist pressure from politicians 
and industry for a return to the light-touch approach of the past.
• Establish a clear sense of purpose: The FCA had been given a strategic objective to “ensuring that the 
relevant markets function well” but among the stakeholders we spoke to there was often confusion about 
what the regulator was trying to achieve. The new Chief Executive would need to articulate a clear vision 
for what the FCA was trying to deliver for the public and how it can be achieved.
• Spell out what success means and develop metrics to monitor whether it is being achieved: The 
FCA was currently lacking a clear framework for measuring the impact its regulatory activities had on 
the market. Once the FCA was clearer about what it was trying to achieve it would need a clearer set of 
metrics to measure whether its activities were having the desired impact. The FCA would also need to 
state clearly what it was trying to achieve with any new change cultural initiative and have the progress 
made against it independently audited.
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• Reduce supervisory churn and retain staff. One of the most frequent complaints from the industry 
was about the variable quality of staff within the FCA. An important contributing factor is that people 
at the regulator will often change jobs in pursuit of promotion or due to restructuring. What this means 
is that when regulators got to know an institution then they are shifted. This is often meant to increase 
independence, but it also lowers expertise leading to banks being asked to engage in box ticking exercises 
rather than focusing on a few important issues. The FCA should consider measures for ensuring that 
people do not continue to see the FCA as a ‘parking spot’. This means harnessing the commitment to the 
organisation which is evidently there. 
• Senior leadership should provide backup to frontline staff. During Martin Wheatley’s term, staff felt 
the FCA was less cowed by the banks and was properly engaging with its mission. The willingness of senior 
ﬁ gures to publicly back up staff was highly valued. This galvanised staff making them more committed to the 
institution. It is important in the future that senior leadership support staff in their attempts to hold industry 
to account. This tends to signiﬁ cantly strengthen morale and provide a sense of purpose in the organisation.
• Make proper use of the new powers granted by Parliament. The FCA had failed to make proper use of 
the new powers it had been given to regulate products, name and shame misleading ﬁ nancial promotions 
or order companies to pay redress. It seems a missed opportunity that the FCA still refuses to name the 
ﬁ rm involved when it ﬁ nds a misleading advert.
• Reduce internal hurdles. We were often told you would spend months having something signed off. This 
meant regulators felt like they were more engaged in dealing with internal bureaucracy than doing the 
work. One aspect of these internal hurdles were departmental silos. Often different parts of the FCA would 
not be engaged effectively with each other. This could mean that the same organisation had multiple FCA 
teams and investigations ongoing at the same time. 
• Improve engagement with the public, SMEs and whistleblowers and take robust action in response 
to their concerns. Engagement could help improve trust, provide a valuable intelligence and offer an 
early warning system of potential risks and problems. It was unclear whether there had been any progress 
in the FCA’s initial aspiration to develop a ‘radar’ to deliver real-time information on risks to consumers. 
Once information had been received it was important that robust action is taken in response. All too often 
people we spoke with thought that their reports, certainly initially, were not being taken seriously. 
• Better access to knowledgeable supervisors for medium-sized businesses and challenger banks. 
Many medium sized institutions were frustrated about being directed to call centres when they had 
regulatory questions. There needs to be a better matching of regulators to institutions. This means medium 
sized ﬁ nancial institutions will not feel like their concerns were being lost in a call centre. Project Innovate 
was seen as a good example of improving the accessibility of the regulator.
• Be more transparent. The FCA was far too secretive which damaged accountability and fed suspicions 
that it wasn’t always working on behalf of the consumer. The FCA needed to be far more open about what 
it was investigating and instructions it had given to the industry. It also needs to provide greater feedback 
to whistle-blowers and others who report problems. The FCA needed to be built on a presumption that 
information would be disclosed unless it would damage the public interest. This could be a big challenge 
for Andrew Bailey – whilst the public may be content to have capital requirements for banks negotiated in 
secret they are less comfortable when the conduct regulator enters into secret agreements with banks.
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• Build on successes. The supervision of peer-to-peer lending was seen as being based on a genuine 
attempt to understand and support new innovative business models. Regulatory activity in the payday 
lending sector had also led to positive improvements. In these sectors the FCA had enjoyed clear political 
support, had shown a willingness to understand and analyse ﬁ rms’ business models and take strong action.
• Develop a greater balance between sanctions and rewards. One of the greatest frustrations expressed 
by the regulators’ employees, as well as by employees at the regulated institutions, is that there seem not to 
be any celebration of good practices. To create more balance the regulator could design a reward mechanism, 
to celebrate best practices both internally, within the FCA, and externally in regulated entities. This could help 
shift away from a bureaucratic culture towards a more meritocratic one, where success is celebrated.
• Understand what happens on the frontline and involve staff in the process of deﬁ ning and 
implementing cultural change. We saw that the FCA had initially got the tone from the top correct. 
However, what was less clear was how this was communicated throughout the organisation and the 
material difference it made on the front line in the organisation. This led to the danger of a disconnect 
between what is happening on the front line and the intentions of senior management. 
• Be wary of extreme risk aversion. There seemed to be a tendency within the institution to avoid 
potential risks at all costs. If ﬁ rms were to be encouraged to take risks then the regulator also needed 
to take risks and develop new approaches. Regulators tended to comply with processes and procedures 
rather than focusing on the issues which mattered. Regulators tend to have an inbuilt risk aversion – and 
this is right. However, excessive risk aversion can mean that many initiatives are not taken forward and 
get lost in bureaucracy. 
• Take an updated approach to big data. Currently the FCA seems to be demanding large amounts of 
data from ﬁ rms, however it is unclear whether it has the capacity to meaningfully analyse this data. The 
FCA needs to consider whether it has the right skills mix and whether new kinds of quantitative skills are 
needed to undertake this work. 
• Challenge the orthodox theory which leads to attempts to increase competition solely by 
disclosing information to consumers. The FCA had been given a new objective to promote effective 
competition and had conducted a number of market studies. However, the policy outputs from these 
studies and other inquiries by the Competition and Markets Authority seemed to be dominated by 
measures relying on disclosure of information to consumers. It was noted by consumer representatives 
that redrafting disclosure documents and other information solutions have had a very limited impact 
on competition in the ﬁ nancial services industry but that this did not seem to be taken into account 
by the FCA or the CMA. 
• Develop genuine competence to understand and regulate culture. As the FCA has sought to 
extend its focus on conduct, it identiﬁ ed bank culture as a priority.  However it then scrapped its review 
of bank culture and it remains uncertain whether the regulator has a strong and focused enough 
competence in this area. If the FCA hopes to measure culture, it should ensure it has staff who have 
expertise in this area and it has a centralised competence in understanding culture. It should publish a 
transparent assessment of progress and not rely on the Banking Standards Board. It shouldn’t franchise 
this vital work out to the industry.
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• Take strong enforcement action against senior executives responsible for misconduct. After a burst 
following the ﬁ nancial crisis the number of individuals sanctioned by the FCA had gone down. Given its 
new powers under the Senior Managers Regime, the FCA should have a presumption that every time a ﬁ rm 
was ﬁ ned the FCA should also take action against the senior manager responsible. If it fails to do this it 
should clearly state the reasons why it has decided to drop the case.
• Understand regulators behavioural biases. The FCA had begun to undertake work examining how 
consumers behave. It needed to acknowledge that staff working in regulators could also be subject to 
behavioural biases. Just like we know that Doctors bias towards over-prescribing drugs, we might ﬁ nd 
that regulators have biases towards excessively complex regulation. This might involve conducting a more 
thoughtful analysis of the behavioural biases which shape regulatory behaviour and suggesting some 
‘nudges’ which might ensure that unhelpful biases do not take over.
• Set up an independent evaluation ofﬁ ce within the FCA to ensure greater independent evaluation 
and internal challenge. The FCA is an organisation which is under pressure from multiple external 
constituencies. However, it tends to deal with this pressure through being guarded and not engaging in 
much serious reﬂ ection. The FCA should set up an Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ ce, similar to the one which 
exists within the Bank of England.
Policy Makers
• Acknowledge limitations of ever more detailed regulation. It is a natural reaction of policymakers to 
call for ever more detailed regulation in reaction to ﬁ nancial scandals and moral outrage. Policymakers 
needed to acknowledge that there were limitations to this approach and that this complexity added 
to cost and distorted competition. Policymakers needed to consider whether they were content with 
a system which costs more than £1.2 billion a year. Policymakers could consider introducing speciﬁ c 
mandates for simpler ﬁ nancial regulation and commissioning more independent evaluations.
• Reduce levels of meddling with regulators. There was a perception among some staff that directions 
from Treasury could often undermine work regulators were doing. This would lead to staff often feeling 
demotivated and unsure about direction of policies. It also meant that the regulators could be blown off 
course. This created a sense of uncertainty within the broader industry. 
• Avoid political pressure for light-touch regulation. We noted that the UK ﬁ nancial sector tended to 
have policy cycles where crises would beget stricter regulation which would slowly be undermined lead to 
a boom and then another bust. Politicians need to be mindful that a move towards lighter touch regulation 
is likely to be a fatal step towards creating another crisis.
• Appoint Boards with a diverse range of views and experience. There is a danger when boards are 
appointed from only one disciplinary background narrow agendas are likely to emerge and there will be 
little in the way of challenge. Policy makers need to ensure that boards have people from a mixture of 
backgrounds to ensure this does not occur.
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• Reform legislation which requires excessive secrecy and harms accountability. Policymakers had 
put in place legislation which resulted in regulators refusing to disclose information. Section 348 of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act, puts a blanket restriction on disclosure of information by the PRA and 
the FCA. This damages accountability as regulators then entered into secret agreements with ﬁ rms and 
refused to disclose these to politicians or the public. Politicians had also given the National Audit Ofﬁ ce a 
role in scrutinising the value for money of the regulator but the NAO was unable to get the information it 
needed from the FCA due to the restrictions imposed by Parliament on the FCA.
• Introduce a duty of care: The clear trend had been towards ever more complicated and detailed 
regulation. To help avoid a tick-box approach to compliance, both within banks and the regulator, 
policymakers should consult on introducing a duty of care which would be owed by banks to 
their customers.
• Consider whether continuing to grow the size of the regulators actually leads to better regulation. 
One of the major directions of travel in the last 15 years has been to give the FCA ever larger scope and 
it will shortly be taking over responsibility for Claims Management Companies. Policy makers need to ask 
themselves whether continuing to grow the scope of regulation is an acceptable idea or whether it may 
be better to focus the regulatory agenda more clearly.
• Ask what happens on the frontline. The Treasury Select Committee frequently interviews senior 
executives at the regulator but lacks a process to gauge, understand and interpret the views of frontline 
staff. Policymakers should gain feedback from staff about culture and how they are inﬂ uenced by the 
prevailing political environment. The TSC would beneﬁ t from commissioning a project which would 
interview a large selection frontline staff anonymously about the culture of the regulator and summarise 
its ﬁ ndings. 
Financial services industry 
• Update perception of regulatory agencies. We were frequently told by bankers that regulators were the 
least intelligent and the most poorly paid in the sector. There is an assumption that if they were any good 
they would be working in a bank. This did not seem to be the case when we actually spoke with regulators. 
It is important than banks update their perceptions of regulatory agencies. 
• Take personal responsibility and don’t franchise out responsibility for culture change to other 
organisations. Improving the culture in ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms will require sustained commitment from the 
leadership of these ﬁ rms. This must involve establishing purpose and values, taking personal responsibility 
for progress and ensuring that effective controls are in place to investigate and confront misconduct.
• Make speciﬁ c proposals for improvement rather than generic criticism. During our research we 
received much general criticism and frustration rather than speciﬁ c proposals about the operation of the 
regulators. More focused and speciﬁ c suggestions about the regulatory process would prove to be more 
helpful than generic criticism.
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• Stop complaining about tick-box regulation then demanding more boxes to tick. We noticed 
large banks in particular would tend to move between pointing out problems with tick box regulation 
and then seeking out certainty by demanding very clear and formal regulatory processes. This meant that 
large banks were in many ways complicit with regulatory creep. Given they had signiﬁ cant regulatory 
resources, they were well placed to deal with these issues. However it did create problems for smaller 
players in the industry. 
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This report was commissioned by New City Agenda. It was carried out by a 
research team at Cass Business School, City University of London. The team 
consisted of Professor André Spicer, Professor Jean-Pascal Gond, Szilvia Mosonyi, 
Zahira Jaser, Dr Emilio Marti and Hannah Petersen. The Cass team received 
extensive support from New City Agenda Staff: Dominic Lindley and Abbie 
Edwards. The research took place between October 2015 and June 2016.
The report set out to examine what the UK’s ﬁ nancial regulators – the FCA, 
PRA and Bank of England – had done to change their culture following the 2008 
ﬁ nancial crisis. 
Background
APPENDIX ONE
96  |  Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England
We began by drawing together a range of documentation which trace the development of UK ﬁ nancial 
regulation. We reviewed what went wrong with the culture of the FSA and how these failings contributed 
to the ﬁ nancial crisis. The next question which we were interested in was how policymakers and regulators 
responded to the ﬁ nancial crisis. We trace these changes and map out the new regulatory structure and 
approaches which have emerged. The results of this historical analysis are reported in Chapter one.
To understand the process of cultural change within the regulators we reviewed written documentation 
including annual reports, speeches, staff handbooks and staff surveys. We also conducted interviews with 
current and former staff at the regulators. We had hoped that the regulators would cooperate by arranging 
interviews for us with their staff. Unfortunately, after initially agreeing to cooperate they then changed their 
mind and were unable to facilitate this activity. Instead we used our contacts to interview a wide range of 
current and former staff. In Chapter two we lay out what action the regulators have taken to change their 
culture, what progress has been made and how staff have reacted.
In order to broaden our understanding of these change processes, we also conducted interviews with 
stakeholders from a wide variety of organisations. When selecting these stakeholders, we aimed to gain a 
view of most of the key stakeholder groups affected by ﬁ nancial regulation including representatives from 
the ﬁ nancial industry, business groups, consumer groups, investors and policy makers. In addition to the 
interviews, most stakeholders provided us with additional material such as submissions to policy processes, 
reports they had produced and other publicly available documents. We interviewed industry representatives 
from a variety of different sectors and sizes of ﬁ rms. The results of these interviews form the basis of what 
is discussed in Chapter three. 
The interviews with current and former regulatory staff and stakeholders were typically semi-structured and 
took place over about an hour. Almost all interviews were conducted face to face. An indicative sample of the 
questions which we asked staff at the regulators and stakeholders can be found in the boxes below.
Questions for current and former staff at the regulators
Introduction
• Could you please let us know about your personal background and current role?
• What difference in terms of culture did you notice in contrast with prior organisations?
Topic 1: Your organization’s cultural context and the trigger events associated 
with culture changes.
• What is the desired or ‘ofﬁ cial’ culture? 
• What is the actual or unofﬁ cial culture? 
• Are there different cultures in different parts of the organisation? What are these?
• How does the culture affect your job?
• Is culture being measured in any way? How does this impact on you?
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Topic 2: Cultural change initiatives at your organization
2.1. Content and design
• What cultural change initiatives are aware of? Have you participated in any way? What impact 
has this had on you? 
• What are the most tangible elements you are aware of? 
• How do you see this culture change linking to other aspects of the organization (such as 
performance assessment, pay, and structure)?
2.2. Impact
• What kind of impact or inﬂ uence is the change/culture change programme having on your part 
of the organisation? 
• What do you see as the main successes related to this initiative?
• What aspects have not worked out so well?
2.3. Barriers and enablers of cultural change
• What do you regard as the main challenges or barriers related to culture change here?
• What are the main factors facilitating this cultural shift (if any)?
• What changes to your organisation’s culture would enable you to do your job more effectively?
• What could politicians, the industry and other stakeholders do to support culture change 
within your organisation?
Topic 3: Cultural change within regulators
• What are the benchmarks or best practice examples which are often mentioned?
• How does your own organization compare to other organisations you are aware of? 
• What are your views on how regulation as a whole has progressed in relation to cultural 
change since 2008?
Questions for stakeholders
Topic 1 – Your background and the role of your organisation
• Could you please let us know about your personal background and current role?
• Could you please let us know more about your organisation and its purpose/mission?
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Topic 2 – Cultural change in the regulators
2.1 Background
• What was wrong with the culture of the regulator prior to the ﬁ nancial crisis and how did this 
culture contribute to the failings of the regulator?
• What, in your view, is the desired or ‘ofﬁ cial’ culture at the regulators? 
• What, in your view, is the actual or unofﬁ cial culture at the regulators?
• Are there different cultures in different parts of the regulators? What are these? 
• What are your views about the change of culture in the regulators since 2008?
• According to you, what have been the main forces driving cultural change in the regulator?
2.2. Impact
• Could you describe the most tangible elements of any culture change programme within the 
regulators which you are aware of (e.g. cost, level of commitment/endorsement from the top, number 
of employees concerned by the change program, expected impact, performance assessment, pay, and 
structure)?
• What kind of impact or inﬂ uence is the change/culture change programme having in the regulator? 
• What are the main successes related to this initiative?
• What aspects have not worked out so well?
• What change have you noticed regarding how the regulators have engaged with your organisation?
• Have you noticed any difference between the culture of the Bank, PRA and FCA? If so, what are 
the main differences?
2.3. Perceptions of barriers/enablers
• According to you, which barriers, if any, prevent or inhibit cultural change in the regulators?
• According to you, which factors, if any, facilitate cultural change in the regulators?
• What could politicians, the industry and other stakeholders do to support culture change within 
the regulators?
Topic 3: The role of your organization in relation to cultural change 
in the regulators
• Did your organization support the process of cultural change at the regulator? In which ways?
• How do you see the role of your organisation in relation to cultural change?
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Topic 4: Cultural change within regulators – best practice
• What are the benchmarks or best practice examples you have from culture change in regulators 
or other public or private sector organisations?
• Which regulator/organisation do you regard as a clear leader/laggard in this domain?
• How would you describe the culture which you would like to see within the regulator once the 
change programme is complete? 
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Early Regulation of the City of London 
As long as there has been markets in the City of London, there has been regulation. The earliest recorded 
regulation of the city was a statue in 1284 which licenses the Court of Aldermen to license brokers. 
Regulation is typically prompted by bad behaviour in the ﬁ nancial markets. Following a ﬁ nancial boom and 
subsequent bust between 1693 and 1695, public trust in the ﬁ nancial markets plummeted and calls for 
legislative intervention increased. The Government passed an Act to Restrain the Numbers and Practices of 
Stock Brokers and Jobbers in 1697. This act was the result of an inquiry which found that 
‘The pernicious Art of Stock-jobbing hath, of late, wholly perverted the End and Design of 
Companies and Corporations, erected for the introducing, or carrying on of Manafactures,..by 
selling their shares for much more than they are really worth..Thus,..the Management of that Trade 
and Stock comes to fall into unskilful Hands, whereby the Manafactures...dwindle away to nothing’. 
It found widespread forms of market manipulation and expressed concern that bad practices in the ﬁ nancial 
market would harm the wider economy. The Act required stock brokers and jobbers to be licenced, imposed 
a limit on their number, required them to swear an oath, placed a maximum limit on commission and 
required them to record all contracts and dealings. 
Regulation also prompts attempts to lobby against it and undermine it from the City. The 1697 Act was the 
source of intense political lobbying by the City of London. Representatives of the City would often circulate 
pamphlets within Parliament defending the role of brokers. The 1697 act was allowed to lapse in 1707 
following intensive lobbying by the City of London who were worried about the undue costs it imposed on 
brokers. Subsequent attempts to reinstate the act in 1711, 1719 and 1721 were all voted down on their 
third readings following intensive lobbying by the City. 
In place of formal regulation, the City has promoted self-regulation. For instance following the lapsing 
of the 1697 act, the City appealed to its ability to regulate itself. This stands in stark contrast to other 
European centres where the regulation of ﬁ nancial markets was often heavily centralised. In London, the 
tradition of self-regulation remained a central principle. Financial markets in the City of London were largely 
regulated by the dense web of relationships between bankers in the City as well as through the Common 
law. The two major institutions of the early modern City of London – the Bank of England and the Stock 
Market – were both the creation of private actors and were subject to private regulation. 
Never-ending cycles - A history of 
ﬁ nancial regulation in the UK
APPENDIX TWO
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The South Sea Bubble - 1720
Often following a period of self-regulation, another ﬁ nancial crisis emerges. In this instance it was the 
South Sea Bubble. This was the result of the founding of the South Sea company in 1711 – which was 
effectively a public-private partnership designed to carry national debt. The price of the company’s shares 
rose tremendously following insider trading, investors borrowing using their shares as collateral to buy more 
shares, and use of company money to deal in its own shares. In 1720, the price of shares collapsed. Many 
individuals were ruined and the national economy was profoundly harmed. Notable losers included Sir Isaac 
Newton who concluded that although he could predict the motions of the cosmos he ‘could not calculate 
the madness of the people’. 
Politicians were keen to track down and punish the culprits. Lord Molesworth said in Parliament that he 
wanted the South Sea directors to be given the same punishment as parricides under the laws of Ancient 
Rome: sewn up in a sack and thrown alive into the Tiber. A former Chancellor of the Exchequer was charged 
with corruption and alongside some of the other directors was sent to the Tower of London. A portion of 
the directors’ assets, including their recent land purchases, were conﬁ scated.68 The 33 directors were ﬁ ned 
the equivalent of more than £3 billion today. The Rt Hon. Robert Walpole MP led the investigation but let a 
key witness escape and suppressed the inquiry to protect those who had accepted bribes and were close to 
King George I. Walpole’s aim was to construct a political performance which gave politicians (and the public) 
sufﬁ cient opportunities to rage and storm, but which limited their ability to interfere in the workings of the 
ﬁ nancial system. Eventually Walpole was able to restore some property to certain South Sea directors, who 
remained important to the ﬁ nancial sector.69
The concern about widespread speculation prompted complains about moral standards within the City, and 
calls for legislation. The result was the passing of the Bubble Act in 1720 which imposed draconian penalties 
on those operating non-chartered companies. Although some think that this was passed in response to the 
events of the Bubble, others believe that it was actually a piece of protectionist regulation supported by the 
South Sea Company to stiﬂ e competition. These laws were only used once in their 100 years of existence, in 
1825. During the remainder of the 18th century, there were hundreds of Acts of Parliament which sought to 
make money and ﬁ nancial instruments more secure. 
The Napoleonic wars, fake countries and bank failure
This cycle can be seen again during the 19th century. Between 1770 and 1810, there was a rapid 
ﬁ nancialisation of the English economy. In 1770, investors could only choose between 5 stocks on the 
London Stock Exchange. By 1824, 624 stocks were traded on the Exchange. Financial activity in the City 
was given added impetus by the issuing of debt to fund the Napoleonic wars. When these wars came to an 
end, the ﬁ nancial industries had to ﬁ nd alternatives to issuing Government debt. This led them to develop 
a bewildering variety of new ﬁ nancial instruments. The economy continued to globalise rapidly. Speculative 
investments in Latin America, including a ﬁ ctitious country called Poyais, were particularly popular. This 
led to collective ﬁ nancial euphoria, poor standards of due diligence, banks making risky loans, ﬁ nancial 
innovations and the extension of the ﬁ nancial sector. It ended in crash in 1825 which saw the failure of six 
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banks in London and 60 county banks. It had a wider effects on the economy, with a doubling in the number 
of bankruptcies the following year. It even had an effect on the publishing industry, with the publishers of 
many romantic authors and poets going out of business – the publishers had paid their authors handsomely 
and had extended them credit on looser terms than banks.70 Just as in previous ﬁ nancial crisis, this crash 
generated a series of moral warnings about the dangers of speculation and concern about ineffective regulation.
Following the collapse, there was an inevitable regulatory response. The Banking Acts of 1826 gave the 
Bank of England a monopoly over issuing notes under ﬁ ve pounds and allowed banks outside of London to 
operate as joint stock banks rather than partnerships. This privilege was extended to London banks by an 
1833 Act. This led to the founding of 138 joint stock banks – although they tended to be relatively small 
operations. The concentration of issuing bank notes in the Bank of England was furthered by the 1844 Bank 
Charter Act. The Bank Charter Act along with the Joint Stock Banking Act of 1844 raised barriers to entry and 
imposed restrictions on expansion by existing banks mergers. This was later repealed in 1857, which along 
with reforms to reforms to company law between 1858 and 1862 which saw the creation of limited liability, 
fuelled a boom in the founding of new joint-stock banks as well as a wave of bank mergers. 
Overend and Gurney – Bank collapses and efforts 
to imprison bank directors
In 1866, the bank Overend and Gurney failed following its over-lending to the railway industry. A bank run 
ensued with crowds gathering outside its ofﬁ ce at 65 Lombard Street. The directors of the company were 
tried at the Old Bailey for fraud based on false statements in the prospectus for the 1865 offering of shares. 
However, despite public anger, the Lord Chief Justice Sir Alexander Cockburn said that they were guilty only 
of ‘grave error’ rather than criminal behaviour, and the jury acquitted them.71 
The move towards limited liability banking was accelerated following the collapse of City of Glasgow Bank 
(CGB) in 1878. Unlimited liability in the City of Glasgow bank meant that shareholders had to pay up to 
27.5 times their initial investment to cover the losses. The press demanded the prosecution of the directors 
in order to ‘restore conﬁ dence in Scottish banking’. The bank’s general manager and one of its directors 
were found guilty of falsifying CGB’s balance sheets and were given 18-month prison sentences. Five other 
directors were found guilty of publishing false balance sheets and were given 8 month sentences. This was 
only the second imprisonment of directors of a British joint stock bank. Despite this, the sentences were 
reported by The Economist to be ‘inadequate’ and ‘leaving a lot of dissatisfaction behind, with questions 
asked as to why the defendants did not receive the harshest penalty available under the law’. But the press 
did think that the outcome would set new standards of honesty in the economy and recharge commercial 
morality. They thought that the guilty verdict placed a new obligation on bank directors to tell the truth 
and would thus prove ‘a safeguard for good faith in banking’ on which ‘we are so much dependent for the 
stability of trade’.72 
From the Victorian era until World War Two, there was a notable lack of formal changes to banking 
regulation. One major attempt to regulate banks was driven by concerns in 1918 that through the continued 
waves of mergers, the sector had become too concentrated. The Colwyn Report73 concluded that the wave 
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of mergers had gone far enough, and that further amalgamations were not advantageous to the wider 
economy. Although this recommendation did not lead to formal legislation, it did lead an often reiterated 
view on the part of the Government and Treasury that further amalgamation was not favourable. In 1921 
a bill was proposed by Mr Walter Forrest MP which would have introduced a statutory annual audit of the 
accounts of all banks by the Board of Trade. In opposing the Bill the Financial Secretary said that it was ‘quite 
unnecessary to commit the administration at this point to the employment, for this purpose; of a new series 
of Government ofﬁ cials. Nothing could be more undesirable’.74 The Bill failed to pass the House of Commons.
These early instances of ﬁ nancial regulation are only the start of a long history of attempts to regulate the 
ﬁ nancial industry in the City of London. However, the pattern they follow is remarkably familiar. They show 
a clear cyclical pattern which is evident to this day. First there is mounting bad behaviour in ﬁ nancial markets 
which leads to a serious economic problems. This is followed by public moral outrage about the ﬁ nancial 
industry. The Government then steps in to impose legislation. This legislation is then slowly undermined or 
not effectively applied. This creates space for bad behaviour which then spreads and forms the basis for the 
next crisis. 
Post World War 2: The Secondary Banking Crisis, 
the Dark Side of the Moon, the Gower Report and 
the Big Bang 
As we saw in the last section, ﬁ nancial markets in the City of London largely operated on principles of 
self-regulation. There was an ongoing cycle of booms, busts, regulatory initiatives and subsequent attempts 
to undermine or outﬂ ank regulation. By the late 1970s, this had produced a collection of largely single 
industry Acts. These were clustered around the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. They were 
supplemented by provisions of various Companies Acts. In some cases the requirements were administered 
by the Government department responsible for the particular act. Often this was the Department of Trade & 
Industry (DTI) – in the unit trust sector a ‘vast body’ of law and practice evolved which was never published 
and was known in detail only to DTI ofﬁ cials. For licenced securities dealers the DTI was criticised for lax 
enforcement and failing to remove a licence when a dealer was considered to be unsatisfactory. In other 
sectors, the requirements were administered by self-regulating bodies such as Lloyds of London or the Stock 
Exchange. There were also a number of professional bodies representing practitioners (such as the Council 
for the Securities Industry) who played some role in maintaining standards of investor protection – although 
some of these were considered to be discussion groups rather than regulatory bodies.
Although the City of London never had a statutory requirement for formal separation of different ﬁ nancial 
activities equivalent to the US Glass-Steagall Act, nevertheless the UK ﬁ nancial remained fragmented 
until the 1980s. Rules at the Stock Exchange prevented banks from becoming members. Building societies 
were restricted from competing with banks for the provision of consumer and commercial credit and 
the operation of the payment systems. Cross ownership between banks and insurance companies was 
discouraged by the Bank of England and the DTI. There were also practices which served to limit competition 
such as ofﬁ cially sanctioned cartels75 and the convention that banks would not compete with building 
societies in the mortgage market. 
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Following its nationalisation in 1946, the Bank of England retained responsibility for bank regulation and 
the affairs of the City. Prudential regulation and supervision was informal – characterised as the Governor’s 
eyebrow – which would be raised if a bank was taking too much risk. In a report into the workings of the 
monetary system the clearing banks commented: ‘we listen with great care to what the Governor says to 
us at any time. He might give us a hint and we should not be likely to ignore it’.76 Banks allowed the Bank 
of England to examine their operations although the BoE had no formal powers of direction to order banks 
to make changes. The secondary banking crisis of 1973-75 and the losses incurred by the Bank of England in 
supporting smaller banks led to the 1979 Banking Act which was intended to prevent a repeat of the crisis. 
The 1979 Act introduced a requirement for banks to be licensed to accept deposits from the public and gave 
the Bank of England powers to supervise bank’s ability to meet the conditions which institutions needed 
to meet to be authorised. The Act also introduced the Deposit Protection Board, guaranteeing 75% of a 
customer’s deposits up to a limit of £20,000. A two tier system of authorisation was introduced between 
Recognised Banks, which had established a good reputation and Licenced Deposit Takers (LDTs) which were 
new. The intention was that close control would be exercised over LDTs, with more informal measures being 
used for Recognised Banks.
The supervisory system relied on regular, close contact being maintained between the Bank of England 
and the management of the individual bank, combined with the submission of quarterly statistical returns 
to the BoE. In the early 1980s the Bank’s approach to supervision was based on being close to people, 
understanding the marketplace and having ‘hidden authority’. The BoE was respected by the banks and there 
was the impression that it knew what is was doing. What it said to the banks was taken seriously. The BoE 
had ‘Soft Power’. Its motto during the time was ‘Do Good by Stealth’. The BoE knew what was going on and 
would say to banks – ‘Don’t try and pull the wool over my eyes’. It would ask banks questions like ‘How can 
you be making so much money’. Understanding the business and knowing what questions to ask were seen 
as being very important for effective supervision.77 
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The collapse of Johnson Matthey bank in 1984 highlighted some of the weaknesses of the regime where 
supervisors relied heavily on the integrity of management of recognised banks and the BoE lacked analysis 
of the quality of loan books. The Bank concluded that: ‘Licensed deposit-takers have been subject to a more 
rigorous regime of supervision, whereas the supervisors have relied heavily on the integrity and co-operation 
of the management of recognised banks. With most banks, this conﬁ dence has not been misplaced. But the 
banking industry has expanded rapidly, and its activities have diversiﬁ ed. Recognised bank status—as we have 
seen with Johnson Matthey Bankers—has not always guaranteed prudence and responsibility.’ 78 The response 
was the 1987 Banking Act which gave the Bank of England extra powers and ensured that only authorised 
institutions could accept deposits. Over time the regulatory system has moved more towards greater 
attention to the law and individual rules. This placed additional pressure on regulators to follow due process. 
Banks were also more willing to use legal protections and more likely to challenge regulators.
There were a number of ﬁ nancial scandals in the late 1970s and early 1980s which illustrated the 
shortcomings of the existing regulatory system for investor protection. The ﬁ nal straw was the collapse 
of investment management company Norton Warburg in February 1981 resulting in losses for investors 
including high proﬁ le victims such as rock group Pink Floyd, who lost all the money they had made from 
their album, ‘The Dark Side of the Moon’. The Stock Exchange also investigated the conduct of a ﬁ rm of 
Manchester stock brokers. Both of these cases highlighted that the current rules did not have provisions 
requiring the disclosure of conﬂ icts of interest. In 1981, the DTI commissioned a Report by Professor Gower 
‘to advise on the need for new legislation’.79 The Gower Report concluded that the current framework 
involved: ‘complication, uncertainty, irrationality, failure to treat like for like, inﬂ exibility, excessive control in 
some areas and too little (or none) in others, the creation of an elite and a fringe, lax enforcement, delays, 
over concentration on honesty rather than competence, undue diversity of regulations and regulators, 
and failure overall to achieve a proper balance between Governmental regulation and self-regulation.’ The 
report’s recommendations were based on the philosophy ‘to provide the essential minimum of regulation 
needed to protect investors from being made fools of, but not to attempt the impossible task of preventing 
them from making fools of themselves’. The industry lobbied for the Gower proposals to be watered down. 
They called for more ‘routine and effective criminal prosecution, principally against those institutions on the 
margins of London’s ﬁ nancial community, whilst arguing for the continued practice of unsupervised self-
regulation for those at its centre.’ 80 As the Council for the Securities Industry put it:
‘We do not agree that the present system, which works well, should be replaced by a single 
comprehensive framework…Unquestionably the greatest weaknesses of the present scheme of 
regulation lies in the failure to deal effectively with commercial and ﬁ nancial frauds.’
Following the report, the DTI prepared a white paper in 1985 which laid the foundations of the 1986 
Financial Services Act. This was passed in November of that year and came into force in 1988.
These changes came into force alongside ‘The Big Bang’ – a dramatic reform of the rules of the Stock 
Exchange. This was prompted by Roy Hattersley’s referral of the Stock Exchange’s rulebook to the Ofﬁ ce of 
Fair Trading under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. Following the 1979 election the investigation was 
dropped under the terms of an agreement between the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and 
the then Chairman of the Stock Exchange. Under the terms of this agreement, outside ﬁ rms were permitted 
to takeover members of the Stock Exchange and to enhance competition minimum commissions were 
abolished. The distinction between ‘jobbers’ – who made markets in stocks - and ‘brokers’ – who executed 
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customer’s orders – was abolished. The removal of this distinction, which had been seen as a primary method 
of protecting investors, increased the potential for conﬂ icts of interest.
The Dawn of Statutory Regulation
The Financial Services Act used a mixture of statutory regulation and self-regulation. It created a Securities 
and Investments Board (SIB) presiding over various new self-regulating organisations (SROs). Departmental 
responsibility initially rested with the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) but was subsequently transferred 
to the Treasury.
The Securities and Investment Board (SIB) set the overall framework for the detailed standards of 
regulation, and consulted on and initiated policy objectives. Below the SIB were a number of Self Regulating 
Organisations (SROs); Recognised Investment Exchanges (RIEs); Recognised Professional Bodies (RPBs), and 
Recognised Clearing Houses (RCHs). The SROs were the most prominent of the regulators. Investment ﬁ rms 
had to be authorised by an appropriate SRO if they wanted to conduct investment business in the United 
Kingdom. The SROs were funded and in part managed by the investment ﬁ rms which belonged to them. For 
this reason, the style of regulation was known as self-regulation. At ﬁ rst, there were ﬁ ve SROs. But after 1994 
there were three: the Securities and Futures Authority, the Investment Managers’ Regulatory Organisation 
and the Personal Investment Authority. Prudential regulation of banks remained with the Bank of England 
and a new Building Societies Commission (BSC) was established to cover prudential and conduct regulation 
of building societies.
The regime established by the Financial Services Act of 1986 was the subject of a number of criticisms. The 
ﬁ nancial services industry claimed it was costly for industry and led to ever changing regulation which was 
costly to comply with. Even Nigel Lawson acknowledged that the regulatory system that emerged was far 
more cumbersome and bureaucratic than the Government had envisaged and ‘paradoxically, the involvement 
of practitioners in the regulatory process, which was intended to avoid this, probably exacerbated it’.81 
Outside groups pointed out that the system tended to favour ﬁ nancial institutions over investors. Finally, 
some critics pointed out that the regime put in place measures which were too mechanistic with the result 
being signiﬁ cant risks were overlooked and regulators failed to act in a quick and timely fashion. 
1989 – A new settlement
In 1989 a ‘new settlement’ was introduced by amending the Financial Services Act. Rules made by the SROs 
no longer had to be ‘equivalent’ to those made by the SIB and instead had to provide an ‘adequate’ standard 
of investor protection. The SIB used these new powers to issue 10 Principles and 40 Core (designated) Rules. 
This represented a ‘striking change in the type of rules used by SIB. It was a move from detailed, speciﬁ c rules 
to vaguer, more purpose-oriented rules, with little change in their substance.’ The SROs also began to develop 
guidance as a direct result of the contradictory demands of certainty and ﬂ exibility. As one ofﬁ cial explained 
in 1995: ‘there is a tension in the desires of members – they want vague, general rules like the Principles and 
detest the detailed rule books, but they also want certainty and detailed information of what is expected 
108  |  Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England
of them. Guidance is an attempt to resolve this tension.’ 82 The SIB also swung in its justiﬁ cation for moving 
from rules to principles:
‘In forming its initial rules SIB argued that detailed rules were necessary to ensure high standards 
of behaviour, given the competitive environment and actors who varied considerably in their 
competence and honesty. In introducing the Principles, therefore, the regulators were concerned to 
convince those who were worried about regulatory laxity that the Principles would be meaningful, 
and enforceable. As one ofﬁ cial stated, “one of the aims was to sell the idea that rules did not have to 
be as speciﬁ c as the old rule book to be effective.” Paradoxically, the Principles are now used by SIB to 
defend itself against charges of overregulation.’ 83
The 1990s - Maxwell, Barings, BCCI 
and Pensions Mis-selling
The 1990s saw a continuation of the cycle of scandal and reform. Following revelations about Robert 
Maxwell’s raid on his companies’ pension funds, an investigation into the SIB was announced in 1992. 
The chairman of the SIB conducted a ‘personal review’ and published his conclusions in ‘Financial Services 
Regulation: Making the two tier system work’.84 This recommended the creation of a SRO to focus on the 
retail investment sector. The result was the creation of Personal Investment Authority (PIA) in 1994. This self-
regulating organisation had sole responsibility for the retail investment industry. It governed the sale of life 
assurance, personal pensions, friendly society investments, unit trusts, investment trust savings schemes and 
ﬁ nancial services offered to members of the public.
The collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 led to criticism of the Bank of 
England and questions were raised about why the bank had not been shut down in the 1980s when evidence 
about its fraudulent activity ﬁ rst came to light. As early as 1982 one internal memo described BCCI as ‘on 
its way to becoming the ﬁ nancial equivalent of the SS Titanic!’.85 The Bingham report found that although 
fraud was highlighted by other parties the Bank of England did not investigate as it did not see itself in an 
investigatory role. Auditors failed to pursue evidence of fraud aggressively enough and didn’t alert the Bank 
of England. The Liquidators of BCCI sued the Bank of England with the legal action continuing until 2012.
Widespread mis-selling of personal pensions began to come to light in the early 1990s – millions of 
consumers had been advised to transfer or opt-out of their occupational pensions and had suffered losses. 
In its evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, the Treasury said that ‘ﬁ rms simply did not abide by the 
regulatory rules’.86 The remuneration arrangements for ﬁ nancial advisers and sales people were also seen as 
contributing to the scandal – advisers were paid commission and given speciﬁ c sales targets they needed to 
meet in order to receive their salary. Reviewing pension mis-selling took over 8 years and resulted in £11.8 
billion of compensation paid to consumers.
In 1994, the Treasury Select Committee started its own investigation into ﬁ nancial service regulation. The 
report found that there was a lack of clarity in the objectives of the Financial Services Act. There was a sense 
that self-regulation was the same as self-interest. There were also doubts about the cost- effectiveness of the 
regulatory system. Finally, there was a feeling that fraud was allowed to go unpunished. 
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The failure of Barings Bank in 1995 due to unauthorised trading led to a report from the Board of Banking 
Supervision of the Bank of England which was published less than 5 months after the bank collapsed.87 
Barings was regulated by the Bank of England and the derivatives trading section which caused the collapse 
was also regulated by the SFA. Recommendations of the report included that the Bank of England should 
have greater knowledge and understanding of bank’s wider businesses and should ask questions about 
proﬁ tability, have more meetings with bank management and greater liaison with other regulators. The 
report also concluded that banks should have clearly deﬁ ned lines of responsibility and accountability. This 
was partly based on the ﬁ nding that rogue trader Nick Leeson reported to 3 different people and after the 
collapse each of them denied being his manager. In the years following the scandal, concern was expressed 
that regulators had failed to hold the senior executives at Barings to account for its failure.
The Financial Services Authority – a single 
regulator for the ﬁ nancial sector
Immediately after the election of the Labour Government in 1997, the Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP announced 
wide ranging plans to reform the structure of ﬁ nancial regulation:  
‘The existing arrangements for ﬁ nancial regulation involve a large number of regulators, each 
responsible for different parts of the industry. In recent years there has been a blurring of the 
distinctions between different kinds of ﬁ nancial services business: banks, building societies, 
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investment ﬁ rms, insurance companies and others. This has added further to the complexity of 
ﬁ nancial regulation. The Government believes the current system is costly, inefﬁ cient and confusing 
for both regulated ﬁ rms and their customers. It is not delivering a standard of supervision and investor 
protection that the public has a right to expect. We are therefore establishing a single, statutory 
regulator for the UK ﬁ nancial services industry with clearly deﬁ ned regulatory objectives and a single 
set of coherent functions and powers.’ 88 
Scandals cited at the time which necessitated the reforms included the failure of Barings bank and the 
widespread mis-selling of personal pensions. There was a sense that senior executives in ﬁ rms had evaded 
responsibility for these failures.
These reforms resulted in a proposed new regulatory landscape including an independent Bank of England, 
responsible for monetary policy and overall ﬁ nancial stability and a single combined prudential and conduct 
regulator - the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
In 1998, the Bank of England Act was passed. A key part of this legislation was to give independence to 
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee for setting interest rates. The act also transferred the 
regulation of deposit-taking by banks and banking supervision in general to the SIB (which would become 
the FSA) from the Bank of England. The Bank still retained responsibility for overall ﬁ nancial stability.
In 1998, the FSA was created. It took over the responsibilities of, and had powers equivalent to at least nine 
regulators. These were:
• the existing FSA (formerly the Securities and Investments Board);
• the Self Regulating Organisations (SROs): Personal Investment Authority (PIA), Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), and Securities and Futures Authority (SFA);
• the former Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England (already transferred to the FSA 
under the Bank of England Act 1998);
• the Building Societies Commission;
• the Insurance Directorate of Department of Trade and Industry;
• the Friendly Societies Commission;
• the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
The staff of the separate regulatory agencies were transferred to become employees of the FSA at an early 
stage, mostly during 1998, even while their governing boards or commissions retained responsibilities under 
the existing legislation. The FSA entered into a series of agreements to provide services to these boards and 
commissions until the new legislation came into force.
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
In 2000, the Financial Services and Markets Act was passed. This was driven by the need for new legislation 
which ﬁ tted with recent ﬁ nancial innovations, the increasing globalisation of the ﬁ nancial landscape, and 
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the dominance of large universal banks. The rationale for a single regulator also included the availability of 
economies of scale in regulation, the clarity of having a single regulator accountable for its performance 
against its objectives and allowing the regulator to resolve any trade-offs between these objectives within 
a single agency.89 The Act created the tripartite framework: the FSA, Bank of England and HM Treasury. A 
Standing Committee on Financial Stability was established and chaired by the Treasury with representatives 
from all three arms attending.
The Act formally merged the nine different regulators together to form the FSA. On its passing the FSA 
became one of the most powerful ﬁ nancial services regulators in the world in terms of its scope, powers 
and discretion. It was established as a ‘company limited by guarantee’ and ﬁ nanced by the ﬁ nancial 
services industry through the payment of a levy. The Board set overall policy, but day-to-day decisions and 
management of the staff were the responsibility of the Executive Committee (ExCo). It was accountable 
to Treasury Ministers and, through them, Parliament (but operationally independent of government). It set 
the standards for ﬁ rms that they must meet and could take enforcement action against them if they fail 
to comply. New activities included regulating mortgage lending, direct supervision of legal and accounting 
and actuarial ﬁ rms, Lloyds of London brought into the FSA’s new regime, new powers on money laundering, 
credit unions regulated for the ﬁ rst time and new powers on unfair contract terms. The FSA also took over 
responsibility for preventing insider dealing from the DTI.
The Act gave the FSA four objectives:
• market conﬁ dence – maintaining conﬁ dence in the UK ﬁ nancial system;
• ﬁ nancial stability - contributing to the protection and enhancement of stability of the UK ﬁ nancial system
• consumer protection - securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers; and
• the reduction of ﬁ nancial crime - reducing the extent to which it is possible for a regulated business to 
be used for a purpose connected with ﬁ nancial crime.
In the course of discharging all its general functions, the FSA also had to ‘have regard’ to the seven principles 
of good regulation:
• the need to use its resources in the most efﬁ cient and economic way;
• recognition of the responsibilities of regulated ﬁ rms’ own management;
• proportionality between the burden, or restrictions imposed on a regulated body in relation to the beneﬁ ts;
• the desirability of facilitating innovation in connection with regulated activities;
• the international character of ﬁ nancial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the 
competitive position of the United Kingdom;
• the need to minimise the adverse effects on competition that may arise from anything done in the 
discharge of its functions; and
• the desirability of facilitating competition between those who are subject to any form of regulation 
by the Authority.
During the ﬁ rst few years of the FSA’s operation there was the need to transfer staff from all of the different 
organisations into the new single organisation. A new management structure was established and new 
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people were arriving every month. There was also a need to align terms and conditions and remuneration 
arrangements. In the winter of 1998, FSA staff all moved into their new headquarters in Canary Wharf. The 
FSA developed what it called an ‘integrated and risk-based’ approach to regulation. 
In its document – A New Regulator for the New Millennium90 – the FSA set out that its aim was to shift 
to a regime which:
• was built on a clear statement of the realistic aims and the limits of regulation;
• recognised the proper responsibilities of consumers themselves and of ﬁ rms’ own management, and the 
impossibility and undesirability of removing all risk and failure from the ﬁ nancial system. A ﬁ rm’s senior 
management is responsible for its activities and for ensuring that its business is conducted in compliance 
with regulatory requirements;
• was founded on a risk-based approach to the regulation of all ﬁ nancial business which integrated and 
simpliﬁ ed the different approaches adopted by the current regulators 
• operated a transparent new framework for identifying and addressing, as part of the regular planning 
cycle, the most important issues facing ﬁ rms, markets and consumers. Each year the FSA will set out 
publicly the areas identiﬁ ed for priority attention – what it will describe as its regulatory themes; 
• used the full range of tools available to the Authority under the new legislation including 
consumer education;
• switched resources from reactive post-event action towards front-end intervention – the FSA would have 
a ‘bias towards proactivity’ seeking to identify and reduce risks before they cause signiﬁ cant damage. This 
will include speaking out promptly and publicly on major issues, highlighting both good and bad practice 
among regulated ﬁ rms and potential problems for consumers
• created incentives for ﬁ rms to manage their own risks better and thereby reducing the burden of 
regulations – harnessing market forces and going with the grain of the market. 
The tripartite system – failed to tackle risks 
to ﬁ nancial stability
Responsibility for ﬁ nancial stability in the UK was shared between HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and 
the FSA, which together constituted the ‘tripartite authorities’. The division of responsibilities between the 
tripartite authorities was set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).91 The MoU stated that ‘the 
authorities maintain a framework for co-ordination in the management of a ﬁ nancial crisis’, and it delineated 
responsibilities for operational crisis management.
The Bank of England was primarily responsible for ensuring the stability of the monetary system. Its role was 
to oversee the ﬁ nancial system infrastructure which was considered to be systemically signiﬁ cant to the UK, 
with a particular focus on the payments system. The intention was that the Bank should be closely involved 
in developing and improving the infrastructure and strengthening the system to help reduce systemic risk. 
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Its role was to maintain a broad overview of the ﬁ nancial system as a whole. The Bank was seen as uniquely 
placed to do this, being responsible for monetary stability and having representation on the FSA Board 
(through the Deputy Governor - Financial Stability). But the ﬁ nancial stability work was not viewed as a 
priority within the Bank. The Bank cut back the number of staff working on ﬁ nancial stability, and its work 
began to be seen as just publishing a twice yearly ‘Financial Stability Report’ document. Bank ofﬁ cials were 
conﬁ dent enough to say, in August 2007, just prior to the ﬁ nancial crisis the Governor said that everyone 
should remember ‘a very, very key point, which is that our banking system is much more resilient than in 
the past.’92 They added that ‘It is not an international ﬁ nancial crisis, it’s developments in spreads, which 
reﬂ ect I think a more realistic pricing of risk and that’s to be welcome.’
The Treasury’s role was to provide the overall institutional structure of ﬁ nancial regulation and the legislation 
which governs it, including the negotiation of EC directives. The Treasury should inform and be accountable 
to Parliament for the management of serious problems in the ﬁ nancial system and any measures used to 
resolve them. There was signiﬁ cant staff turnover amongst those in the Treasury working on ﬁ nancial services 
and responsibility for policy was moved twice in two years to different parts of the Treasury. In summer 
2007, there was, intentionally, limited capacity on ﬁ nancial stability issues – a team of three people.93 The 
strong global consensus at the time, of which the Treasury and Bank of England were part, believed that the 
regulatory approach and new methods of securitising debt had substantially reduced systemic risk in the 
ﬁ nancial sector.
The MoU also established a Standing Committee for Financial Stability – a monthly meeting of senior 
ofﬁ cials from across the Tripartite. The Committee largely focused on the ﬁ nancial sector’s resilience to 
operational disruption, such as a terrorist attack. War games or dummy runs of a possible ﬁ nancial crisis were 
played out. In 2004, this included a major stressed bank – like Northern Rock – in difﬁ culty because of its 
mortgage lending book; in 2005, it was a liquidity crisis in an investment bank – a re-run of Barings. The war 
games revealed the lack of a statutory resolution framework to deal with a failing bank. This was followed 
up by the Treasury, but not vigorously, as the risk of major ﬁ nancial instability was deemed to be low and 
therefore no new arrangements were in place when Northern Rock failed.
A single Ombudsman and compensation scheme
The Act also established a single Ombudsman scheme - the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) and a single 
compensation scheme – the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). The FOS brought together 
the existing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the ﬁ nancial services sector in a consolidated 
statutory scheme. This allowed consumers to address complaints to a single organisation with conﬁ dence 
that the scheme would have appropriate jurisdiction for their complaint. The Ombudsman’s decisions are 
based on what is ‘fair and reasonable’ and the ﬁ rm is required to accept them. The FSCS brought together the 
Investors Compensation Scheme and four other compensation schemes whose coverage included insurance, 
bank deposits and building society deposits. It would be ﬁ nanced by a levy on the industry, but would not be 
pre-funded – its levy would be designed to cover the cost of ﬁ rms which had failed, rather than to build up a 
signiﬁ cant fund to cover the cost of future failures.
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Additional responsibilities for the FSA and pressure to 
pursue a light-touch and principles-based approach
Following the establishment of the FSA, there were some incremental changes which increased the scope 
of its operations. In 2003, there were internal changes at the FSA and senior management were determined 
that it would produce fewer consultation papers – keeping the number issued in a year below 20. This was 
achieved by consolidating a number of consultations into one big 300-page ‘Quarterly Consultation Paper’. 
They also revised their supervisory strategy and recognised the different emphasis of different institutions on 
wholesale and on retail issues. In 2004, the FSA launched the ‘Treating Your Customers Fairly’ (TCF) principles 
and announced that a key part of its strategy would be to move away from detailed rules and towards broad 
principles. The FSA aimed to remove around half of the content of its ‘Conduct of Business’ rulebook which 
applied to investment businesses. It also announced that it would rely more on voluntary industry developed 
guidance, which would be ‘approved’ by the regulator. Complying with industry guidance would not be a ‘safe 
harbour’ but would be a ‘sturdy breakwater’.
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‘We are reluctant to introduce ever more intrusive regulation. To do so would add to our costs and to 
the regulatory costs of the industry, and could create defensive and costly markets, which might be 
smaller and less innovative. For this reason, we are focusing on delivering TCF based on principles. 
If the approach is successful, we would expect to see payback in both market-based success and 
less intrusive, and therefore less costly, regulation… Detailed rules are suitable for many areas 
of regulation, but in the ﬁ eld of fairness, which is ﬂ exible and dynamic, varying with particular 
circumstances, their impact can be limited. They tend to set a single standard and do not provide the 
ﬂ exibility that ﬁ rms need to deliver fair treatment in a way that ﬁ ts their target group of customers 
and their individual strategy. Principles do offer this ﬂ exibility.’ 94
In 2004/05, the scope of the FSA increased. It took over responsibility for all mortgage regulation, including 
administration and mortgage advice. It also started to regulate general insurance activities, including car, 
home and pet insurance and more complicated forms of insurance such as critical illness and Payment 
Protection Insurance (PPI). PPI was widely mis-sold and accounted for between 30% and 40% of retail 
banking proﬁ ts during the period it was sold. The FSA did not appreciate the full extent of proﬁ t made 
by a few high street retail banks as it lacked the capability to do market wide analysis. FSA ofﬁ cials had 
great hope that the industry would improve voluntarily, saying in 2005 that ‘the simplest, quickest and 
most effective way forward’ was that ‘the industry could decide to improve its own standards and to move 
decisively towards putting in place the elements of a considerably more competitive market.’95 To the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, they justiﬁ ed their approach because:
‘the FSA board, and as communicated originally if I recall correctly even from Howard Davies as joint 
chair and chief executive of the FSA, took an approach based on the mantra of “We are not a price 
regulator”. So the fact that the market was uncompetitive and as a result some consumers were 
paying much higher prices than they needed to pay was not necessarily something which the FSA 
would have picked up as being in itself mis-selling. There was nothing in the ICOB rule book which said 
you may not charge more than £X,000.’ 96
The FSA conducted a number of mystery shopping investigations into PPI and issued a number of ﬁ nes – 
although as consumer groups pointed out at the time, these were only a tiny proportion of the revenue 
gained from selling PPI. HFC were ﬁ ned just 0.4% of their revenue gained from selling PPI and even after 
the FSA introduced a policy of increasing ﬁ nes Alliance and Leicester were ﬁ ned just 3% of their PPI 
revenue.97 The banks resisted the FSA’s actions and eventually sought a judicial review of the regulator’s 
policy on how banks should deal with PPI complaints. 
The increasing scope of the FSA increased the number of regulated ﬁ rms from 10,500 initially to over 
25,000. In 2008, the FSA also announced that it would be taking over responsibility for conduct regulation 
of retail banking deposit products – current accounts and savings accounts – from the voluntary Banking 
Code Standards Board.
Light-touch regulation
In the years leading up to the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, the FSA found itself under pressure to deliver light touch 
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regulation. In 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair, pointed out that the FSA was ‘seen as hugely inhibiting of 
efﬁ cient business by perfectly respectable companies that have never defrauded anyone’.98 A similar theme 
was emphasised by Ed Balls, who in 2006 pointed out that ‘In the late 1990s, our decision to establish a 
single regulator for ﬁ nancial services, replacing the fragmented, overlapping and self-regulatory system we 
inherited with today’s system of increasingly light-touch and risk-based regulation.’99 Opposition politicians 
said that the FSA operated an ‘Intrusive regulatory regime’ and was ‘increasingly a tool of the Treasury’ which 
threatened to squeeze the life out of the City by over-regulating it. A memo prepared for the Conservative 
Shadow Treasury team in 2004 and released to The Telegraph said that the ‘FSA’s approach to retail ﬁ nancial 
services has been driven by fears of upsetting consumers and accused the FSA of aggressive attacks on 
sectors of the ﬁ nancial services industry’. The then Shadow Chancellor, Oliver Letwin MP, said that he was 
concerned by ‘the intrusive regulatory regime’ imposed by the City watchdog.100
Even the National Audit Ofﬁ ce did not raise any signiﬁ cant concerns about the FSA’s approach. In a report 
published prior to the ﬁ nancial crisis the NAO said that the FSA had ‘developed and applied a rigorous 
risk-based methodology’ which was ‘highly regarded within the ﬁ nancial services industry in the UK and 
internationally and its risk–based approach is increasingly seen as a model to follow by other regulators.’101 
Reﬂ ecting on the underlying regulatory philosophy of the time, Adair Turner described how: 
‘there was a philosophy of regulation which emerged, not just in this country but in other countries, 
which was based upon too extreme a form of conﬁ dence in markets and conﬁ dence in the ideas that 
markets were self-correcting, which therefore believed that the fundamental role of the supervision 
of ﬁ nancial institutions, in particular banks, was to make sure that processes and procedures 
and systems were in place, while leaving it to the judgement of individual management to make 
fundamentally sensible decisions’. 
He added that there was ‘a political philosophy where all the pressure on the FSA was not to say: “Are you 
looking more closely at these business models?’ but to say: ‘Why are you being so heavy and intrusive? Can 
you not make your regulation a bit more light touch?’102 On the Prudential side ‘There was a large amount 
of detailed investigation of relatively small things that weren’t going to have a lot of impact on the overall 
riskiness of the Bank’s balance sheet. There was a failure to look at the big risks that were being taken.’ 103
The report into the failure of HBOS104 found that the FSA senior management adopted an approach to 
supervision which entailed placing heavy reliance on a ﬁ rm’s senior management and control functions. The 
FSA did not see its role as being to criticise a ﬁ rm’s business model in case it was perceived to be acting as a 
‘shadow director’. This approach gave rise to a supervisory framework with:
• inadequate resources devoted to the prudential regulation of large systemically important banks;
• inadequate focus on the core prudential risk areas of asset quality and liquidity in an apparently benign 
economic outlook;
• inadequate consideration of strategic and business model related risks, including the adequacy of capital 
buffers; and
• a risk-assessment process that was too reactive.
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What went wrong with the FSA – a failure of 
structure, culture and approach
The history of ﬁ nancial regulation in the UK operates in a cyclical fashion. Following a crisis, policymakers 
tend to increase regulation, give regulatory agencies new powers and reorganise their structure. However, 
the new powers are often undermined over time. This results in a new kinds of ﬁ nancial innovation, pressures 
for light-touch regulation from politicians and an overconﬁ dence from regulators that they are now cleverer 
and more effective than in the past. This effectively lays the groundwork for a new crisis and another round 
of regulation. 
Another consistent theme are constant promises by politicians and regulators that senior executives of ﬁ rms 
will be held accountable for scandal and misconduct. Regulators and politicians have been promising this 
over 300 years – without much success. Indeed the situation has got worse.
The most crucial lessons is that it is not just what regulators do directly after a crisis that matters, but 
how they hold onto the lessons they learned and ensure that they continue to guide their actions – how 
regulators change their culture to embed this new approach.

Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England  |  119
The ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008 was a signiﬁ cant challenge to the UK ﬁ nancial 
regulatory landscape. It stretched the regulators to their breaking point. It 
showed up some signiﬁ cant shortcomings which eventually led to a fundamental 
rethink of how the industry was regulated. The result was the foundation of 
the Prudential Regulation Authority and the FSA transforming itself into the 
Financial Conduct Authority. In this Appendix we trace these changes and map 
out the new regulatory structure and approaches which have emerged following 
the ﬁ nancial crisis.
Regulatory Responses 
to 2008 Crisis 
APPENDIX THREE
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2008: Review of Northern Rock and Supervisory 
Enhancement Programme 
One of the ﬁ rst victims of the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2007-2008 was Northern Rock. The bank was forced to turn 
to the Bank of England for liquidity assistance during September 2007. This prompted the ﬁ rst run on a UK 
bank in 150 years. The bank was subsequently nationalised in February 2008. 
Following this high proﬁ le failure, the FSA, the Bank of England and the Treasury announced the results of 
their review into the failure of the bank. The FSA published its response in March 2008 which said it believed 
that its ‘overall regulatory philosophy as a risk-based, outcome-focused regulator is supported and reinforced 
by its analysis’. The review had several proposals for the improvement of the regulatory framework. It 
suggested that high-impact ﬁ rms should be subject to ongoing supervision of core risk areas, with a 
speciﬁ c focus on capital and liquidity. Supervisors should perform an annual review of the bank’s business 
and strategic plans. Day-to-day supervision should also be more rigorous. The Supervisory Enhancement 
Programme (SEP) was to be a ‘key component of the current three-year plan (2007 – 2010) which, in terms 
of internal change, has as its primary objective the creation of an effective management, operational and 
cultural framework to deliver more principles-based regulation.’105 
The SEP was launched by the FSA in August 2009 and announced a number of changes, including: 
a) A signiﬁ cant increase in resources devoted to the supervision of high impact ﬁ rms and, in particular, 
to complex banks;
b) A shift in supervisory style to focus on key business outcomes and risks, and on the sustainability 
of business models and strategies;
c) Emphasis on technical skills as well as probity in assessing approved persons;
d) An increase in supervisory resources devoted to sectoral and ﬁ rm comparator analysis, to better identify 
ﬁ rms that are outliers in terms of risks and business strategies, and to identify emerging sector-wide 
trends that may create systemic risk; and
e) A much more intensive analysis of information relating to key risks. 
An important feature of the supervisory enhancement programme were issues of ‘culture and people’. 
This included measures such as involvement of senior FSA ofﬁ cials in supervision; A focus on staff quality, 
retention and training; and increasing the number of supervisory staff by about 10%.
2009: Turner Review
The summer of 2008 bought a meltdown in global ﬁ nancial markets. This led to the widespread failure 
or near failure of systemically important ﬁ nancial institutions. Following emergency measures taken by 
regulators during 2008, there was a wider reﬂ ection on how regulators operated. 
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A key part of that in the UK was Adair Turner’s review.106 It included a wide range of recommendations to 
both banks and the regulatory landscape. An important part of that was continuing the implementation of 
the SEP. Central aspects of this which Turner identiﬁ ed as important were increasing resources devoted to 
supervising systematically important banks; focusing on business models and strategies rather than systems 
and processes; focusing on technical skills as well as probity; increased analysis of sectors and comparison 
between ﬁ rms; investment in specialist prudential skills; increased product regulation; focus on remuneration 
policies; more information requirements and an intensiﬁ cation of balance sheet analysis. 
Ultimately, what the review proposed was an approach to banking supervision that was more intrusive and 
systemic. This represented a departure from the ‘light touch’ approach to regulation which had dominated 
prior to the ﬁ nancial crisis.
2010: The announcement of a new 
regulatory landscape
A further step reforming the regulatory landscape was taken in June 2010 when the Government announced 
its proposed new regulatory arrangements.107 A key part of this was the announcement of what would 
become known as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). This would be a ‘strong consumer champion in 
pursuit of a single objective’ and would have ‘a dedicated focus on the importance of proper conduct’. The 
approach of this new authority was encapsulated in three goals: 
a) making the retail market work better for consumers;
b) avoiding the crystallisation of conduct risks that exceed our risk tolerance; and 
c) delivering credible deterrence and prompt and effective redress for consumers.
These goals were to be achieved through three mechanisms: 
a) Seeking to improve the long-term efﬁ ciency and fairness of the market; 
b) Delivering intensive supervision of ﬁ rms. The new supervisory approach will ensure ﬁ rms treat their 
customers fairly and will equip the regulator to intervene earlier in the development of retail products. 
Interventions of this nature, which necessarily involve us making a judgement on potential detriment, 
will need to be based on sound business-model analysis and integrated ﬁ rm-risk assessment; 
c) In the event that failure has occurred, the regulator will secure the appropriate level of redress and 
compensation (when justiﬁ ed), and achieve effective credible deterrence by taking tough action against 
ﬁ rms and individuals who have transgressed.
In 2011, the White Paper conﬁ rmed the intention to transfer prudential supervision for banks, insurers and 
major investment ﬁ rms to a subsidiary of The Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, and 
rename the FSA the Financial Conduct Authority.108 In preparation for these changes it was announced that 
separate conduct and prudential business units would be created within the FSA. 
122  |  Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England
The Financial Services Act, 2012 
The White paper of 2011 formed the basis of the Financial Services Act 2012. This established the current 
ﬁ nancial regulatory landscape. The Bank of England extended its remit to focus on issues of ﬁ nancial stability 
and established the Financial Stability Committee. The Financial Services Authority became the Financial 
Conduct Authority. Prudential issues were hived off from the FSA and became a subsidiary of the BoE – the 
Prudential Regulation Authority. Thus creating a twin peaks style regulatory model in the UK:
‘The ﬁ nancial crisis exposed the inherent weaknesses in the “tripartite” system of regulation in the 
UK. Perhaps the most signiﬁ cant failing is that no single institution had responsibility, authority 
or powers to oversee the ﬁ nancial system as a whole. Before the crisis, the Bank of England had 
nominal responsibility for ﬁ nancial stability but lacked the tools to put this into effect; the Treasury, 
meanwhile, had no clear responsibility for dealing with a crisis which put billions of pounds of 
public funds at risk. All responsibility for ﬁ nancial regulation was in the hands of a single, monolithic 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority, and there was clearly, in the run-up to the ﬁ nancial crisis, 
too much reliance on “tick-box” compliance.’ 109
The Treasury Committee concluded ‘Judgement-led regulation is welcome: the FSA has concentrated too 
much on ensuring narrow rule-based compliance, often leading to the collection of data of little value and to 
box ticking, and too little on making judgements about what will cause serious problems for consumers and 
the ﬁ nancial system.’110 
Bank of England (BoE)
The oversight of the UK ﬁ nancial system as a whole and responsibility for protecting and enhancing the 
stability of the system was given to the Bank of England. 
The governance of the Bank was to work in the following ways. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was to 
direct the BoE where public funds were at risk and there was a serious threat to ﬁ nancial stability. A new 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank of England was created with powers to monitor and respond 
to ﬁ nancial stability risks. It could also issue recommendation and direction to the FCA or the PRA over 
matters of ﬁ nancial stability. The FPC became a sub-committee of the Court of Directors of the Bank of 
England, consisting of the Governor of the Bank, the Deputy Governor of the Bank, the Chief Executive of 
the FCA, a member appointed by the Governor of the Bank after consultation with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, four members appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a representative of the Treasury. 
The FPC meets at least quarterly and publishes its Financial Stability Report twice a year. The Report sets out 
its assessment of risks and weaknesses in the ﬁ nancial system based on a set of indicators and the measures 
it is taking to address them. 
In order to co-ordinate with other regulators, both the FCA and the PRA must take appropriate steps to co-
operate with the Bank of England in connection with, among other things, the Bank’s pursuit of its ﬁ nancial 
stability objective.
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In March 2013, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) recommended that regular stress testing of the UK 
banking system should be developed to assess the system’s capital adequacy. In a Discussion Paper published 
in October 2013, the Bank of England set out proposals for the main features of a framework for annual and 
concurrent stress-testing of the UK banking system. The inaugural stress test results were published on 16 
December 2014 and explored vulnerabilities stemming from the UK household sector in particular, reﬂ ecting 
the Financial Policy Committee’s assessment of the main domestic risks to ﬁ nancial stability at that time.111
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
The overall responsibility of the PRA is to supervise all ﬁ rms that manage signiﬁ cant risks as part of their 
business. It provides prudential regulation of deposit takers (banks, building societies and credit unions), 
insurers and major investment ﬁ rms. There are approximately 1,700 ﬁ rms prudentially regulated by PRA. 
Prudential regulation aims to protect consumers and taxpayers from risks to the safety and soundness of 
individual ﬁ rms and the stability of the ﬁ nancial system.
The PRA is led by the BoE Governor and a Deputy Governor. It has three supervision arms (insurance, 
international banks, UK deposit-takers), a supervisory risk specialists group and regulatory operations arm.
The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) has a statutory duty to maintain effective arrangements to 
consult practitioners and consider their representations. The Practitioner Panel considers the policies 
and practices of the PRA and provides input to the PRA Board in order to help it meet its statutory and 
operational objectives. The membership of the Panel is representative of PRA regulated ﬁ rms. Members 
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have been nominated by trade associations, with the composition being broadly representative of how the 
PRA allocates its resources. Members are independent of the ﬁ rm and trade association they are drawn from. 
The Panel meets approximately every six weeks and its members serve a three year term.
The PRA is led by its governing body, the Board. The Governor of the Bank is Chair of the PRA; the Bank’s 
Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation is the Chief Executive; the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability 
and the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority are members of the Board; and additional 
members are appointed by the Bank’s Court of Directors, with the approval of HM Treasury. A majority of 
the Board must be made up of members who are not employed by the PRA or the Bank. Appointed members 
have renewable terms of three years. 
The PRA and the FCA have a duty to co-ordinate the exercise of their functions. The Chief Executives of the 
regulators meet quarterly to review how well coordination is working. In certain circumstances, the PRA may, 
if it considers it necessary, direct the FCA to refrain from exercising its regulatory or insolvency powers in 
relation to PRA-authorised persons if the PRA is of the opinion that the exercise of the power in the manner 
proposed may threaten the stability of the UK ﬁ nancial system or result in the failure of a PRA-authorised 
person in a way that would adversely affect the UK ﬁ nancial system. This effectively means that the PRA can 
overrule the FCA in relation to large ﬁ rms regulated by the PRA.
Some ﬁ rms are subject to ‘dual regulation’, with their conduct regulated by the FCA and prudential matters 
regulated by the PRA. This requires coordination between the two regulators to ensure that there is no 
duplication or gaps in regulatory cover which ﬁ rms are exploiting.
The PRA’s general objective is to promote the safety and soundness of PRA authorised persons. It should seek 
to ensure that the business of PRA-authorised persons is carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect 
on the stability of the UK ﬁ nancial system. It should seek to minimise the adverse effect that the failure of a 
PRA-authorised person could be expected to have on the stability of the UK ﬁ nancial system. Finally the PRA 
has an insurance objective of contributing to the securing of an appropriate degree of protection for those 
who are or may become policyholders. 
The PRA has regard to a number of ‘regulatory principles’ set out in the Act. These cover: the need to 
minimise adverse effects on competition; efﬁ ciency; proportionality; the desirability of sustainable UK 
economic growth; senior management responsibility in ﬁ rms; recognising differences in the nature and 
objectives of authorised persons; transparency; disclosure of information relating to persons on whom 
requirements are imposed by or under the Act; and the general principle of consumers taking responsibility 
for their decisions. The Act removed the need for the regulator to have regard to the international 
competitiveness of the UK as a location for ﬁ nancial services and the desirability of facilitating innovation.
The PRA’s approach to using regulation and supervision has three characteristics: 
a) It is judgement based. The PRA uses judgement in determining whether ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms are safe and sound, 
whether insurers provide appropriate protection for policyholders and whether ﬁ rms continue to meet 
the Threshold Conditions. 
b) It is forward looking. The PRA assesses ﬁ rms not just against current risks, but also against those that 
could plausibly arise in the future. Where the PRA judges it necessary to intervene, it generally aims to do 
so at an early stage.
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c) It is focused: the PRA focuses on those issues and those ﬁ rms that pose the greatest risk to the stability 
of the UK ﬁ nancial system and policyholders. A stable ﬁ nancial system is one in which ﬁ rms continue to 
provide critical ﬁ nancial services – a precondition for a healthy and successful economy. 
The PRA does not seek to operate a ‘zero-failure’ regime. Rather, it seeks to ensure that a ﬁ nancial ﬁ rm which 
fails does so in a way that avoids signiﬁ cant disruption to the supply of critical ﬁ nancial services.
Financial Conduct Authority
The FCA protects consumers and supervises all ﬁ rms to ensure that their business is conducted in a way that 
advances the interests of all users and participants. The FCA should provide conduct regulation and also the 
prudential regulation of non-PRA ﬁ rms like smaller investment ﬁ rms, exchanges and other ﬁ nancial services 
providers. According to the National Audit Ofﬁ ce, before its expansion into consumer credit there were 
26,000 ﬁ rms which have their conduct regulated by FCA, and 23,000 ﬁ rms prudentially regulated by FCA. 
The FCA is tasked with maintaining arrangements for supervising authorised persons, monitoring compliance 
and taking enforcement action. It has a wide range of rule-making powers which go beyond the powers 
previously enjoyed by the FSA. It has a variety of executive and non-executive committees (including 
diversity). The organisation has nine divisions: (1) Supervision – retail and authorisations; (2) Supervision – 
investment, wholesale & specialists; (3) Strategy and competition; (4) Enforcement and market oversight; (5) 
Markets policy and international; (6) Risk and compliance oversight; (7) General Counsel; (8) Internal audit; 
and (9) Operations. 
The FCA is required to coordinate with the PRA ‘through day-to-day communication at working level, in 
addition to which there is regular more senior-level interaction. The PRA CEO and FCA CEO are members 
of the boards of the respective organisations’. The PRA has the power of veto where it considers that action 
FCA are taking may threaten ﬁ nancial stability or cause the failure of a PRA-authorised person in a way that 
would adversely affect ﬁ nancial stability.
The FCA’s strategic objective is to ensure that the relevant markets function well. Its operational 
objectives are to:
a) secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers;
b) protect and enhance the integrity of the UK ﬁ nancial system;
c) promote effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets for regulated 
ﬁ nancial services or services provided by a recognised investment exchange in carrying on 
exempt regulated activities. 
As part of the Financial Services Act the FCA was given a number of new powers. These included the ability 
to ban ﬁ nancial products, publish details of misleading ﬁ nancial promotions, and let people know when we 
are proposing to take disciplinary action against a ﬁ rm. The FCA also gained a recently activated power to 
establish individual ﬁ rm or industry wide redress schemes.112 
The FCA regularly assess ﬁ rms’ conduct, varying the intensity of assessment based on the nature and size 
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of the ﬁ rm. It places ﬁ rms in four different categories. The largest ﬁ rms, with the most customers, face 
continuous assessment over rolling two-year periods. The assessments become progressively less intense 
for ﬁ rms in the three other categories, with ﬁ rms in category four having some form of assessment every 
four years. It carries out work on issues and products, undertaking fast, intensive campaigns on sectors 
of the market or products that are putting or may put consumers at risk. This work is driven by a sector 
risk assessment, which analyses the different areas of the market and the risks that may lie ahead. It also 
responds to events as they arise, by aiming to deal quickly and decisively with problems that are emerging 
or have happened, and securing customer redress or other remedial work where necessary.
In its document on the ‘Journey to the FCA’113, the new regulator set out eight key success measures which 
it aimed to achieve in the ﬁ rst 3 years. These were that the regulator had:
• successfully intervened earlier to the beneﬁ t of consumers;
• dealt quickly and efﬁ ciently with ‘crystallised risks’;
• actively involved and engaged with our stakeholders and put consumers at the heart of what we do;
• addressed competition issues to the beneﬁ t of consumers;
• successfully inﬂ uenced international policy;
• been able to deliver judgement-based, early intervention regulation;
• delivered business as usual; and
• encouraged positive cultural change in ﬁ nancial services ﬁ rms
In April 2014 the FCA took over responsibility for consumer credit regulation from the Ofﬁ ce of Fair Trading. 
This brought an additional 50,000 ﬁ rms within the scope of the FCA’s rules – many of these were small 
businesses. The FCA now regulates over 70,000 ﬁ rms in total. The payday lending sector was identiﬁ ed as 
an early priority for action by the FCA. In 2013, Parliament had given the FCA a duty to introduce a price 
cap to secure an appropriate degree of protection from excessive charges for borrowers of payday lenders. 
It introduced a formal price cap on interest rates of 0.8% a day and capped default charges at £15 and the 
total cost of the loan at no more than the amount borrowed. Stricter rules were also introduced covering 
affordability assessments and restrictions on the ability of payday lenders to use Continuous Payment 
Authorities to take payments from consumers’ bank accounts.114 The FCA had also carried out thematic 
reviews into logbook loans, debt management and a market study of the credit card sector.
Bank of England Act 2016
The Bank of England Act 2016 reformed the governance and accountability of the Bank of England. It ended 
the subsidiary status of the Prudential Regulation Authority – making it a full part of the BoE. The Act 
abolished the Bank’s Oversight Committee. This committee was made up of the non-executive members of 
the Bank’s board of directors, known as the Court. The Oversight Committee’s functions were transferred to 
the Court. The Act allowed the National Audit Ofﬁ ce to undertake value for money reviews of the Bank for 
the ﬁ rst time – although the subjects they will be allowed to examine are restricted. 
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Reforms were also made to the mechanisms intended to ensure that senior managers across the ﬁ nancial 
services industry can be held to account for failings that occur on their watch. The Senior Managers and 
Certiﬁ cation regimes were expanded to all ﬁ rms. However, the ‘reverse burden of proof’ was removed and 
the onus is now back on the FCA and PRA to prove misconduct. The Government said that it would have 
been disproportionate to apply the reverse burden of proof to smaller organisations like building societies 
and credit unions. 
The method of appointing the Chief Executive of the FCA was also changed to enable the Treasury 
Committee to hold a hearing with the individual before the appointment is conﬁ rmed. The Government 
made a promise ‘in a future Bill, to make a change to the legislation governing appointments to the FCA 
CEO to make the appointee subject to a ﬁ xed, renewable 5-year term. This would not apply to Andrew 
Bailey…but would ﬁ rst apply to his successor.’ 115
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After exploring the UK case in depth, we illuminate the international context by giving a brief overview 
of the cultures of regulators in other leading global ﬁ nancial centres. We focus on regulators in ten of the 
eleven global leading ﬁ nancial centres.116  
In the majority of these global ﬁ nancial centres there is a single regulatory authority, which in a few 
cases is integrated into the central bank (Ireland, Singapore). For the United States and Canada, which have 
multiple regulatory agencies for the ﬁ nancial sector, we focused on the regulatory agency with the broadest 
mandate (SEC and OSFI, respectively). For the United Kingdom we focused on both the FCA and PRA. This 
meant that we examined:
• Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) – Netherlands
• Central Bank of Ireland – Ireland 
• Bundesanstalt für FinanzDiensTleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) – Germany
• Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) – Hong Kong
• Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)
• U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) – United States
• Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) – France
• Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) – Singapore
• Ofﬁ ce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) – Canada
• Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht (FINMA) - Switzerland 
Our review suggests that the culture of regulators varies substantially among the regulators of
these ﬁ nancial centres. Indeed, as one top executive from a North American regulatory agency noted 
in a background interview, the culture of regulators is ‘inﬂ uenced by a number of things that are…
country-speciﬁ c’, such as the size of the ﬁ nancial sector in a country or the type of interactions with 
the political system.
In order to ﬂ ag up noticeable differences in organisational culture between the different regulatory 
agencies, we analyse the level of diversity in different regulatory agencies. In this report, having an 
organisational culture with high diversity means that regulatory agencies take into account many 
Comparing the culture of regulators 
in major ﬁ nancial centres
APPENDIX FOUR
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different worldview and represents a broad set of stakeholders. By contrast, having an organizational culture 
with low diversity implies that regulatory agencies refer to a narrower set of worldviews and stakeholders. 
We use diversity to describe differences between the cultures of regulatory agencies without assuming that 
more (or less) diversity is necessarily better. 
Speciﬁ cally, we draw on two indicators for the levels of diversity. On the one hand we measure the diversity 
in topics by conducting a content analysis of the most recent annual reports of the regulatory agencies. 
On the other hand we analyse diversity in backgrounds by exploring where senior regulators worked before 
joining the regulatory agency. Our two measures suggest that substantive cultural differences do exist 
between leading regulatory agencies across the world. Our results also indicate that these differences in the 
cultures of regulators are correlated with different regulatory approaches.
Diversity in topics
To analyse the diversity of topics that regulatory agencies engage with, we focus on the regulatory agencies’ 
own annual reports. These reports offer a good overview of all the regulators’ concerns over the course of 
the year and they are sufﬁ ciently similar in their aims and scopes to allow for a cross-national comparative 
approach. Analysing these reports helps us explore whether regulators decide to focus on a technocratic set 
of topics related to the day to day job of regulating the ﬁ nancial sector or whether they also cover a broader 
set of topics.
To analyse the topics we ﬁ rst compared the ten regulatory agencies’ annual reports. We found ﬁ ve 
broad topics. 
1. Topics of compliance include misconduct by ﬁ nancial ﬁ rms and how the respective regulatory agency 
works towards preventing or punishing such misconduct. 
2. Topics of stability refer to both the stability of individual institutions and the overall ﬁ nancial system. 
3. Topics of accountability encompass measures of transparency and accountability aimed at ensuring the 
public is served in the best possible way. 
4. Topics of consumer protection apply to considerations as to whether customers are treated fairly and 
ﬁ nd a level playing ﬁ eld. 
5. Topics of structural policy refer to how regulatory agencies try to inﬂ uence the structure of the ﬁ nancial 
sector, for example, to make it more competitive, internationally attractive or more sustainable.
For each of these topics we established a dictionary of commonly used terminology associated with the 
topic and measured the extent to which these occurred in the annual reports.117 We analysed the most 
recent annual reports for each country and found that for each of the regulatory agencies the breakdown of 
topics covered was very similar between the years. We thus used averages from the two reports per country.
Overall, we ﬁ nd that 40% of relevant contents of reports refer to compliance, 31% to stability, 15% to 
consumer protection, 7% to structural policy, and 7% to accountability. Importantly, as shown in the Table 
at the end of this Appendix, the regulatory agencies vary greatly in how they prioritize the ﬁ ve topics.
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Compliance is a major focus in the United States (80%) and Switzerland (58%), where the regulatory 
agencies give a very detailed account of all the violations of securities or banking laws that they encountered 
and of their respective enforcement activities. The stability topic is most prominent in Canada (65%) and 
Germany (60%); German regulators discuss both the capital requirements of banks and questions of risk 
management at greater length than any other regulatory agency. Consumer protection is a prominent topic 
in the regulatory authorities in the United Kingdom (36%) and the Netherlands (27%); both agencies report 
in great detail on their activities undertaken to protect and beneﬁ t consumers and their goal of creating a 
level playing ﬁ eld. Structural policy is a relatively big topic in Singapore’s regulatory agency (13%), which 
states its mission as promoting ‘economic growth, and a sound and progressive ﬁ nancial centre,’118 and 
French regulators (12%), who mention the sustainability of ﬁ nancial markets more often than other 
regulators. The topic of accountability received the widest coverage in the annual reports from Canada 
(16%) and Hong Kong (10%) respectively. The Canadian regulatory agency highlights how it collaborates 
closely with all stakeholders, while the Hong Kong regulatory agency makes a lot of references to how it 
serves the public interest.
Ensuring compliance is a largely technical activity that all regulatory agencies must – irrespective of their 
other priorities – engage in as their day to day commitment to support properly functioning markets. As its 
basic function and irrespective of whatever else it does, a regulatory agency must try and ensure that market 
participants do not manipulate markets and breach securities or banking laws. As expected, our analysis 
shows that regulatory agencies stick closer to the average for the compliance topic than for the other topics; 
that is, the variation in the volume of discussion of compliance is less than for the other topics.
By contrast, topics of stability, consumer protection, structural policy, and accountability constitute broader 
activities in the sense that now all regulatory agencies engage in them. For example, in their annual reports 
the US regulators hardly refer to accountability (1%) and stability (7%), Canadian regulators take little notice 
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of consumer protection (1%), and Swiss regulators pay little attention to structural policies (3%). Indeed, 
the Swiss regulatory agency explicitly mentions that it ‘does not engage in structural policy.’119 We thus 
see that the ten regulatory agencies are less consistent in how much attention they give to each of these 
broader activities.
Our proxy for the diversity of topics covered is the degree to which regulatory agencies focus on the basic 
activity of ensuring compliance. While all regulatory agencies cover the compliance topic, strong variations 
are noticeable in the degree to which they take into account broader topics (stability, consumer protection, 
structural policy, and accountability). In this sense, for example, the United States and Switzerland have a low 
diversity of topics. Their strong focus on compliance (80% in the US and 58% in Switzerland) may give them 
little room to take into account broader topics – or vice versa, their lack of discussion of less technocratic 
topics determines the narrow focus on compliance. By contrast, given a lower coverage of compliance topics 
in Canada (11%), Singapore (23%) and Germany (23%), these regulatory agencies have more leeway to 
explore broader topics. 
Diversity in backgrounds
The second way we analyse the level of diversity in the cultures of regulators is by researching the 
employment background of regulators. Do most regulators within a regulatory agency have a similar 
background or do they come from very different ﬁ elds of work? Do most come from the banking or other 
ﬁ nancial sectors? To get an idea of executive personnel background we used the proprietary business 
intelligence database BoardEx to assess where top executives worked prior to joining the regulatory agency. 
Our decision to look into regulators’ backgrounds is grounded in a large array of academic and journalistic 
articles which, many motivated by the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, decided to consider the formal and informal ties 
between the ﬁ nancial sector and its regulators. This can sometimes be characterised as the ‘revolving door’ 
between the ﬁ nancial sector and regulators. These articles suggest that the ideas and actions of regulators 
can be inﬂ uenced through shared identities and shared networks with ﬁ nancial sector employees. We focus 
speciﬁ cally on the top executives because previous studies have shown that top executives have a very high 
inﬂ uence on an organisation’s culture and policy outcomes.
We began our research with an explorative study into a selection of senior regulators per agency, randomised 
where possible. Where possible we drew our data from the agency’s websites and beyond that from business 
intelligence site BoardEx. We classiﬁ ed the prior work experience of top executives at a regulatory into the 
ﬁ ve categories:  
1. ﬁ nance (banking, asset management, etc.); 
2. insurance, accounting;
3. academia; 
4). law, and; 
5). other (government services, journalism, consulting, etc.). 
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As top executives sometimes worked in different industries we counted connections rather than people. That 
is, if a top executive spent a decade working as a journalist after working a decade as an investment banker, 
this would be counted as two separate connections.
Our ﬁ ndings, as illustrated in the Table at the end of the Appendix, show that there is a difference in the 
level of diversity of pools from which the employees we looked at were drawn: especially the Dutch, US and 
British top level regulators seem to stem from a variety of backgrounds including not only ﬁ nance but also 
business, law, academia and others, such as journalism. In comparison, the Swiss and Irish regulatory agencies 
display less variety.
We then looked more closely at speciﬁ c sectors represented within the regulators’ previous employments 
pool. In this paragraph we wish to highlight several noticeable results. We found, for example, that the Dutch 
agency scored most diverse across the board, with no sector noticeable overshadowing another, and a higher 
level of formers business people and academics than most. The regulatory authorities from the United 
Kingdom, Singapore, France, and Ireland all had comparatively high numbers of former bankers, higher than 
any other. But no regulatory agency was, in our data, so very much dominated by bankers as Swiss regulatory 
agency – together, former bankers (48%) and others former employees from the ﬁ nancial sector make up 
76% of overall connections. The US regulators also showed a high degree of diversity in backgrounds – there, 
notably, we see the largest number of lawyers or other legal professionals employed. The German regulators 
turned up a larger diversity score than many, however, an unusual (in comparison) high concentration of 
former insurance employees – many of which even seemed to have employed by the same insurance ﬁ rm, 
Allianz. This is interesting given that in our content analysis of the BaFin annual report, special attention is 
paid to risk management topics. Singapore and Hong Kong both had an average number of former bankers as 
employees and average amounts of diversity – notably, both employ former senior politicians.
Reviewing our ﬁ ndings given scholarly focus about informal ties between the ﬁ nancial sector and its 
regulators we looked at a simple indication of reliance on the ﬁ nancial sector for an employee pool, and 
received further results. For example, despite the British regulators being one of the most diverse and the 
Swiss regulator one of the least diverse in their overall employee pool in our study, both employ a clear 
majority of ﬁ nancial sector veterans compared to for example Amsterdam, which has a much more evenly 
mixed pool in our database and cannot be said to rely as heavily on one ﬁ eld. Our measure ‘percentage of 
top executive connections to ﬁ nancial sector’ divides the number of connections to the ﬁ nancial sector 
through the overall number of connections.
Relating the culture of regulators to 
regulatory approaches
Figure A4.1 illustrates the ten regulatory agencies and shows large differences in the percentage of 
connections to the ﬁ nancial sector among their executives (vertical axis) and the percentage of compliance 
topics covered in their annual reports (horizontal axis). We see these differences as a signiﬁ cant marker that 
the cultures of regulators vary substantially among the leading ﬁ nancial centres.
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Figure A4.1 - Differences in the culture of regulators in 
leading ﬁ nancial centres
In this section we show that these differences matter for how countries regulate ﬁ nancial markets. 
When looking at policy outcomes, different countries take different approaches to ﬁ nancial regulation, as 
documented in surveys from the World Bank. Based on these surveys, the World Bank economists James 
R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine compare ﬁ nancial regulation in different countries.120 Particularly 
interesting for our context is their index for the strength of ofﬁ cial supervisory power. The authors measure 
supervisory power based on survey questions such as ‘Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change 
its internal organizational structure?’ or ‘Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors?’ These 
authors then analyse how the strength of ofﬁ cial regulatory power has changed over time by comparing 
the years 1999 and 2011 (before and after the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis). They ﬁ nd substantive differences in 
the trajectories of different countries. While the strength of ofﬁ cial regulatory power has increased 
substantially in Canada (+5) and Singapore (+4.3), it became weaker in Ireland (–3) and Hong Kong (–2.4). 
These changes in the strength of ofﬁ cial regulatory power are correlated with the culture or regulators 
as measured by the sum of our two axes. Figure A4.2 shows that countries such as Switzerland or Ireland, 
whose regulatory agencies have a low degree of organisational diversity (that is, given our data they are 
governed by many people with a predominantly ﬁ nancial only background and a strong focus on compliance 
before and above other topics), have weakened the ofﬁ cial regulatory power. By contrast, countries whose 
regulatory agencies have a high degree of organisational diversity, such as Germany or Canada, have 
strengthened their ofﬁ cial regulatory power. The correlation is particularly strong for the European and the 
North American countries.121  
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Figure A4.2 - Correlation between the culture of regulators 
and changes in supervisory power
This correlation indicates that organisational culture could be a factor in determining regulatory activity. 
Our expert interviews conﬁ rm this notion: for example, one top executive from a European regulatory 
agency explained that a change of culture was seen as necessary to implement a more assertive approach 
to ﬁ nancial regulation after the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis. Prior to this change, ‘the policy of ﬁ nancial regulation 
… tended to be inﬂ uenced by a philosophy of encouraging industry.’ Another senior regulator from North 
America notes that they encourage diversity in backgrounds because ‘we found that it is beneﬁ cial 
to have a range of experiences and perspectives around the executive table.’ In addition to expertise from 
the ﬁ nancial sector, their regulatory agency actively aims to bring in ‘people who have deep knowledge 
and understanding of public policy objectives and how public policy works.’
In line with the last statement, academic research also suggests that higher diversity within organisations 
lowers the risks of one-sided information and evidence inﬂ uencing policymakers and targeted regulators. 
In comparison to their international peers, the FCA and PRA have a strong focus on compliance though 
not overly so, as less than half of their reports are devoted to this topic. What stands out is an extended 
focus on consumer protection, which in turn leaves only little space for accountability and structural policies. 
The FCA and PRA seemingly draws their top management from a wide range of diverse sectors, however 
with a strong reliance on the ﬁ nancial sector which twice as many of their top regulators have links to
than to any other sector. 
Our current results suggest that the culture of regulators matters for ﬁ nancial regulation. We ﬁ nd that when 
there is a homogenous culture, ﬁ nancial regulators only tend to focus on a narrow range of topics and issues. 
However when regulators nurture a more diverse culture they consider a wider range of issues. This broader 
perspective can act as a guard against group think.
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Financial regulators around the world have started to reﬂ ect on the role 
which cognitive biases play in ﬁ nancial markets. In particular regulators have 
increasingly sought to use the ﬁ eld of behavioural economics - examining 
how cognitive biases can lead consumers to make predictable mistakes when 
choosing and using ﬁ nancial products. However, there has been little reﬂ ection 
on the role which cognitive biases play within ﬁ nancial regulators or how these 
biases affect the way the regulator’s staff and executives take decisions. 
Cognitive biases are the mental short-cuts which we use to make decisions. 
They are particularly prevalent when we are making decisions under pressure 
or under conditions of uncertainty. Cognitive biases are useful because they 
help us to make decisions quickly. But they are dangerous because they can 
often lead us to incorrect conclusions. 
Cognitive Biases in 
Financial Regulators  
APPENDIX FIVE
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Cognitive Biases
There have been nearly four decades of research on cognitive biases. Psychologists have documented over 
ﬁ fty different cognitive biases. For about a decade, economists have recognised that agents in ﬁ nancial 
markets often fall prey to cognitive biases. A handful of studies have identiﬁ ed the cognitive biases which 
are particular pertinent to ﬁ nancial regulators. Some of the biases which are most pertinent to ﬁ nancial 
regulators include:122  
Bounded search. Financial Regulators often only look for a limited range of problems. These are typically 
shaped by the kinds of problems in which they are skilled and used to ﬁ nding in organisations. Once they 
have found something which resembles one of the limited range of problems which they are looking for, 
then they often select from a very limited range of remedies. This helps to speed up analysis processes, but 
it often leads to misdiagnosis and poor prescriptions of remedy. Problems are only diagnosed when they 
familiar – but many other problems are missed. Regulators only rely on limited range of remedies – which 
could mean other potentially useful regulatory measures are overlooked. For instance, in the lead up to 
the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis, UK regulators normally set rules around the sales process for products and the 
disclosure of information to consumers. This meant they overlooked problems with the products themselves 
and never considered banning products like PPI. Regulators may also fall back on disclosure remedies – 
perhaps based on simplistic statements like ‘Sunlight is the best disinfectant’. Reviewing disclosure materials 
may also be used as a strategy by regulators so that they can say that they are ‘doing something’ about 
a particular market. For example, regulators have responded to complaints about poor outcomes in the 
annuity market by reviewing the letters sent to consumers when they retire – without much overall impact 
on the market.
Bounded Rationality. Financial Regulators are often inundated with information. They receive a constant 
stream of data from the ﬁ rms which they regulate. In addition they receive large amounts of market 
intelligence. The problem is that they are often unable to effectively process all this information. As result, 
they only look at particular pieces of information. This can effectively create tunnel vision where they only 
see information which ﬁ ts, or obviously does not ﬁ t, a pre-existing template. It can mean that information 
which is not neatly picked up by this template is missed. For instance to judge whether a ﬁ rm has appropriate 
conduct, a ﬁ nancial regulator might tick off a series of boxes. Once these boxes are ticked, no other 
information is considered. This can mean regulators neglect huge swathes of data which they actually already 
have. It can also mean that regulators ﬁ nd it hard to be proactive in their policy-making – ignoring a potential 
problem until the evidence of it is overwhelming – by which time it is too late to do anything about it.
Availability, Hindsight and Fundamental Attribution Biases. These are three ways which regulators might 
sort the deluge of information which they are faced with. Availability bias means that they tend to unduly 
focus on the recent or easily available. For instance, if there have been some recent bad news stories about 
a particular ﬁ rm or sector, their attention is likely to be draw in their direction (although the problems in 
the market might be elsewhere). They also suffer from hindsight bias – placing too much emphasis on past 
events which actually occurred (rather than near misses for instance). This can mean that regulatory agencies 
can effectively be regulating for the last crisis. Fundamental attribution bias means we tend to over-estimate 
the role which innate factors play in driving wrong-doers and under-estimate situation factors. This tends to 
mean that once a ﬁ nancial regulator identiﬁ es a problem, it tends to focus on a few suspect ﬁ rms and ignore 
broader structural factors which might have caused these problems. 
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Framing effects. Framing is way which a particular piece of information is presented. Often we judge 
information based on the broader messages around it. Perhaps the most well-known framing effect is 
when something is presented as a loss, then we are more likely to focus on it than if it was framed as a 
gain. Regulators are well known for being particularly prone to this risk aversion, so they will often go out 
of their way to minimise losses and lose sight of potential gains. Similarly, if information is framed in a 
way which resonates with existing values in an organisation then people are more likely to attend to it 
than if it is presented in terms of values which are alien to the organisation. This can lead regulators to pay 
more attention to information which is framed in terms of dominant values or ideas in the regulator.
Overconﬁ dence.  This is the tendency to assume that one is better than one actually is. We typically 
overestimate our abilities and the impact which we have on the world around us. In regulatory organisations, 
this means they are often overconﬁ dent about the efﬁ caciousness of their actions, the accuracy of their 
prescriptions and their organisational abilities. For instance, many ﬁ nancial regulators in the world tend to 
think they are among the best ﬁ nancial regulators in the world. This can mean they are less open to learning 
from others. Similarly, history shows that regulators often display signiﬁ cant conﬁ dence in their regulatory 
system just prior to signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial crises. When setting the new capital requirements for banks the 
Bank of England reduced the amount of capital it thought banks should hold as it believed that the PRA was 
a more effective supervisor than the FSA. The PRA also exhibits overconﬁ dence in believing that it now has 
the tools and ability to close down large banks which run into difﬁ culty without causing ﬁ nancial panic.
Conﬁ rmation Bias. This is the tendency to only seek out information which conﬁ rms our existing point of 
view. Conﬁ rmation bias is particularly pronounced when information is ambiguous and an actor is forced to 
justify their decisions publicly. Financial regulators are often driven by conﬁ rmation bias when they focus 
on information which conﬁ rms their over-arching assumptions of regulatory positions. Once regulations 
are on the books, regulators may feel the need to justify their worth instead of critically evaluating their 
effects. This can mean they entirely miss information which does not conﬁ rm their position. For example, 
the assumption that increased information will help consumers make the right decisions will lead them to 
focus on information provision strategies rather than other issues. This search for evidence with conﬁ rms the 
regulators position is exacerbated by the constant need for ﬁ nancial regulators to justify themselves publicly. 
It often means ﬁ nancial regulators are forced to be overly conﬁ dent about their position in public, but then 
start to believe this overly conﬁ dent position. Conﬁ rmation bias can also occur when regulators only assess 
the costs and the beneﬁ ts of their proposed regulation after the have already decided what to do.
Group think. This occurs when individuals become committed to a group and subsequently they align their 
thinking to ﬁ t with the prevailing consensus in the group. When information is presented which does not 
ﬁ t with the dominant values of the group, it is overlooked. This can often mean that even when individuals 
perceive a problem or disagree with the group, they are willing to overlook it in favour of group consensus. 
In ﬁ nancial regulators this means that once a regulator has taken a particular policy position, members will 
tend to disregard sharing information or opinions which disconﬁ rm this position. This has the advantage of 
afﬁ rming a strong group coherence and corporate culture. But it also comes with the risk that issues which 
don’t neatly ﬁ t with group consensus are overlooked. The risk of group think can be exacerbated if decisions 
within ﬁ nancial regulators are made by committees. 
Social inﬂ uences: Emotions and norms in social interactions are important: regulators may allow themselves 
to be persuaded or trust the person from the bank they are supervising because he or she comes across as 
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‘likeable’ and therefore trustworthy. As regulators have greater social and workplace interaction with those 
from larger institutions they may fail to challenge the decisions made. Regulators may also fail to challenge 
or question social groups to which they think they belong. For example, some people may identify as bankers 
who are just temporarily working in the regulator. Research in the Dutch ﬁ nancial regulators found that 
supervisors with previous tenure in the ﬁ nancial sector are more likely to socially identify with the ﬁ nancial 
sector and that social identiﬁ cation with the ﬁ nancial sector negatively affects supervisors’ task performance.123
Salience and vividness: All of us struggle to give sufﬁ cient attention to complex problems. This can lead 
to people falling back on simplistic soundbites about regulation – ‘principles-based’, ‘outcomes focussed’, 
‘risk-based’. It can also lead to regulators and politicians putting forward arguments like ‘regulation shouldn’t 
constrain innovation’ or ‘consider the unintended consequences’ to argue against proposed regulation. 
De-Biasing 
Each of these cognitive biases are deeply rooted in human cognition. Financial regulators are settings which 
are ideal for cognitive biases to ﬂ ourish: They are overburdened with information, much of the information 
they receive is ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, they are constantly under pressure to 
justify their decisions publicly, in some cases there is a deep rooted culture and individuals stay with the 
organisation for a long period of time, and often organisational members feel embattled by external players. 
All these factors can lead to ﬁ nancial regulators to double down on their judgements – even when this might 
not be justiﬁ ed by the evidence. 
Some measures have been suggested for decreasing cognitive biases, including the follow:124  
Education. By providing additional information which might have been missed which will help to make a 
more rounded choice. For instance, regulators might be given information from experts on current thinking 
about their own and others areas of expertise. 
Awareness of cognitive biases. Simply informing regulatory ofﬁ cials of different cognitive biases is likely 
to make them less likely to fall prey to them. For instance, if they are aware of loss aversion they can correct 
their perceptions when making decisions. However, there is also a danger that awareness about cognitive 
biases can be quickly forgotten, particularly when an individual is faced with a challenging situation. 
Increase Diversity. Teams which are more diverse tend to have a wider range of perspectives and question 
and challenge others perspectives. This means that they are more likely to come to higher quality decisions 
if managed correctly. This could include increasing the diversity of backgrounds of those in the teams. The 
key to unleashing the potential of diverse teams is to ensure that they get their different perspectives and 
assumptions on the table early in a group process. If they hold off and pretend they are all similar, it is likely 
underlying differences will derail the group process later on.
Wisdom of the crowd. Averaging estimates from the predictions of wide group of people often yields 
better predictions than a single or a few experts. This can be done in a number of ways. Regulators could poll 
external audiences on important questions to get a sense of what the average answer might be. Regulators 
could also use internal polling to generate predictions. Finally, teams or even individuals can harness the 
Cultural change in the FCA, PRA and Bank of England  |  143
wisdom of internal crowds by articulating a range of estimates and then averaging. This process often helps 
to break up disciplinary tunnel vision of experts. 
Internal questioning and evaluation. This can be done by appointing devils advocates whose task is to 
question a group. This might slow decision making down, but it generally leads to higher quality decisions. 
Regulators could also ensure all projects have post-mortems and pre-mortems. Post-mortems are the well-
known process of reﬂ ecting on lessons learned from a projects and feeding these forward. Pre-mortems are 
a less well known process whereby actors ask what could go wrong. They do this by doing a short exercise 
whereby at the start of a project they collectively imagine what factors might contribute to the projects 
failure and how they might be ameliorated. All three of these processes can help to temper the optimism of 
individuals, making them less likely to be over-conﬁ dent about their decisions. 
Generating alternatives. This involves at some point of the analysis process seeking to generate as many 
alternative interpretations or courses of action as possible. Although many will be useless, they will often 
help to widen people’s thinking. Research has shown that the more alternatives which are generated in a 
decision making process, the better the eventual decision tends to be.
Modelling. This involves removing expert judgement (and expert bias) from the picture and relying on 
computer models to predict outcomes. This can be done by collecting historical data on a range of input 
and output variables, weighting each variable appropriately and then examining predictions. This can help 
regulators to break up the over-reliance on recent performance on one of two variables. It can help regulators 
realise that often they have been looking at the wrong thing when making judgements. However it is also 
crucial to be aware that computer models also have inbuilt biases which can also skew predictions.  
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Incentives. It is possible to overcome cognitive biases in some cases by adjusting incentive structures. 
For instance, if we remove immediate incentives for quick decisions and increase incentives for longer 
term thinking then it is likely snap decisions most likely to be plagued by bias will be reduced. Similarly, 
if incentives to agree with group consensus are removed then it is likely that more divergent opinions 
will be voiced.
Accountability. Increased accountability can increase the costs of making the wrong decision. By increasing 
accountability, regulators are more likely to be incentivised to carefully consider their decisions and possible 
biases. For instance if regulators are aware that they will be accountable for their decisions through processes 
of public review, they are more likely to thoroughly consider the thinking process rather than come to a 
decision hastily. However, in the realm of ﬁ nancial regulation accountability could, in the ﬁ rst instance be to 
Government ofﬁ cials and politicians who may also be subject to behavioural biases – such as believing that 
the economic and regulatory system that they have designed is superior to other countries.125 
Choice Architecture. By changing the way information is presented to a person, it is possible to increase 
the quality of their decisions. One way to do this is by relying on defaults, where users are automatically 
given a better choice and have to actively opt out of it. This harnesses the power of inertia and automatic 
behaviour. Regulators could harness defaults by considering the kinds of information and the order it is 
presented in to supervisors or enforcement ofﬁ cials. A second way is to introduce nudges which encourage 
reﬂ ection. These are subtle behavioural prompts which force people to stop and reﬂ ect on their decisions 
for a moment. For instance, when making a decision regulators might be prompted to think about risks, the 
dynamics of implement or perhaps alternative scenarios. Another alternative is planned interruptions, where 
regulators are asked to step back and think about their course of action for a moment. Finally, situations can 
be presented to regulators where they have to make an active choice rather than just letting events passively 
run their course. 
Future Oriented Decisions. Regulators can also design choice situations so people make more reasoned 
decisions in the future. Often people’s considerations about the future are more rational than those in the 
present. This can be harnessed through choice in advance, whereby actors have to make a choice about a 
course of action in advance rather than waiting until the last possible time. Building on top of this individuals 
can then be required to pre-commit to actions. This means they have not only made a choice, but there is 
also a potential cost if they back out of that course of action. Another way to do this is through ‘temptation 
bundling’ where a pleasurable activities (incentives) are bundled together with activities which might be 
experienced as costly or unpleasurable in the short term but beneﬁ cial in the longer term. For instance 
regulators could bundle together aspects of their jobs which they enjoy with more painful aspects which 
have longer term payoffs. 
Building social identity as a regulator: This could be done by implementing policies designed to 
reduce social identiﬁ cation with the ﬁ nancial sector particularly for those with extensive prior experience 
of the sector. Stimulating a strong professional identity of being a supervisor, through measures such as 
introductory programmers and follow-up courses, setting up a professional group of ﬁ nancial supervisors 
or stimulating membership of professional groups and professional qualiﬁ cations, are likely to curb 
regulatory capture
Presentation of Information. The ﬁ nal way which regulators can de-bias decisions internally is by 
considering the way which information is presented to ofﬁ cials. For the results of consultations, information 
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could be presented giving equal weight to views of consumers/consumer groups and industry – even if the 
overwhelming majority of response come from the industry. To get around feelings of being overwhelmed, 
regulators could be presented with a few simple but crucial metrics about the ﬁ rms they supervise. These 
may help to draw attention to important factors rather than inducing confusion. Regulators also need to 
carefully consider which information is presented – for instance is it only for this year or is it over a longer 
period of time. By expanding the scale, people can come to more reasoned decisions. Regulators also need 
to consider how this information is framed. For instance, if it is framed as a loss then others are more likely 
to act on it than if it is framed as a gain. Using graphic or pictorial representations of complex data can also 
help individuals to process it and incorporate it into their decision making. Finally, providing social norms can 
also prompt desirable behaviour. For instance if regulators are provided with information about averages on 
certain metrics and where a supervised ﬁ rm sits in relationship to these averages, if may prompt a closer look 
at under-performing ﬁ rms.  
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